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Abstract 
 
Qui tam is the process whereby an individual sues or prosecutes in the name of the 
government and shares in the proceeds of any successful litigation or settlement. The Latin 
name points to the long history of the legislation, which was created in the ancient times. The 
qui tam authorises private citizens with non-public information relating to the fraud to bring 
suit on behalf of the government even without prosecutorial endorsement. Qui tam is 
generally a civil procedure, and the individual need not have been a victim of the misconduct. 
The aim of this research is to contribute to the original knowledge by providing an analysis of 
the qui tam legal concept in its historical evolution in a space of time through two millennia, 
with main focus on two primary common law jurisdictions – the United Kingdom and USA. 
The hypothesis underlying the research is that under certain conditions pursuing goal to 
better and more efficiently exercise some of its functions the state following qualitative 
changes in a socio-economic environment may delegate part of its authority to the citizens, 
and provide them with selectively adopted set of pecuniary and non-pecuniary incentives to 
accept this authority. The hypothesis is tried with analysis from the following perspectives: 
macro level - state regulatory practice, and socio-economic development; corporate level -- 
cost of compliance, and corporate response; basic level -- personal motives, and risks for 
actual and potential whistleblowers. 
The conceptual framework applied is based on the economic analysis of law, which focuses 
on the economic efficiency of legal rules. The starting point of the research is the assumptions 
that legal rules ought to be efficient, and that individuals respond to legal rules economically. 
However the analysis goes beyond the fundamentalist strong-form rationality assumption, 
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which implies that economic agents always make choices that maximise their own welfare.  
For the purposes of this research, the people are viewed as weakly rational – rational, but 
subject to some consistent deviations. Methodologically the research borrows from the 
behavioural economic theory its attention to such factors as frame dependence and 
inefficient markets. 
The analysis shows that qui tam regulations have decentralised the problem of enforcement, 
which apart from tackling the inevitable bureaucratic inaptitude, significantly reduces its 
costs. With respect to more traditional forms of monitoring and regulatory control such a 
system has proven to offer solid advantages. First of all, it does not require setting up a costly 
structure. The financial sophistication, and organisational complexity, combined with 
technical ingenuity and elaboration of the contemporary big business present a cognitive 
challenge for the investigative and prosecutorial agencies. To investigate white-collar crime 
they have to spend increasingly huge resources, both financial and intellectual. The relative 
scarcity of these resources in the post-crisis developed economies has paved way for the qui 
tam legislation to give governments chance to catch up. 
 
From the narrow regulatory point of view, the bounty system imposes a downward shift in 
costs of compliance – from the regulator to a corporate level, – because it does not require 
significant increase in regulators’ staff and budgets. The macroeconomic approach, which 
focuses on the costs and benefits on a much wider scale, brings in a more complicated picture, 
when potential short-term increase in costs on a corporate level are offset on a longer-term 
time scale by rising economic efficiency as a result of reduced losses through corporate fraud 
and government imposed fines, increased public trust, and improved corporate governance. 
 4 
From the point of view of the lawmakers, by creating competition for enforcement, qui tam 
laws reduce the chances that the potential enforcer is bought off, thus providing some 
additional efficiency through the dual enforcement model. This leads the research to 
conclude on the motives and logic that stand behind the state, which in such way delegates 
part of its authority:  the qui tam have always been popular with ruling classes for the same 
reason in the past as well as at present times – under public pressure to prosecute more 
effectively misdeeds and fraud the society decries as inacceptable, legislative bodies enhance 
qui tam, when they consider the enforcement of some law beyond the unaided capacity, or 
interest of law enforcement officials. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 5 
Table of Contents 
 
Introduction             7 
 
Chapter I 
Advent and Decline of Qui Tam Laws in Europe and Evolution of Qui Tam Laws 
in the United States           18 
 
Early evolution of Qui Tam         23 
The Rise and Decline of Qui Tam Laws in England      32 
Early American Experience         44 
Birth of the False Claims Act         47 
Citizens’ suit vs. Qui Tam         50 
1943 Retrenchment          53 
Qui Tam on Offensive         56 
2009-2010 Amendments: All-Purpose Antifraud Statute     61 
 Constitutional Pass          74 
 Conclusions           83 
 
Chapter II 
Literature Review           85 
  
 Literature on the historical development of the qui tam legislation   87 
 Literature on qui tam in the contemporary USA     110 
 Academic literature on whistleblowing and whistle-blowers’ protection  164 
  
 6 
Conclusions          177 
 
 
  
Chapter III 
Law and Economics Analysis of Qui Tam Legal Concept     180 
  
 Analysing Qui Tam in the Context of Public vs. Private Enforcement  193 
 Applying Coasean Framework to the Law Enforcement     210 
Modelling a Qui Tam Mechanism within Regulatory Enforcement Policy  220 
Economic Analysis of Qui Tam Relators’ Behaviour     238 
Qui Tam and the Optimal Regulatory Design of the Bounty Based Public-Private 
Model of Enforcement        258 
Qui Tam as a Most Effective Mechanism of the Public-Private Enforcement 266 
 Qui Tam vs. Administrative Drift or Capture      277 
 
Qui Tam and Information Asymmetry      290 
 
Qui Tam Enforcement and a Corporation: Empirical Evidence of  
Mutual Benefit         299 
 
 
 
Conclusions          320 
 
Table of Cases         326 
 
 Bibliography          333 
 
  
 7 
Introduction 
 
The aim of the research is to describe and analyse the qui tam legal concept as a complex 
legal phenomenon in its evolution in a space of time as long as 20 centuries in primary 
common law jurisdictions – the United Kingdom and USA.  
The phrase “qui tam” comes from a longer one -- qui tam pro domino rege, &c, quam pro se 
ipso in hac parte sequitur”, which might read in full as “he who brings this following matter 
for my Lord the King and who as well who brings this following matter for himself.”1  
Though it would be unfair to claim that qui tam is an obscure legal concept, while in fact it is 
rather well represented in academic literature, as well as in professional publications for 
acting lawyers. However, the focus of analysis has been so far on just one of its aspects – 
incentives for and status of whistle-blowers. Indeed, in the eyes of the US lawmakers and 
power wielding agencies qui tam is a delegation of some prosecutorial authority to the 
whistle-blowers, who step in the shoes of the government to bring to the court of law cases 
to fight alleged wrongdoings. 
What is customarily omitted is the other side of the power sharing equation -- the state. When 
someone is authorised to exercise some prosecutorial powers, it means the state disperses 
part of its authority to a citizen. The motives of the altruist whistle-blowers – the activist 
                                                          
1 Blackstone explained that the phrase “qui tam” originates from the one, which he abbreviated to qui tam pro 
domino rege, &c, quam pro se ipso in hac parte sequitur” (Blackstone, pp. 161-162 [online] available at: < 
http://www.lonang.com/exlibris/blackstone/ > (accessed on 4 September 2014). Taking the “&c” into account, 
the phrase English reading might be as follows: “He who brings this following matter for my Lord the King and 
who as well who brings this following matter for himself.” In any event, later courts and commentators usually 
drop at least the “&c” from Blackstone’s quote, see e.g., Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United States 
ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 768 n.1 (2000) 
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citizens, driven by some sense of a moral duty – are relatively well analysed in academic 
literature. The same can be said about qui tam relators -- not so altruist citizens, motivated 
primarily by the pecuniary considerations, or bounty they receive as a part of the remedial 
proceeds. 
The motives and logic that stand behind the state, which delegates part of its authority, are 
limited to the observation, that qui tam have always been popular with ruling classes for the 
same reason in the past as well as at present times: legislative bodies have authorised it when 
they consider the enforcement of some law beyond the unaided capacity (or interest) of law 
enforcement officials2.  
Sometimes qui tam is misunderstood as an American invention attributed to the more or less 
modern times – XIX century, when in a midst of the Civil War the Congress passed the False 
Claims Act, aimed at tackling fraud in government procurement by offering huge bounties to 
those relators, who would bring the cases to the court of law. 
The fact that qui tam has existed since the ancient times remains obscured, although it is well 
known to those scholars, who declared their opposition to it. Those who are well introduced 
to the long history of this legal principle, mostly view it as a “barbarous relic”, following the 
famous remark of the British economist John Maynard Keynes3. They argue that qui tam was 
a necessary tool, which empowered underdeveloped executive powers of the ancient and 
medieval sovereigns to exercise prosecution more effectively, and keep proper order among 
their subjects4. The rise of a modern state, capable to police, investigate, and prosecute 
                                                          
2S. Rept. No. 77-1708, at 2 (1942), and H. Rept. No. 78-263 at 2 (1943), each quoting from a letter by Attorney 
General Biddle 
3 Keynes, J.M. (2000). A Tract on Monetary Reform. Prometheus Books, p. 172 
4 Beck, J.R., The False Claims Act and The English Eradication of Qui Tam Legislation, 78 North Carolina Law 
Review 539-642 (1999-2000); Deutsch (2010), supra note 140 at 35 
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wrongdoings and offenses in the society, makes qui tam irrelevant, and ultimately redundant. 
Moreover, some argue that the very concept of a modern police force and prosecution is 
undermined by the existence of qui tam. The invective “viperous vermin”5, -- used in the XVII 
to decry those who abused qui tam laws as delators, damaging social homogeneity and 
economic stability, -- from the point of view of the modern critics, is even more applicable to 
the contemporary qui tam relators6.  
While such criticism warrants some merits the underlying logic fails properly explain the fact 
that qui tam has enjoyed a revival and expansion since the 1980s, and at present, it is turned 
into all-powerful weapon by the US Congress. 
The research question of this work therefore is: what makes the qui tam a viable concept, in 
spite of being abolished in the UK, it resurrected in the USA, and to date has much wider 
scope than 150 years ago – now it is related not only to the fraud with government 
procurement, but to all sorts of wrongdoings in a financial sector? And can qui tam enjoy 
revival, and expand even further to be employed in criminal prosecution? 
For the purposes of this research the qui tam is examined as one of a dual nature, stemming 
from interaction between a state and an activist part of its citizenry. This approach puts more 
emphasis on an underlying logic and motivation of the executive branch to cede part of its 
                                                          
5 Coke, E. (1669). The Third Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England, [online] available at: 
<http://books.google.co.uk/books?id=E5A0AAAAIAAJ&printsec=titlepage#v=onepage&q&f=false> (accessed 
on 29 August 2011), p.194 
6CATO Institute repeatedly pointed out that qui tam actions had the potential to seriously damage US economy. 
Its experts were actively involved in successfully challenging constitutionality of the qui tam provisions of the US 
Patent Law (see: http://www.cato-at-liberty.org/catos-first-brief-in-a-patent-case-on-constitutional-grounds/) 
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authority to the citizens, rather than on a set of rules encouraging people activists to combat 
fraud by a mix of pecuniary and non-pecuniary incentives. 
The scope of research extends to the analysis of the interaction between the state and 
whistle-blowers (actual and potential) with the third party always present – the corporate 
sector, as a main target of relators’ activities. As if emphasising that the prime suspect is the 
big business US lawmakers introduced a threshold of $1 million remedies a potential qui tam 
case may bring to qualify for bounty7. Although the critique of the qui tam based on the 
assumptions about its dubious moral grounds and potential to undermine social stability8 
does not prove to have much ground, the ability of qui tam actions to raise the costs and 
reduce efficiency in corporate sector, as some of the unforeseen externalities of the new 
legislation begin to bite, requires additional research. 
The hypothesis underlying this research is that under certain conditions pursuing goal to 
better and more efficiently exercise some of its functions the government following 
qualitative changes in a socio-economic environment may delegate part of its authority to the 
citizens, and provide them with selectively adopted set of pecuniary and non-pecuniary 
incentives to accept this authority. 
                                                          
7 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (An Act to Promote the Financial Stability 
of the United States by Improving Accountability and Transparency in the Financial System, to End ‘Too Big to 
Fail’, to Protect the American Taxpayer by Ending Bailouts, to Protect Consumers from Abusive Financial Services 
Practices, and for Other Purposes), Pub. L. 111-203, H.R. 4173. Other names of the statute include Financial 
Reform Act and Financial Transparency and Accountability Act. Hereafter the Dodd-Frank Act is cited from: 
<http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-111hr4173ENR/pdf/BILLS-111hr4173ENR.pdf> (accessed on 27 
November 2014) 
8 De Maria, W, (2001). Designing Dynamic Disclosure Law. Submission to the Senate Finance and Public 
Administration Legislation Committee Inquiry into the Public Interest Disclosure Bill 2001 [online] available at: 
<www.aph.gov.au/~/media/wopapub/senate/sub02_doc.ashx>  (accessed on 2 October 2015) 
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The hypothesis will be tried with analysis from the following perspectives: macro level - state 
regulatory practice, and socio-economic development; corporate level -- cost of compliance, 
and corporate response; basic level -- personal motives, and risks of actual and potential 
whistle-blowers. 
On a macro level, the advent of global corporations stemming from the paradigm shift in 
production toward the network model, and deregulation of financial markets, has fostered 
their growing power and effectiveness beyond and above the boundaries of nation states9. 
The global corporations have effectively surpassed the jurisdiction and authority of the state 
in the countries of their origin. At the same time the financial sophistication, and 
organisational complexity, combined with technical ingenuity and elaboration of the 
contemporary big business present a cognitive challenge for the investigative and 
prosecutorial agencies in the modern states. To investigate white-collar crime they have to 
spend increasingly huge resources, both financial and intellectual. 
 
In theory, the law enforcement can respond along the following lines: 
 By adopting supranational legislation, and developing supranational organisations, 
wielded with powers and authorities, transferred from the national level; 
 By strengthening international cooperation in corporate crime investigations between 
the national peers, and developing relevant regulatory frameworks; 
 By increasing efforts and allocating additional resources on a national level; 
 By adopting new legislation with a purpose to decriminalise what currently constitutes 
corporate crime. 
 
                                                          
9 Hardt, M. and Negri, A. (2000). Empire. Harvard University Press, Cambridge and London, p. xii 
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So far the predictions about the rise of the international organisations has only partially come 
to fruition -- the body of supranational laws may impress none, but the members of the 
European Union; international cooperation is in constant fight with beg-thy-neighbour 
mentality; and the only way to stand up to the challenge is to constantly increase the efforts 
on a national level. 
 
Nationally decriminalisation still remains theory, and national governments after the latest 
financial crisis combined with what is called the Great Recession is under significant financial 
stress. The budget that they can allocate to the corporate fraud investigations is limited at 
best in an era of austerity and budget cuts. The ability of governments to borrow also 
challenged. Taking in consideration that from the historic perspective, the rise of the 
government bureaucracies and state budgets, based on extensive taxation, is a relatively 
young phenomenon of the late XIX-XX centuries, it is possible to hypothesise that 
governments may employ selected relevant elements of policies from not so far past. Thus, 
before the formation of the colonial administrations into formidable power structures the 
British and Dutch governments in XVII-XVIII centuries effectively exercised control over vast 
parts of their colonial empires through the private enterprises – the respective East India 
companies10. This legacy is unlikely to be recovered, but the qui tam is here to stay, and has 
potential to expand further. 
 
From narrow regulatory point of view, the bounty system imposes a downward shift in costs 
of compliance – from the regulator to a corporate level – because it does not require 
                                                          
10 The Dutch East India Company was dissolved in 1800 (Ricklefs, M.C., (1991). A History of Modern Indonesia 
Since c.1300, 2nd ed. MacMillan, London. p. 110); the British East India Company was brought under the Queen’s 
rule in 1858, and dissolved in 1874 (Lawson, Ph., (1993). The East India Company: A History.  Addison Wesley 
Longman, Harlow. pp. 160-163) 
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significant increase in regulators’ staff and budgets. The macroeconomic approach, which 
focuses on the costs and benefits -- while affecting the national economy -- shifts to the 
corporate level the problem of the externalities brought by the new regulation. This problem 
arises in a peculiar inverse version of the Piguvian framework11 of approach to regulation: the 
externalities of the Government intervention reduce the efficiency of the market and damage 
the economy12. Though assessing the extent of such damage is not a straightforward task -- 
thus, while indicating what the cost of different elements of the financial reform will be 
analysts sometimes miss to assess the ability of corporations to generate new revenue 
streams to offset the ones that are being lost. As a result, the externality of the reform may 
start bite, and this in its turn will require new legislative efforts to repair the externality, so 
that the resulting accumulated economic costs of the new regulations may turn out to be 
higher than expected. 
On a corporate level the expansion of qui tam to some extent reflects the failure of the legal 
view on who should lead the fight against corporate fraud – i.e. shareholders. They do not. 
According to Dyck et al., 11.2-13.6 per cent of all firms in the US have on-going fraud, of which 
only 3.2 per cent are eventually caught. As a result, estimated up to 3.5 per cent of equity 
value is lost due to fraud13. Another research shows that the percentage of fraud detected by 
whistle-blowers jumps from 14 to 41 per cent when moving from financial to healthcare 
fraud, where the False Claim Act with its qui tam provisions applied at the time of the 
research14. 
                                                          
11 Pigou, A., (1938). The Economics of Welfare, MacMillan, London 
12 Zingales, L., The Future of Securities Regulation (29 January 2009). Chicago Booth School of Business 
Research Paper No. 08-27; FEEM Working Paper No. 7.2009. [online] Available at: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1319648 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1319648 (accessed on 30 April 2010) 
13 Alexander Dyck et al., Who Blows the Whistle on Corporate Fraud?, 65 Journal of Finance 2213 (2010) 
14 Ibid. 
 14 
 
On a basic level – personal – the analysis’ prime focus is on the potential whistle-blowers, 
though it is worth mentioning that the qui tam not necessarily implies whistle-blowers -- 
presumably the corporate employees who disclose corporate fraud. The qui tam concept 
deals with “relators”, who may be most likely, the employees, but as well may be a third party, 
who is in possession of the relevant information. 
Whatever they can be the key question remains the same: What is the real personal cost to 
blow the whistle? Potential relators would weigh the possibility of a reward against a number 
of opposing considerations: the likelihood of information they submitted actually being used, 
and whether the use would result in a successful legal proceeding; whether they would lose 
their own income; whether they would incur personal legal liability for their own part in the 
scheme; whether they would lose their anonymity; whether they would become a target of 
retaliation in the workplace and subject of alienation from colleagues. There is a threat that 
they are will be blacklisted by the peer companies and will lose not only the current income, 
but also any future income in the well-paid financial sector. What happens after the whistle 
is blown? Nick Perry's 1998 sociological analysis15 comments that the case material indicates 
that the characteristic trajectory of whistle-blowers’ careers is, with few exceptions, a 
downward spiral. There is the further prospect that this will be linked to a blame-the-victim 
strategy. Whistleblowing might well be classified, therefore, as a form of occupational suicide 
- or perhaps as accidental career death16. High reward aims to solve the basic problem that it 
is too expensive to an employee to guard the law. 
                                                          
15 Perry, N., Indecent Exposures: Theorizing Whistle-blowing. 19 (2) Organization Studies 235-257 (1998) 
16 Ibid. 
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From the societal perspective, the qui tam allows citizens to become public prosecutors to 
fight corporate crime on behalf of the society as a whole. But, as De Maria comments17, 
whistleblowing is a complex social phenomenon. Solo acts of disclosure in the public interest 
-- whistleblowing -- are both pro-social and anti-social. It is good for society because it exposes 
wrongdoing and “it gives a battery charge to tired old democracy”, and it help establish moral 
heroes to follow. But whistleblowing erodes trust among work colleagues. There is no 
discrimination between whistleblowing and dobbing: “In our consciousness these are 
scrambled -- we hate dobbers and we will continue to confuse them with whistle-blowers for 
at least another generation”18. He suggests that there is a cost as "we move from a work 
culture where no one would, or could disclose, to one where today's workmate could be 
tomorrow's informer"19. 
This research, however, shows that by undermining groupthink, and cosy old schoolboy club 
atmosphere the qui tam concept serves the society in a much more efficient way. The 
corporations have never been mafia-style run organisations, which members plead blind 
allegiance to. The employees are not bound by the code of omerta. As multibillion fines show, 
the work ethic that encourages disclosure of any wrongdoing eventually proves the best way 
to promote loyalty to the ultimate bosses of a corporation – the shareholders, as well as to 
all its other stakeholders, including society as a whole. 
The fact that qui tam is an ancient legal concept which has been evolving through twenty five 
centuries in different countries, cultures and jurisdictions puts particular significance to the 
                                                          
17 De Maria, W., (1998). Whistleblowers Left With No More Than a Squeak. The Whistle [online] available at: 
<http://www.bmartin.cc/dissent/contacts/au_wba/whistle199803.html  > (accessed on 18 March 2012) 
18 Ibid. [online] 
19 Ibid. [online] 
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context -- whether moral, ethical, political or economic – in which the concept is analysed. 
Without a context the meaning of the concept becomes blurred. This distinguishing 
characteristic of qui tam predetermined the choice of the underlying methodology of this 
research. The conceptual framework must be flexible enough to embrace the complexity of a 
three-level analysis, while contemporary literature on the subject yields only its multi-
fractured image. The analysis is carried out from the perspective of the law and economics, 
but devolved from its traditional efficiency-oriented frame of reference, preoccupied with 
mathematical models, which was its core in the 1970-1980s. 
Economic analysis of law has evolved a lot in recent years, and its actual insights reach far 
beyond the theses professed by the efficiency approach initiated more than four decades ago.
 
Law and economics has become a vast and heterogeneous discipline, reflecting several 
traditions, sometimes competing and sometimes complementary, including the Chicago 
School of Law and Economics, the New Haven School, Public Choice theory, Institutional Law 
and Economics, New Institutional Law and Economics and Austrian Law and Economics. The 
Austrian outlook is based on a traditional understanding of law, so the main assessments 
focus on the impact of the policy measure at issue upon the processes through which 
individual learning and behavioural changes take place over time20. By accentuating evolution 
and individuals’ perspective, the socially sensitive Austrian approach provides this research 
with a relevant framework to lead a malty-layered view of its analysis.  
The rest of the research proceeds as follows. 
                                                          
20 Crespi, G. S. Exploring the Complicationist Gambit: an Austrian Approach to the Economic Analysis of Law, 73 
Notre-Dame Law Review 2 (1998), p. 16 
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Chapter I describes the phenomenon of qui tam through its millennia long evolution in the 
UK and the USA by putting it in historical and economic context. 
Chapter II reviews the literature on qui tam as one of the historically most efficient and 
successful models of private enforcement, though a very divisive subject of academic 
research. 
Chapter III presents a conceptual framework, based on the works applying economic methods 
in analysis of law, and applies the framework to explaining historical role of qui tam, the roots 
of its recent revival in the United States, and presents the contemporary analysis of qui tam 
on macro-, corporate and personal levels. 
Conclusions follow. 
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Chapter I 
Advent and Decline of Qui Tam Laws in Europe and Evolution of Qui Tam Laws in the 
United States 
 
 
The aim of this chapter is to render the extensive description of the qui tam as a legal 
phenomenon, and present an evolution of the qui tam laws in England and USA within their 
historical and socio-economic context. Being highly context sensitive the qui tam legislation 
was shaped by the context, representing political, economical and societal change though its 
history. As will be shown this context is determinant of the qui tam evolution and forestall its 
development. This chapter is looking for an answer to the question, what stands behind 
remarkable vitality of the qui tam, which history exceeds 25 centuries, laying foundation for 
the further analysis of its recent development, present state, and possible future, carried out 
in the following chapters.  
 
Qui tam is the process whereby an individual sues or prosecutes in the name of the 
government and shares in the proceeds of any successful litigation or settlement. The name 
qui tam is the shortened version of an abbreviated Latin phrase qui tam pro domino rege 
quam pro se ipso in hac parte sequitur, meaning “(he) who brings an action for the king as 
well as for himself (in this case)"21. While the government may bring suit to recover losses 
from breach of law without cooperation from private citizens, the qui tam also authorises 
private citizens with non-public information relating to the fraud to bring suit on behalf of the 
                                                          
21 Blackstone, supra note 1 at 7, pp. 161-162 [online] 
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government. These whistle-blower22 (or qui tam relator) suits entitle the claimant to receive 
a percentage of the recovery for the government23, that percentage varying from 10 to 30 per 
cent, depending upon whether or not the government itself intervenes in the suit24. In some 
cases relators in some patent and Indian protection qui tam cases were entitled to half of the 
recovery25. 
 
A creature of antiquity – a period of history, when state institutions were embryonic and law 
enforcement mostly private – this practice was common in medieval England even before the 
dawn of the common law. Later it successfully established itself in a common law tradition. 
 
While being close relatives, the qui tam legislations of these countries historically developed 
in different ways, having moved since mid-XIX century in precisely opposite directions. The 
dawn of the qui tam in the United Sates coincided with dusk of this sort of legislation in the 
UK. Abandoned in the UK sixty years ago qui tam provisions have survived in the United 
States. While Congress moved to supplement public enforcement with qui tam enforcement, 
the movement in England was in precisely the opposite direction: toward purely public 
implementation of penal statutes. 
 
                                                          
22The Dodd-Frank Act explicitly defines whistleblower in a broader sense: “The term ‘whistleblower’ means any 
individual, or 2 or more individuals acting jointly, who provides information relating to a violation of this Act to 
the Commission, in a manner established by rule or regulation by the Commission” (Commodities Futures Trading 
Commission – CFTC, in case of Commodity whistleblower incentives and protection) or “of the securities laws to 
the Commission, in a manner established, by rule or regulation, by the Commission” (Securities and Exchange 
Commission – SEC, in case of Whistleblower protection in securities regulation). [Emphasis in italic added]. 
Noticeably, the Act denies recognition to organisations as potential whistleblowers. (The Dodd-Frank Act, supra 
note 7 at 10 [online]) 
23Plus costs and attorneys’ fees 
24 Dodd-Frank Act in regard to the financial fraud requires the total sum of recoveries to exceed $1mln, as a 
precondition of eligibility to get a reward (The Dodd-Frank Act, supra note 7 at 7) 
25 Patent and Indian protection in Doyle, Ch. Qui Tam: The False Claims Act and Related Federal Statutes. CRS 
Report to Congress -- R40785, August 6, 2009 
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Comparative analysis proves that these differences reflect also two different approaches to 
the concept of whistleblowing, the personal motives of the potential whistle-blowers, and 
systems of their protection and rewarding.  
 
In the United Kingdom Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998 makes the whistleblowing law part 
of the UK's employment legislation by inserting its main provisions into a new part, Part 4A, 
of the Employment Rights Act 199626 to protect a broad range of employees. 
Part 4A explains that for the whistleblowing protection to apply the information must concern 
some wrongdoing (section 43B)27: 
(1) in this Part a "qualifying disclosure" means any disclosure of information, which, in the 
reasonable belief of the worker making the disclosure, is made in the public interest and tends 
to show one or more of the following: 
(a) that a criminal offence has been committed, is being committed or is likely to be 
committed, 
 
(b) that a person has failed, is failing or is likely to fail to comply with any legal 
obligation to which he is subject, 
 
(c) that a miscarriage of justice has occurred, is occurring or is likely to occur, 
(d) that the health or safety of any individual has been, is being or is likely to be 
endangered, 
 
                                                          
26 The Public Concern at Work [online] available at: < http://www.pcaw.org.uk/pida-43a-f > (accessed on 8 
September 2015) 
27 Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998, CHAPTER 23 /An Act to protect individuals who make certain disclosures 
of information in the public interest; to allow such individuals to bring action in respect of victimisation; and for 
connected purposes, [online], available at <http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1998/23 >  (accessed on 8 
September 2015) 
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(e) that the environment has been, is being or is likely to be damaged, or 
(f) that information tending to show any matter falling within any one of the preceding 
paragraphs has been, is being or is likely to be deliberately concealed. 
 
Another condition for the disclosure to qualify for the protection is that the disclosure must 
be made in one of more than six ways (sections 43C-43H)28: 
 Disclosure to employer or other responsible person 
 Disclosure to legal adviser, if it is made in the course of obtaining legal advice 
 Disclosure to Minister of the Crown 
 Disclosure to prescribed person 
 Disclosure of exceptionally serious failure 
 Disclosure in other cases. 
 
The law stipulates that it does not matter whether the person to whom the disclosure is made 
is already aware of the information (section 43L)29. 
This broad grant of protection is nevertheless limited by the requirement that the employee 
have acted in good faith, as the law explicitly withholds protection from whistle-blowers who 
act for personal gain. UK approach, at least in theory, relies on a broad, non-subject-matter 
based protection for whistle-blowers, which relies on moral and ethical obligations instead of 
bounties30. 
 
                                                          
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Elletta Sangrey Callahan et al., Whistleblowing: Australian, U.K., and U.S. Approaches to Disclosure in the 
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The US lawmakers believe that by empowering private persons to initiate lawsuits against 
fraud, and guaranteeing them a portion of the government’s recovery, the government is able 
to punish more fraud against the United States than the Department of Justice could on its 
own31. Qui tam suits create a significant financial incentive for whistle-blowers to come 
forward, and they allow the government to avoid diverting resources to litigating fraud claims 
that are weaker than others, but may still ultimately be successful. 
 
Being deeply enrooted in the very fabric of American society, qui tam since 1986 have been 
enjoying renaissance due to concerted efforts set by both legislative and executive branches.  
Today qui tam lives on in federal law in four principal statutes: the False Claims Act32, Fraud 
Enforcement and Recovery Act33, Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act34 and Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act35. In two minor examples it was 
present in Patent Act, which Section 292 before it was amended in 2011 had been recognised 
as a qui tam statute36; and Indian protection law, which Section 201 enacted in 1834, and still 
active, authorises qui tam actions for five different violations37. Additionally, Deficit Reduction 
Act of 2005 offers a set of economic incentives to encourage every state without its own state 
false claims act with qui tam provisions to adopt one38. 
 
                                                          
31 Davis, M.S. The Effects of False Claims Act Whistleblowers on the Pharmaceutical Industry. Working Paper 10-
0-6612, Harvard Law School, May 2006 
 
3231 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733, as amended, 2009 
33Public Law 111-21, 123 Stat. 1617-1621 (2009)  
34Public Law 111-148 & 111-152 (2010) 
35Public Law 111-203 (2010)  
36U.S. Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. 292, as amended, 1994 and 2011 
37Indian Protection, 25 U.S.C. 201, 1834 
38 Public Law 109-171 (2006) 
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What makes the scope of the qui tam actions in USA so broad is that although frequently 
punitive, it is generally, a civil procedure. Unlike antitrust laws, Racketeer Influenced and 
Corrupt Organizations Act39 (RICO), and other federal punitive damage private attorney 
general provisions40, the individual need not have been a victim of the misconduct to litigate. 
These same incentives that justify the government’s endorsement of qui tam suits, however, 
also constitute the reasons to fear that qui tam suits will be abused and lead to excessive 
litigation. Reviled at various times throughout the ages as a breeding ground for “viperous 
vermin” and “parasites”41, qui tam nevertheless have been popular with governments for the 
same reason as at present times: legislative bodies have authorised it when they consider the 
enforcement of some law beyond the solitary capacity, or interest of law enforcement 
officials42. 
 
The critics of American qui tam statutes often point out that the US legal system still relies on 
a British legacy, which Britain itself abandoned more than 60 years ago43. The closer look at 
the legal and – even more significant – economic and political logic, which determined the 
abolishing of qui tam in England, however, does not provide conclusive arguments for the 
opponents of qui tam. On the contrary, it casts doubt whether historical analysis can augment 
the challenge to the effectiveness of qui tam in the contemporary United States. 
 
Early evolution of Qui Tam 
 
                                                          
39 18 U.S.C. § 1961–1968 
 
41Coke, supra note 5 at 9, p.194 
42S. Rept. No. 77-1708, at 2 (1942), and H. Rept. No. 78-263 at 2 (1943), each quoting from a letter by Attorney 
General Biddle 
43 Beck (2000), supra note 4 at 8 
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English qui tam statutes had historical antecedents in Greek and Roman, and Anglo-Saxon 
law. 
 
The first written evidence of what later became known as qui tam can be found in ancient 
Greece. As a result of the legislation by the Athenian statesman Solon (circa 640-560BC) the 
so-called sukophantai (sycophants) came into being44. Since there was no police force in the 
ancient Greek states, it was a growing necessity to find ways of bringing to court those who 
had harmed individual citizens. Solon, arguing that “the best governed state was one in which 
those who were not wronged were as diligent in prosecuting criminals as those who had 
personally suffered”45, ruled that for certain types of offence, “anyone who wanted to” could 
bring a case to court46. Those cases offered financial rewards for a successful prosecution, but 
having been wise to prevent abuse Athenians established several policies intended to reduce 
sycophancy47. 
 
First, they instituted punishments – ranging from monetary fines to a prohibition on bringing 
additional prosecutions to full disenfranchisement – for voluntary prosecutors who failed to 
gather a fifth of the jurors’ votes, or dropped prosecutions before completion48. In addition, 
many public suits required deposits to be paid in advance (the proceeds from public suits 
                                                          
44Original meaning is “fig-revealers”. The term is conventionally transliterated as “sycophant” or “sykophant,” 
but the English adjective “sycophantic” derives from a later, post-classical development in the meaning of the 
word (Todd, S.C. (2003). A Glossary of Athenian Legal Terms, Demos, p.49) 
45Osborne, R. (2010). Athens and Athenian Democracy. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 
46 Fleck, R.K. and Hanssen, F.A. (2011). On the Benefits and Costs of Legal Expertise: Adjudication in Ancient 
Athens (online), at: < 
https://www.google.co.uk/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=4&ved=0CDEQFjAD&url=https%3A%2
F%2Fwww.aeaweb.org%2Faea%2F2012conference%2Fprogram%2Fretrieve.php%3Fpdfid%3D501&ei=SxOYVZj
zAsHq7AbR_LKAAw&usg=AFQjCNESyh_tSAWhAIz2ZRG4rBM9Pm4xJQ&bvm=bv.96952980,d.ZGU&cad=rja> 
[accessed on 27 August 2014] 
47Aristotle. (2013). The Athenian Constitution. Start Publishing LLC 
48Bonner, R.J. (1969). Lawyers and Litigants in Ancient Athens. Benjamin Blom, New York, p.64 
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were shared with the state) – those were forfeit, if the case was lost49. For example, claimants 
to property confiscated by the state were required to post one-fifth the estate’s value50. 
 
Furthermore, citizens who believed themselves targeted by a sycophant could bring counter-
suits charging prosecution without justification -- and this was used most frequently in 
maritime disputes51. Finally, the Assembly could charge a man directly with sycophancy, 
although the rules made this a rare case. The Assembly heard accusations no more than once 
a year, and the penalty could be applied only to three citizens and three foreign residents 
annually. The penalty was a fine set by a court in a separate hearing52. 
 
In two centuries the sycophants became so common that even could find themselves in 
theatre. In Aristophanes’ comedy Wealth (another title Plutus) (388BC), the sycophant 
became impoverished because the blind god Wealth/Plutus had his sight restored, and could 
finally see who deserved to be rich. He lamented his “patriotic martyrdom”, claiming that, as 
“unofficial superintendent of all public and private affairs” he was simply “seeking to help my 
beloved city to the utmost of my ability”53. In another Aristophanes’ comedy -- Akharnians -- 
a Boiotian visitor looking for a characteristically Athenian product has a sycophant wrapped 
up to take home with him54. 
 
Aristophanes leaves no doubt about his personal attitude to the sycophants, which at first 
glance may be confused as a reflection of a public opinion at the time. However, given that 
                                                          
49MacDowell, D.M. (1978). The Law in Classical Athens. Cornell University Press, Ithaca, p.239 
50Bonner (1969), supra note 47 
51Fleck and Hanssen (2011), supra note 45 [online]  
52 Ibid. 
53Andrews, A. (1981). Greek Society. Pelican books, p.p. 247-248 
54Fleck and Hanssen, supra note 45 at 20 [online] 
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Aristophanes in his plays expressed the views of an old-fashioned conservative55, his 
depiction of the activist citizen was much closer to the feelings of the Athenian aristocracy. 
As Harding wrote, sukophantai were “a segment of society whom the wealthy despised even 
more than they disliked the popular juries”56. 
 
Together with juries, the sukophantai were one of two of the most fundamental pillars of 
Athenian democratic ideology, notably: a) the control of the law courts by the ordinary 
citizens, and b) the belief that every citizen not only could, but should, prosecute any 
infringement of the Law57. In the absence of a police force and state prosecutors that segment 
of society was the true guardian of the laws. Sometimes overzealous and prosecuting for 
personal gain they could provoke a justifiable hostility of the wealthy. But it is telling that 
curtailing the power of the popular courts along with the physical elimination of the known 
sukophantai together with most prominent and radical democratic politicians were the major 
planks in the oligarchs’ programme at the end of the fifth, as well as in the fourth century BC 
in Athens58. 
 
The Athenian state had to maintain a justifiable balance: if the Athenians pursued sycophants 
too aggressively, they risked discouraging the legitimate voluntary prosecutions on which 
their system depended59. Despite the opprobrium this kind of activist citizenry received from 
Demosthenes, who called a sycophant a man that “makes all kinds of charges and proves 
                                                          
55Andrews, supra note 53, p. 248 
56Harding, Ph. (2015). Athens Transformed, 404–262 BC: From Popular Sovereignty to the Dominion of Wealth. 
Routledge, p.3 
57Ib., p.3 
58Ib., p.4 
59Fleck and Hanssen, supra note 45 at 20 [online] 
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none”60, the Athenians “had great difficulty in suppressing sycophants”61. Bonner pointed 
out, that “there are abundant indications in literature that sycophants were both numerous 
and formidable”62. The significance of the activist citizens is highlighted by the fact that the 
Demosthenic corpus has about 100 uses of the term sukophantai63. 
Roman criminal law relied on a system of prosecution by private citizens, known as 
delatores64. Delatores or delators could be both ancient Roman prosecutors and/or 
informers. The role of the informer in matters of criminal law and fiscal claims was of singular 
importance to the maintenance of order in Roman society, which was without an adequate 
police force or public prosecutor before advent of Principate65. Dominik and Hall define three 
roles of the delator: one who denounces a crime (index), one who witnesses (testis), and the 
prosecutor (accusator)66. Unlike Ancient Athens, not much details available on how the 
system of delatores worked during earlier years of Republic. But the activist members of the 
society were rewarded. The later Republic encouraged delatores with pecuniary awards and 
public praise for citizens, while it could be freedom for slaves and citizenship for foreigners67. 
Beginning no later than Lex Pedia, which retroactively made criminals of Caesar's assassins; it 
became common for Roman criminal statutes to offer a portion of the defendant's property 
                                                          
60Quoted in Bonner, supra note 47 at 20, p.64 
61McDowell, supra at 66 
62Bonner (1969), supra note 47 at 20, p.65 
63Robin Osborne, Vexatious Litigation in Classical Athens, p.93 (in Cartledge, P. at al. (2003). Nomos: Essays in 
Athenian Law, Politics and Society. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge) 
64 Robinson, O.F. (1995). Criminal Law of Ancient Rome. Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, p.100 
65Dominik, W.J. and Hall, J.C.R. (2010). A Companion to Roman Rhetoric. John Wiley & Sons, p.113 
66Ibid. 
67Encyclopaedia Britannica [online], at <http://www.britannica.com/topic/delator>, (accessed 12 July 2014) 
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as a reward for a successful prosecution.68 Such statutes in broad sense can qualify as qui tam 
legislation because they defined an offence against the public and permitted an uninjured 
private party to sue for a share of a statutory forfeiture69. As in ancient Athens, Roman 
Republic and later Principate adopted some measures to prevent abuse. The unsuccessful 
delatores could face punishment by infamia (loss of many civil rights), branding, flogging, or 
banishment70. However, many unscrupulous delatores routinely escaped punishment, when 
their activities helped to augment imperial fisc in time the emperors were in need of funds71. 
 
Two laws formed the foundation of the legal framework for delatores in imperial Rome -- the 
Lex Papia Poppaea and the Lex Lulia de Maiestate (the Law of conspiracy and the Law of 
treason). Created be the emperor Augustus for the good of the state they were open to 
different interpretations due to their vague terminology72. Extending the Lex Maiestatis to 
include slander against the emperor encouraged the activity of delatores at all levels of 
society, in both the imperial capital and the provinces. Tacitus wrote that “every corner of the 
Roman world had suffered from their attacks”73. The ubiquity of delatores was due to the fact 
that prosecuting real or imaginary conspiracies against the emperor became a lucrative -- 
                                                          
68 S. H. Rutledge, S.H. (2001). Imperial Inquisitions: Prosecutors and Informants from Tiberius to Domitian. 
Routledge, New York, p.42 
69 Ibid. 
70 Encyclopaedia Britannica 
71 Ibid. 
72 Bunson, M. (1991). A Dictionary of the Roman Empire. [online], at: < 
https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=HsrGEFpW80UC&pg=PA129&lpg=PA129&dq=delatores+rome&source=b
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though disreputable -- profession. In the case of treason, an informer could receive a quarter 
of the estate while the remainder of what was confiscated went to the imperial coffers74. 
Suetonius and Tacitus wrote of the malicious delatores who brought false accusations in order 
to obtain the confiscated goods of the accused. Moreover, successful delatores could gain 
influence with those in power. Roman archives passed to the posterity the names of the most 
important and powerful delatores: Domitius Afer, Naebius Massa, and Marcus Aquilius 
Regulus75. Tacitus refers to two notorious delatores under Vespasian – Vibius Crispus and 
Eprius Marcellus – as “friends of Caesar”76. The wealth and status that came from informing 
enabled people to circumvent the typical avenues of promotion, and informants were 
routinely depicted as those arising from the dregs of society, including slaves and freedmen 
motivated by the desire for money, status, political influence, or self-preservation. 
Rutledge, however, draws a more complicated picture of the Roman public prosecutors. In 
his view, the delatores and accusatores were reflective of enduring cultural and political 
values of the Roman society, and often their motives would have been perfectly understood 
by Cicero and his republican counterparts77 at the end of the Republic. In De Officiis Cicero 
advocated the acts of citizens prosecuting the wrong doings, but in his opinion, they should 
act only “in the interest of the state… or to avenge wrongs… or for the protection of our 
provincials”78, and “this sort of work… may be done once in a lifetime or at all events not 
often”79. Cicero concludes by emphasising the moral dimension of the prosecutorial activities 
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76 Whitlark, supra note 73 at 28, p.41 
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of the members of public: “But if it shall be required of anyone to conduct more frequent 
prosecutions, let him do it as a service to his country; for it is no disgrace to be often employed 
in the prosecution of her enemies. And yet a limit should be set even to that. For it requires 
a heartless man, it seems, or rather one who is well nigh inhuman, to be arraigning one person 
after another on capital charges”80. 
From the point of view of a famed statesman of the Republic, there was nothing inherently 
impropriate in such acts. It was the transformation of the Roman state from republic to 
empire that brought crucial changes to the political and legal structure under which 
prosecutors worked. And it was the shift to an autocratic form of government, new repressive 
laws and the makeup of the courts that facilitated the activities of delatores, turning them 
into the instruments of the repressive rule of one man during the early Principate81. 
Delatores and accusatores were important part of the Roman imperial machinery on its early 
stages of development. But after Flavians ascended to the throne in 69 AD, the means of state 
control and intelligence gathering gradually improved. As Bunson wrote, “the dangerous 
speculatorers of the guard, the agents, spies and killers of the Praetorian ranks” serving as 
one of the early Roman intelligence units, and later far larger and better organised 
prumentarii “rendered the concept of the delatores obsolete”82. During the years of later 
Principate with the Roman bureaucracy at its zenith all informers were paid by the 
government, “dependent upon imperial spy masters for their wages”83. Although it was not 
until the end of the IV century, that the legislation for accusatores ceased to exist. It was 
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abolished by the emperor Theodosius I the Great, who proclaimed Nicene Christianity the 
state religion, outlawed all Hellenistic rituals and customs, and significantly changed imperial 
laws84. 
An example of private qui tam enforcement can also be found in Anglo-Saxon England.85 In 
695 A.D., Withered, King of Kent, issued a law prohibiting labour on the Sabbath, which 
included the following qui tam enforcement provision: "If a freeman works during the 
forbidden time [between sunset on Saturday evening and sunset on Sunday evening], he shall 
forfeit his healsfang86, and the man who informs against him shall have half the fine, and [the 
profits arising from] the labour”87. This Anglo-Saxon provision foreshadowed subsequent 
developments in English law, as the backlash against obnoxious conduct of informers 
enforcing the Sunday closing laws 1250 years later helped generate the political consensus 
for England's elimination of qui tam legislation88. 
 
Historically qui tam closely related to the bounty hunting. In early medieval Europe the 
nascent states had little or no institutions to back the interests of their sovereigns. The early 
monarchies offered bounties to enlist the services of influential subjects. In case a subject 
was instrumental in defeat and capture of the adversary the sovereign would give a loyal 
subject the titles and part of the income producing lands, which previously were held by the 
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vanquished opponent89. This tradition was still alive by the time of American Revolution – 
veterans of the American revolutionary war were entitled to land grants for their service90. 
In the early democracy of ancient Iceland there was no government authority with 
prosecution and punishment functions – prosecution was private. The Hrafnkels saga91 
describes in detail the private nature of criminal prosecution and execution of judgements in 
that island in medieval times. The convicted criminals forfeited their property to the 
prosecutor. In order to raise support for the prosecution, the prosecutor offered share of the 
criminal’s property to the prosecutor’s supporters in the prosecution92. 
Remarkably, the qui tam prosecution precedes the simpler bounty system, when information 
about breach of law is traded for a reward. The ability to serve as an ancillary to the state 
institutions, and even as their substitution, preserves qui tam as a convenient law 
enforcement option available to the state at any given stage of its evolution through history. 
Rise, decline and new dawn of qui tam in England provide a clue to understanding its vital 
streangth as a law enforcement mechanism.   
 
The Rise and Decline of Qui Tam Laws in England 
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In England even before the Magna Carta, common law qui tam provided an efficient way to 
pursue fraud without government prosecutors93. In addition, private citizens valued qui tam 
more because it allowed them access to royal courts94. The steep rise of qui tam enforcement 
began in earnest 250 years after the Norman Conquest.95 Legislation important to the 
national sovereign was not always a high priority to local officials; in fact, enforcement of 
national law was particularly difficult when such national legislation undermined local 
officials' interests. Faced with limited public enforcement resources and the difficulty of 
implementing national policies over numerous, geographically separated, local jurisdictions, 
Parliament began during the fourteenth century to turn increasingly to qui tam enforcement 
as the most practical means to police compliance with regulatory requirements96. 
 
The 1318 Statute of York,97 an early English qui tam provision, demonstrates the potential for 
conflict between national policies and local interests. The legislation related to the "assizes of 
wine and victuals," which required uniform prices for certain consumer goods, set by 
reference to established criteria98. Parliament was concerned that enthusiasm for enforcing 
the price restrictions could wane if local officials were themselves selling the regulated 
commodities. The Statute of York prohibited such trade99. 
 
This prohibition on sale of regulated commodities by officials could have its intended effect 
only if the threat of forfeiture was supported by a high probability of enforcement. The King 
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did not have an extensive network of paid royal officials whose loyalty to the interests of the 
Crown could be assumed100. The question, therefore, was how to assure that city and borough 
officers would take seriously the threat of forfeiture posed by the statute. Parliament's 
solution was to permit qui tam enforcement of the penalty: "[T]he third Part [of the forfeited 
merchandise] shall be delivered to the Party that sued the Offender, as the King's Gift. And in 
such Case he that will sue [for a thing so forfeited,] shall be received101. 
 
Concerns about local under-enforcement of national regulations explain a 1331 qui tam 
statute102 that was intended to enforce a provision of the 1328 Statute of Northampton 
regulating the length of fairs103, and two Statutes of Labourers, enacted in 1349104 and 
1350105. The statutes allowed informers to seek forfeitures from a town mayor or a bailiff, 
who failed to enforce the regulations issued by Parliament106.  
 
Over the next 150 years, “what began as a trickle of qui tam statutes gradually became a 
flood”107. The majority of these enactments regulated economic activities in a wide array of 
industries108. Qui tam provisions, for instance, could be found in a 1381 statute, that regulated 
the price of wine109, a 1416 statute110 prohibiting "patenmakers" from using the timber "aspe" 
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in making "patens" or "clogs”111, and a 1423 statute providing for forfeiture of defectively 
tanned leather and prohibiting “cordwainers” from acting as tanners112. Numerous other qui 
tam statutes touched upon a wide variety of British commercial activities113. 
 
In addition to many statutes regulating economic affairs, a number of qui tam statutes 
enforced non-economic social regulations114. The use of qui tam provisions to regulate the 
performance of public servants became increasingly common in the fourteenth and fifteenth 
centuries. In 1360, Parliament enforced what in contemporary parlance could be named an 
anticorruption regulation, by permitting informers to sue jurors who accepted bribes115. 
Shortly thereafter, another law authorised qui tam suits if a person responsible for procuring 
and arranging for carriage of provisions for the King's household accepted a bribe116. A 1391 
statute permitted suits against mayors, sheriffs, and bailiffs who failed to implement a rule 
concerning measurement of grain117. A 1442 statute prohibited customs officials and other 
public employees from engaging in businesses related to their public duties118. The value of 
qui tam suits as a check on public officials had become so well accepted by 1444 that 
Parliament adopted no fewer than five such statutes in that single year119. 
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By the sixteenth century, qui tam statutes had become a common feature of English law120. 
They brought with them, however, unintended consequences. They gave rise to a class of 
bounty hunters who unscrupulously exploited weaknesses in the system: “Old statutes which 
had been forgotten were unearthed and used as means to gratify ill-will. Litigation was stirred 
up simply in order that the informer might compound for a sum of money. Threats to sue 
were easy means of levying blackmail.”121 
 
Edward Coke in his Third Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England, originally published 
posthumously in 1644, devotes a chapter to the reform legislation designed to control the 
practices of these “vexatious relators, informers, and promoters,” whom he classifies as 
turbidum hominum genus122 and as a species among the classes of “viperous vermin”123 -- a 
class was so unpopular that Queen Elizabeth I found it necessary to issue a proclamation 
shielding its members from mob violence.124 Legislative reform (An Act to redress Disorders 
in common Informers125, and some other statutes and royal proclamations126), however, 
appears to have been effective, because more than a hundred years after Coke’s comments, 
in XVIII century, Sir William Blackstone described qui tam without criticism, expect to note a 
statutorily-cured abuse127. 
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Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of England, written in 1765-1769, provides significant 
contribution to the legal concept of qui tam. He addressed qui tam actions in the course of 
discussing the law of contracts. In Blackstone's view, it was from the fundamental social 
contract, that the obligation to obey a penal statute derived128. The person who violated a 
penal statute was "bound by the fundamental contract of society to obey the directions of 
the legislature, and pay the forfeiture incurred to such persons as the law requires”129. 
 
Blackstone's discussion suggests the following criteria by which to identify a qui tam 
statute130: 
 The statute defines an offense against the sovereign or proscribes conduct contrary 
to the interests of the public; 
 A penalty or forfeiture is imposed for violation of the statute; 
 The statute permits a civil or criminal enforcement action pursued by a private party; 
 The private informer need not be aggrieved and may initiate the action in the absence 
of any distinct, personal injury arising from the challenged conduct; 
 A successful informer is entitled to a private benefit consisting of part or all of the 
penalty exacted from the defendant; 
 The outcome of the private informer's enforcement action is binding on the 
government. 
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While many types of legislation exhibit some of these characteristics, the combination of all 
these features serves to distinguish a qui tam statute from other models of statutory 
enforcement131. 
 
In XVIII-early XIX centuries qui tam legislation remained popular aimed at supporting 
regulation of various economic activities. During reign of George II and George III more than 
20 such qui tam laws were enacted132. It is worth mentioning, that in XVIII century Parliament 
actively enacted qui tam statutes relating to religious beliefs (targeting Catholics, but also 
dissenting Protestants as well as all others not zealous enough to exercise their religious 
duties)133 and excessive consumption of alcohol134 (the latter was one of the most hated, 
provoking recurring riots and numerous violent attacks on informers)135. From this moment 
the tide of popularity of qui tam activities turned on descent136. 
 
The period extending from the last quarter of the XVII century to the beginning of the XIX 
century was prosperous as British entrepreneurs extended the range of their business around 
the globe. By the 1720s Britain was one of the most prosperous countries in the world137. 
Economic might pre-determined the vast geography and success of military activities abroad. 
 
In XVIII century Britain was involved in over 100 wars with the most significant such as War 
of the Spanish Succession, Carnatic wars in India, the Seven Year War, American War on 
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Independence, and above all the Napoleonic wars. The rising costs associated with warfare 
had a profound impact on the government financing forcing it to shift from the income from 
royal agricultural estates and special imposts and taxes to reliance on customs and excise 
taxes. In 1790 an income tax was introduced for the first time. The rise in taxes amounted to 
20% of national income138, but the demand from the state for more war supplies stimulated 
the industrial sector, paving the road of Industrial revolution. 
 
The industrial revolution transformed the XIX century Britain. In 1801, at the time of the first 
census, only about 20% of the population lived in towns139. By 1851 the figure had risen to 
over 50%. By 1881 about two thirds of the population lived in towns140. Economic and social 
changes were followed by the expansion of the government, establishing state bureaucracy 
as a linchpin of an empire. 
 
With the expansion of the government reliance on qui tam legislation declined dramatically 
as a result of the development of alternate means of law enforcement. By the late nineteenth 
century, Parliament's enthusiasm for qui tam statutes had cooled significantly.  Only twelve 
qui tam statutes had been enacted between 1825 and 1895141. Only one qui tam statute was 
adopted in the twentieth century -- directed at police officers who interfered with voting for 
local offices142 -- and this was merely a re-codification of a nineteenth century enactment.143 
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The decline of qui tam enforcement coincided with the development of modern police 
departments and the proliferation of public prosecutors. A decade after Parliament created 
a permanent police force for the city of London in 1829144, it enacted Metropolitan Police 
Courts Act sought to restrict the activities of common informers145. The abolishing of qui tam 
after that was not very much surprising. 
 
There were three main reasons, which led to the repealing qui tam at the time. 
 
First, In England the qui tam doctrine was initially instituted as a legal adjunct to supplement 
country's insufficient legal machinery in order to bring more offenses to the cognizance of the 
courts146. Informers might have been necessary at an earlier time in English history. It was not 
until 1856 that all areas of the country had a police force147. When the administrative 
machinery of the state was weak to secure law enforcement, this field of activity had to be 
left in the hands of private enterprise148. It was necessary that there should be some incentive 
and the common informer had to be able to obtain substantial financial inducement to carry 
out the important social work of seeing that the law was maintained149. The rise of law 
enforcement, both quantitative and qualitative, made that private enterprise function 
redundant. 
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Second, Sir John Fielding, a magistrate who presided over an early police force in London150, 
believed that the rewards offered to informers had the perverse effect of discouraging public-
spirited citizens from reporting evidence of crimes151. From the point of view of the majority 
lawmakers at the time of abolishing the qui tam laws (year 1951), the qui tam informer 
undermined the coherence and homogeneity of the British society. The informer was berated 
for lacking public spiritedness, because he demanded a reward to perform the duty of every 
citizen152. Moreover, "he is unconcerned about the public interest, and he is actuated purely 
by mercenary motives and his own cupidity153. Majority view was that it was wrong for a free 
country to allow informers to seek redress for their own pecuniary advantage in respect of a 
public wrong in which they had no direct personal interest or concern; a wrongdoing to the 
State should surely be atoned for by a penalty payable to the State alone154. 
 
Third, qui tam legal principles provoked legal conflict with Scotland, for the reason Scottish 
legal system did not recognise common informer procedure before Union of Parliaments155.  
 
The occasion that caused abolishing of qui tam appeared on the 100th anniversary of the 
Great Exhibition of 1851. The UK Government began planning years in advance for a huge 
event -- the "Festival of Britain, 1951." The event would have its serious side, but there would 
also be "amusements" of a less educational nature156. As plans for the Festival solidified, the 
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concern arose that if the Festival were open on Sundays, some informer might sue 
government organisers or private parties participating in the entertaining events157. The 
precise application of the eighteenth century Sunday Observance Act was unpredictable in 
the twentieth century, and the Government introduced a Sunday Openings Bill to exempt the 
Festival from the Sunday observance statutes and to specify the permissible scope of the 
Festival's Sunday exhibitions158. Shortly before debate on the Sunday Opening Act, the 
Common Informers Act of 1951 was introduced as the primary legislative vehicle for abolition 
of England's remaining qui tam statutes, which were expressly characterised as 
anachronism159. By the overwhelming majority two bills were enacted by the Parliament. 
 
It would be inaccurate though to state that qui tam has left Britain, and the page in its history 
in the UK has been turned over. In October 2013 the Secretary of State for the Home 
Department presented to the Parliament Serious and Organised Crime Strategy, on behalf of 
HM Government. Introducing it the Home Secretary pointed out that serious and organised 
crime was a threat to the UK national security, and cost the UK more than £24 billion a year160. 
The Startegy accepts that “for too long, too many serious and organised criminals have been 
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able to remain one step ahead and out of law enforcement’s reach”161, calling for “a new 
response”162. 
 
One of such new responses the Strategy identifies is a qui tam163. In section “PROTECT: 
Increasing protection against serious and organised crime” the government put forward a 
plan of action: 
6.44 We need to not only target serious and organised criminals but also 
support those who seek to help us identify and disrupt serious and organised 
criminality. In July, we announced a review of the support that is available to 
those who report suspected illegal activity. BIS, the Ministry of Justice and the 
Home Office will consider the case for incentivising whistle blowing, including 
the provision of financial incentives to support whistle blowing in cases of fraud, 
bribery and corruption. As part of this work we will examine what lessons can 
be drawn from the successful ‘Qui Tam’ provisions in the US where individuals 
who whistle-blow and work with prosecutors and law enforcement can receive 
a share of financial penalties levied against a company guilty of fraud against 
the government164. 
 
The examination has brought no visible results so far, but the trend towards more role for the 
private enforcement in the UK has become more salient after a new legislation came into 
force on 1 October 2015 allowing US-style class actions lawsuits in case a competition law has 
been breached165. Under the Consumer Rights Act 2015 companies, which are found to have 
broken anti-trust law in Europe, may also be liable for millions of pounds in compensation. 
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Amending a Competition Act 1998, the new legislation permits “collective proceedings”, 
combining “two or more claims” meaning that damages can add up quickly166. 
 
The class actions stand as the most powerful and prevalent model of private enforcement in 
the United States, comprising with two other models – qui tam and citizens’ suit – three main 
pillars of the private justice in America167. 
 
When set into historical context qui tam reveals correlation with the expansion of the English 
and UK government, both in terms of state bureaucracy and its financial might. The more 
power state bureaucracy accrues, the less it relies on private initiative in law enforcement, as 
bureaucracy values tend to favour predictability, control, and administrative ease. However, 
when the government finds itself squeezed financially, as did the UK government after the 
recent financial crisis, it turned to a qui tam model as a useful tool. As correlation does not 
necessarily imply causation, the hypothesis that financial and administrative might somehow 
connected to the expansion or diminishing of qui tam will be tried whithin another historical 
context – in America.  
 
 
Early American Experience 
 
Qui tam was no stranger to US legal system derived from the British one. Nurtured over the 
several centuries the qui tam laws were considered to be such a vital element of good 
governance that they were among the earliest laws enacted by the colonial legislatures prior 
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to the revolution168. Colonial courts heard qui tam cases arising under those statutes169, as 
well as under English law170. Some of the earliest recorded qui tam actions in published United 
States case law occurred during the year of the drafting of the United States Constitution and 
three years before the first sitting of the Supreme Court. In 1787, the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court heard the case of Phile qui tam v. The Ship Anna171, in which an informer brought a case 
against a ship owner for beer brought into the state without being recorded on the ship’s 
manifest and without the proper dues being paid to the state, in violation of state law. 
Furthermore, in Musgrove qui tam v. Gibbs172, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court ruled on a 
usury violation, which deprived the state of penalties under the usury statute. Later qui tam 
cases routinely appeared among the cases of the early federal courts173. 
 
                                                          
168 1 Statutes of Connecticut 531 (1672) (penalties of 10 shillings for permitting a night-time disorderly assembly 
under one’s roof to be distributed half to the town and half to the individual who filed the complaint); Colonial 
Laws of Massachusets 8 (1686) (penalties for fraud in the sale of bread to be distributed one-third to inspector 
who discovered the fraud and remainder for the benefit of the town where the offense occurred); Id. at 54 
(penalties for catching mackerel out of season to be distributed one half to the informer and one half to the 
town where the offense occurred); 1 Colonial Laws of New York, 1664-1719, 279, 281 (1692) (penalty of £50 
for an officer’s failure to perform duties for the prevention of piracy to be distributed one moiety to the informer 
and one to the province); Id. at 845 (1715) (20 shilling penalties for taking oysters out of season to be distributed 
half to the informer and half to the benefit of the poor of the town where the offense occurred); 2 Colonial Laws 
of New York, 1720-1737, 988, 989-90 (1737) (penalties of £30 for peddling without a license to be distributed 
one moiety to the informer and one for the benefit of the town where the offense occurred); 7 Virginia Statutes 
(Henning) 282, 285 (1759) (penalties for peddling without a license to be distributed one moiety to the king for 
the support of the College of William & Mary and one to informer who brings the action on the debt for its 
recovery); IV Statutes of South Carolina, 1752-1786, 460 (1778) (penalties of £1,000 for acting as a magistrate 
without authorisation to be distributed one half to the public treasury and one half to those who sued for their 
recover) 
169 Churchill v. Blackburn, 1 Va. Colonial Dec. R26 (Va. Gen. Ct. 1730); Musgrove, qui tam v. Gibbs, 1 U.S. 216 (Pa. 
1787) 
170 Britton, qui tam v. Ridgely, 4 H. & McH. 503 (Md. Prov. 1768) (3 & 4 GEORGE II, ch.12); Anderson, qui tam v 
Winston, 2 Va. Colonial Dec. B201 (Va. Gen. Ct. 1735) (32 HENRY VIII, ch.9). 17 E.g., section 3, Act of March 1, 
1790, 1 Stat. 101, 102 (1790); section 4, Act of July 20, 1790, 1 Stat. 131, 133 (1790); section 3, Act of July 22, 
1790, 1 Stat. 137, 138 (1970); section 44, Act of March 2, 1791, 1 Stat. 198, 209 (1791) 
171 United States ex rel. Stevens v. Vermont Agency of Natural Resources, 162 F.3d 195, 202 (2d Cir. 1998), cert. 
granted, 11g S. Ct. 2391 (iggg) 
172 1 U.S. 197, 1 Dall. 197, 1 L.Ed. 98 (1787) 
173 United States v. Simms, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 252 (1803); Adams v. Woods, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 336 (1805); The 
Emulous, 1 F.Cas. 697 (D. Mass. 1813)(No. 4,479), revised sub nom., Brown v. United States, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 
110 (1814) 
 46 
It will be contrary to the historical facts to assume that the framers of American Constitution 
were not familiar with qui tam legislation. Immediately after enacting the Constitution, the 
First Congress employed qui tam actions in various forms and contexts. Six statutes imposed 
penalties and/or forfeitures for conduct injurious to the general public and expressly 
authorised suits by private informers, with the recovery being shared between the informer 
and the United States174. Three statutes by similarly imposing penalties and/or forfeitures for 
conduct injurious to the general public, authorised informers bringing successful prosecutions 
to keep the entire recovery175. Two other qui tam statutes imposed penalties and/or 
forfeitures for conduct injurious both to the general public and more concretely to a subclass 
thereof. One allowed any person to sue176, and the other allowed suits by anyone whose 
private rights were violated177. 
 
As Sylvia (2010)178 pointed out: “[I]n the early years of the Nation, the qui tam mechanism 
served a need at a time when federal and state governments were fairly small and unable to 
devote significant resources to law enforcement. As the role of the Government expanded, 
the utility of private assistance in law enforcement did not diminish. If anything, changes in 
the role and size of Government created a greater role for this method of law enforcement”. 
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A birth of the False Claims Act in the middle of the American Civil War serves as a perfect 
example of how insightful is this conclusion. 
 
Birth of the False Claims Act 
The circumstances under which a False Claims Act was adopted point to the main condition 
that makes qui tam valuable to the government – inability of its administration to prosecute 
fraud and provide for the proper level of deterrence. 
 
The Civil War prompted Congress to enact the original False Claims Act in 1863. As 
government spending on war materials increased, government contractors took advantage 
of opportunities to squeeze money out of the United States government. “Through haste, 
carelessness, or criminal collusion, the state and federal officers accepted almost every offer 
and paid almost any price for the commodities, regardless of character, quality, or 
quantity.”179 The Act180 was directed against government contractors, who, in short, falsely 
made fraudulent claims for payment by the government, or did not deliver what they had to, 
thereby defrauding the government181.  
The original legislative proposal would have made contractors subject to martial law. A 
substitute bill provided for both civil and criminal penalties: the perpetrators were liable to 
pay three times the government’s damages plus a civil penalty ranging from $5,500 to 
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$11,000 per false claim182. In 2015 money that would cost about $100,000 and $200,000 
respectively183. 
The original Act enacted by the Congress provided for civil penalties of double the amount of 
damages sustained by the United States as a result of the false claim plus $2,000 forfeiture 
for each claim submitted184. The Act also authorised private individuals to sue on behalf of 
the United States185. 
The qui tam provision for whistle-blowers (“relators” as the Act defines them) has been 
included in §3730B. It states that: “A person may bring a civil action for a violation of section 
3729 for the person and for the United States Government. The action shall be brought in the 
name of the Government”. In return for private action in the name of the government those 
whistle-blowers “receive at least 15 per cent but not more than 25 per cent of the proceeds 
of the action or settlement of the claim, depending upon the extent to which the person 
substantially contributed to the prosecution of the action”186. That is if the government 
supports their claims, if the government does not support their claim during the proceedings 
the percentage ranges from minimum 25 to max 50 per cent. All reasonable procedural 
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expenses, fees, and costs are awarded against the defendant. So when a private person187 
blows the whistle by starting his or her own civil action under the False Claims Act this action 
may end up with a substantial bounty in a form of a percentage of the award. In the original 
Act, if a private citizen used the qui tam provision to file suit, the government had no right to 
intervene or control the litigation. 
The Act has proved so effective for the federal government that some state and local 
governments have passed their own versions. According to Taxpayers Against Fraud in 
Washington D.C.188, an organisation dedicated to promoting the False Claims Act, 21 states 
have their own version of the Act - California, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, 
Indiana, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Montana, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, 
Nevada, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Utah and Virginia - as well as 
the District of Columbia and the cities of New York and Chicago. In addition, Colorado, 
Connecticut, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, New Hampshire, Texas and Washington have 
Medicaid-only recovery statutes189.  
The Act survived in substantially its original form until World War II190. After the Great War in 
the twentieth century, qui tam statutes had largely fallen into desuetude, although they often 
remained on the books. Although decisions construing the False Claims Act were relatively 
few before 1943, in a classic and oft-quoted passage, one court rejected the argument that 
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courts should limit the statute’s reach on the grounds that qui tam actions were poor public 
policy191: 
“The statute is a remedial one. It is intended to protect the treasury against the hungry and 
unscrupulous host that encompasses it on every side, and should be construed accordingly. 
It was passed upon the theory, based on experience as old as modern civilization that one of 
the least expensive and most effective means of preventing frauds on the treasury is to make 
the perpetrators of them liable to actions by private persons acting … under the strong 
stimulus of personal ill will or the hope of gain. Prosecutions conducted by such means 
compare with the ordinary methods as the enterprising privateer does to the slow-going 
public vessel”. 
Until World War II the Act did not attract much attention192. The rise and strengthening of the 
executive after the Civil War brought about new ideas of the Progressive Era with their 
attention to social responsibility and public service. Public mood favoured philanthropy, local 
government and direct taxation193. 
 
Citizens’ suit vs. Qui Tam 
 
Discussion about pecuniary and altruistic motives underlying activist behavior that serves the 
interests of community – popular in the United States in the beginning of the XX century – 
juxtaposed qui tam and non-pecuniary forms of public service. It shows that public opinion 
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and social acceptance has become an important factor warranting the survival of any given 
legal concept. 
  
It is worth mentioning that in regard to qui tam legislation the first part of the XX century 
proved relative trends on both sides of the Atlantic. Both in the UK and the US the legislators 
as well as general public were gradually embracing the concept of spirited altruistic pro-active 
citizenship contrary to the low pecuniary mercenary-type motives of common informers. As 
a result of that trend a new class of litigants, somewhat in the middle between those two 
paradigmatic groups, became popular in the courtrooms – rightfully aggrieved and 
constitutionally friendly “private attorneys general”.  
 
In XX century, the US Congress has chosen a different means by which to enlist the aid of 
private citizens in supplementing executive branch enforcement of Federal statutes: the 
"citizens' suit."194 By this device, Congress legislatively defined legal interests (overlaying 
those already established at common law), and authorised private citizens to protect these 
interests through litigation seeking monetary and/or injunctive relief against persons invading 
them. Most such citizens' suits supplant executive branch enforcement by compelling alleged 
wrongdoers' compliance with statutory directives, while other such suits compel the 
executive itself to enforce public law obligations against suspected wrongdoers.195 Individuals 
bringing suits of either type got the name "private attorneys general," because Congress 
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intended their individual actions, when aggregated, to benefit the public at large by 
effectuating important Federal policies. 
 
From Congress' perspective, qui tam statutes and the more comfortable citizens' suit 
provisions have served the same purpose: both are designed to encourage private citizens to 
help the executive branch deter and redress violations of Federal law. However, some 
researches questioned the wisdom of dual public and private enforcement in general, or the 
context or structure of particular such schemes196. But Congress' authority to determine that 
dual enforcement constitutes long-term social policy, and to implement that decision by 
enacting traditional citizens' suits provisions, was beyond serious dispute. The Supreme Court 
repeatedly has held that "Congress may enact statutes creating legal rights, the invasion of 
which creates standing" for the injured party to sue for redress197. For many decades, courts 
have entertained suits brought by private citizens to vindicate legislatively defined interests, 
recognising constitutional constraints on Congress' power to authorize such suits only at the 
extreme margin198. 
 
In contrast to the qui tam enforcement the constitutional status of traditional citizens' suit 
scheme has remained so far unquestioned and unchallenged. The concept of private 
attorneys general stands comfortable to the jurists, as private citizens may represent their 
own interests in federal court, but not the interests of the entire polity in federal litigation. In 
broad terms such approach led to enactment of some amendments to the legislation 
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containing qui tam provisions, which significantly reined in power of pecuniary motivated qui 
tam relators. The regulatory change of mind was triggered by the abuses related to the 
government procurement during World War II, but had been preceded by the change of 
public opinion since the dawn of the XX century. 
 
 
1943 Retrenchment 
Qui Tam retrenchment coincided with a remarkable milestone – by 1943 the number of US 
government employees reached a record 3,5 million. During 12 years of Franklin Roosevelt’s 
New Deal federal government rose almost sevenfold from little more than 500 thousand in 
1933199. The activist government significantly expanded into economy, finance and social 
security, its newly formed agencies administered numerous programmes. The American 
public in general backed this development. Both public opinion, and administration were not 
in favour of private enforcement as an outdated legacy. The ideological agenda the 
government was pursuing focused on its agencies as solution to the challenges the society 
was facing, and the growing budget through the increased taxation provided governments 
with financing. 
The spike in government’s spending after beginning of the World War II spawned various qui 
tam actions over defence procurement fraud. Exemplifying popularised by Robert Merton 
concept of unintended consequences200, some relators sought to exploit what was effectively 
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an unintended “loophole” in the Act that permitted them to file parasitic lawsuits. These 
relators simply copied the information contained in criminal indictments, when the relator 
had no information to bring to the government’s attention independently201. 
The Department of Justice sought to stop these abusive actions in 1943 in United States ex 
rel. Marcus v. Hess202. The Supreme Court, however, refused to read the government’s 
requested limitations into the statutory language, and concluded that it was up to Congress 
to “correct” any problems with the Act203. 
Congress responded promptly. At the request of the Attorney General, legislation was 
introduced that would have effectively eliminated private actions for damages and penalties 
by relators. A Senate Committee then sought to ensure that suits could continue to be 
brought by private citizens, so long as they were the “original source” of the information in 
question and had disclosed information in writing to the government before suit204. 
The final version of the 1943 amendments to the False Claims Act passed after considerable 
debate205, 19 omitted the “original source” provision, and made other changes that rendered 
the Act less useful both to the government and to potential relators. The 1943 amendments 
eliminated jurisdiction over qui tam actions that were based on evidence or information in 
                                                          
201 Legislative History, at 11, 5276317 
202 U.S. 537 (1943) 
203 Id., at 546-47 
204 Sylvia, supra note 178 at 46, § 2.8, at 49 & n. 6 (citing 89 Cong. Rec. 7570 (1943)) 
205 In the congressional debate, Senator Langer of North Dakota defended the Act as necessary to adequate 
enforcement: “I submit that the present statute now on the books is a most desirable one. What harm can there 
be if 10,000 lawyers in America [are] assisting the Attorney General of the United States in digging up war frauds? 
In any case, the Attorney General can protect himself by filing a (civil) lawsuit at the time when he files the 
indictment.” 89 Cong. Rec. 7607 (Sept. 17, 1943) (quoted in Legislative History, at 11, 5276) 
 55 
the government’s possession, even if the relator had provided the information to the 
government206.  
Other changes made by the 1943 amendments were to permit the Department of Justice to 
intervene and litigate cases filed by relators. In addition, the 1943 amendments reduced 
substantially the relator’s share of recovery to a maximum of 10% of the proceeds in 
intervened cases, and a maximum of 25% of the proceeds in cases in which the government 
did not intervene207. 
With all those novelties, Congress apparently “over-corrected” the Act in 1943, when it made 
it difficult for what might be deemed bona fide relators to initiate qui tam actions. However 
the resurrection of the qui tam 40 years later proved that the US government was not ready 
to abolish the concept, despite strong opposition from some lawmakers and jurists. The last 
30 years brought about significant changes to the status of common informers. In a 
fundamental regulatory U-turn the Congress by strengthening qui tam provisions of the 
federal legislation granted American relators the second life. 
The changes stemmed from the new economic policies, which put an end to the post-war 
dominance of the Keynesian economic thinking with its emphasis on the government 
intervention and expansion of the state. In 1981 the new US President Ronald Reagan had 
declared what later acquired a nickname “reagonomics”. Its four pillars were to tighten the 
money supply in order to tackle inflation, rein in the growth of government spending, reduce 
the federal income tax and capital gains tax, and to ease government regulation208.  As it is 
                                                          
206 Act of December 23, 1943, Ch. 377, 57 Stat. 608 
207 Sylvia, supra, § 2:8, p.51 
208 Roubini, N. and Mihm, S. (2011). Crisis Economics: A crash course in the future of finance. Penguin Books 
 56 
shown in the next part, the resurrection of the qui tam enforcement was not coincidental, 
and its new advent was inspired primarily by what has become one of the most recognisable 
features of the Regan’s era – huge rise in military spending. 
 
 
Qui Tam on Offensive 
In the beginning of the 1980s the pendulum of public opinion swung in favour of a smaller 
government and privatisation. After domineering for most of the XX century idea of ever 
expanding big government and state intervention lost massive public support. Internationally 
the term Washington Consensus was coined to describe the strong market-based approach, 
and scaling back the government’s activity. The number of federal employees per 100 people 
in the United States population has gradually decreased from over 14 per 100 in the early 
1970s to a little over 10 per 100 by the late 1990s209. However, the government’s spending 
was not scaled back, and the federal budget deficit was rising. 
 
As historical analysis presented above shows, those conditions were the best for the qui tam 
to resurrect. And it did. 
 
In 1981 the new US government significantly reduced the maximum tax rate, and lowered the 
top marginal tax rate from 70 to 50 per cent. In 1986 the rate was further reduced to 28 per 
cent210. However, the public expenditures were significantly increased, primarily as a result 
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of military spending, which was about 6 per cent of GDP for the most of Reagan’s tenure. The 
military budget rose (in constant 2000 dollars) from $267.1 billion in 1980 (4.9 per cent of 
GDP and 22.7 per cent of public expenditures) to $393.1 billion in 1988 (5.8 per cent of GDP 
and 27.3 per cent of public expenditures). All these numbers had not been seen since the end 
of U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War in 1973211. 
 
Following the rise of the federal deficit (from 2.65 per cent of GDP in 1980 to 3.04 per cent 
GDP in 1988, Reagan's final budget year), the nominal national debt rose from $900 billion to 
$2.8 trillion by year 1989212. The federal government has not shrunk remarkably as it had 
been promised, but it did not increase either – the federal bureaucracy was shown that it had 
its limits. 
In recent history the Reagan’s era got into prominence by the huge increase of military 
spending. Direct and indirect defence spending hit a peak of $456.5 billion in 1987 (in 
projected 2005 dollars), compared with $325.1 billion in 1980 and $339.6 million in 1981, 
according to the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments213. Most of the increase was 
for procurement and research and development programs. The procurement budget leapt to 
$147.3 billion from $71.2 billion in year 1980214. 
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The government’s procurement expansion in general, and rise in military spending in 
particular were followed – predictably -- by the soaring shenanigans of the defence 
contractors.  
 
It is worth mentioning, that the 1943 amendments to FCA addressed reform of those qui tam 
procedures seen as rewarding the unworthy, and obstructing other law enforcement efforts. 
But by the 1980s the law lost its even theoretical grip. In year 1985 45 of the 100 largest 
defence contractors, including 9 of the top 10, were under investigation for multiple fraud 
offenses. Additionally, the Justice Department has reported that in 1985 four of the largest 
defence contractors have been convicted of criminal offenses, while another has been 
indicted and awaits trial215. The Department of Justice has estimated fraud as draining 1 to 10 
per cent of the entire Federal budget. Taking into account the spending level in 1985 of nearly 
$1 trillion, fraud against the Government could be costing American taxpayers anywhere from 
$10 to $100 billion annually216. 
 
A new wave of the state’s procurement expansion in a political environment encouraging 
spending discipline and administrative efficiency brought about yet another rise of qui tam 
laws, which were rediscovered by the lawmakers as a powerful weapon to combat rogue 
government contractors, and more broadly financial fraud in general. 
 
The first decisive step was made by the Administration in 1986, when in the face of the 
evidence of extensive fraud against the United States Congress revitalised the False Claims 
Act through a series of amendments, thus creating the modern FCA, as it is presently 
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known217. American legislators made a meaningful remark: “Several restrictive court 
interpretations of the Act [that] have emerged which tend to thwart the effectiveness of the 
statute”218. In fact, it was not the court rulings, but mounting federal military and social 
spending, and prevailing at the time Small Government Theory that backed decision of the 
congressmen. From this point of view, the downsized government in an era of huge budget 
deficits and massive borrowings were happy to outsource some government functions to 
active citizens. Thus, while urging enactment of an anti-fraud qui tam measures in 1986, 
Senator Grassley made it clear: “Fraud allegations are climbing at a steady rate while the 
Justice Department’s own economic crime council last year terms the level of enforcement in 
defence procurement fraud inadequate”219. 
 
The 1986 amendments, which reinvigorated qui tam procedures, reflected a fairly wide array 
of concerns. Changes included: 
 An explicit cause of action for reverse false claims (false statements calculated to 
reduce an obligation to pay the United States)220; 
 A cause of action for retaliation against whistle-blowers221; 
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 An increase in sanctions from a penalty of not more than $2,000 and double damages 
to a penalty of not less than $5,000 nor more than $10,000 and treble damages222; 
 An increase in the maximum award available to qui tam relators from not more than 
25% to not more than 30%223; 
 An express definition of the knowledge required for a violation and declaration that a 
specific intent was unnecessary224; 
 A specific preponderance-of-the-evidence burden of proof standard225; 
 A declaration that states might act as qui tam relators226; 
 A revised jurisdictional bar for qui tam suits based on matters of public knowledge227; 
 An expanded statute of limitations228; 
 An authorisation for government use of civil investigative demands229. 
 
In 20 years since 1986 the beefed-up qui tam legislation has recovered an amount in excess 
of $20 billion230. Under the qui tam provisions of the False Claims Act, more than $18.5 billion 
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has been recovered from the healthcare industry (broadly defined to include pharmaceutical 
and medical device companies) since 1986231. In 2010 alone, more than $3 billion was 
recovered under the FCA, which includes $2.5 billion in healthcare recoveries232. In November 
2010, the Assistant Attorney General for US Department of justice’ Civil Division, Tony West, 
pointed out that the aggressive pursuit of fraud under the False Claims Act resulted in the 
government’s largest two-year recovery in history, and that “[n]owhere is this more apparent 
than in our success in fighting health care fraud.”233 By the time of this statement public 
consensus in the United States was that qui tam lawsuits had been unequivocal success. 
 
 
2009-2010 Amendments: All-Purpose Antifraud Statute 
 
The harsh financial crisis of 2007-2008 and the following recession had a deep profound 
impact on a US financial system, government finances, national debt, the way the big 
government operates, as well as a scope of its activities. 
Between June 2007 and November 2008, Americans lost an estimated average of more than 
a quarter of their collective net worth. Taken together, these losses total $8.3 trillion234. Since 
peaking in the second quarter of 2007, household wealth dropped down $14 trillion by the 
end of 2008235. 
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Real US GDP began contracting in the third quarter of 2008 and did not return to growth until 
Q1 2010236. The contraction was 2.05 per cent237. Following different estimates, the fall in 
global trade at the time was between 25 and 35 per cent238.  
The Dow Jones index fell 55 per cent – from 14,198 in October 2007 to 6,469 in March 2009239.  
As a result, $50 trillion in value disappeared from world financial markets – stocks, bond, 
currencies – in 2008, $11 trillion in the US240. 
By February 2009 the US government had committed $9.7 trillion to the bailouts, an amount 
sufficient to pay off more than 90 per cent of the nation’s mortgages. In March that year, 
according to Bloomberg estimates, government loans, spending, and guarantees in the 
programmes soared to $12.8 trillion, more than all the existing US national debt to date241. 
A combined total public debt outstanding rose from $8.678 trillion as of 01 Jan 2007 to 
$13.178 trillion on 1 July 2010, and further to $17.824 on 30 September 2014, or about 103% 
of Q1 2014 GDP242 (66 per cent GDP in 2008 pre-crisis243). The combination of the national 
debt and other federal obligations would bring total obligations to nearly $62 trillion in 2Q 
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2010244. Without enormous expansion of the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet US Government 
would most likely face significant rise in its borrowing costs245. The chase for money has 
become the defining feature of the current fiscal policy, and the government’s financial policy 
as a whole. 
Following financial crisis of 2007-2008 the US regulatory system in respect of qui tam has 
incurred profound changes. These changes, however, had to deal with a growing dissent. 
 
It could not be said that the new rise of the qui tam since 1986 has enjoyed a unanimous 
support or at least acquiescence of the society. The powerful forces mainly from the 
corporate sector increasingly felt discomfort with the broader ramifications of the legislation. 
When the qui tam laws started to bite after long period of just barking, a high tide of lawsuits, 
challenging various aspects of the new legislation, flooded the US courts. The constitutionality 
was one of the central and most powerful issues, raised by the plaintiffs, who targeted qui 
tam246. None of those challenges have been success so far, but for a brief period of time in 
2004-2008 it appeared that the courts may to some degree emasculate the qui tam on 
procedural grounds following the ruling on United States ex rel. Totten v. Bombardier Corp 
(Six Circuit Court of Appeals, 2004), and Allison Engine Co. v. United States ex rel. Sanders 
(Supreme Court, 2008).  
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After the Allison Engine247 ruling, a noticeable shift occurred in lower court decisions that 
reflected the holding of the case. First, lower courts relied on the decision in refusing to find 
liability under the FCA in the absence of evidence showing a direct link between defendants' 
false statements to a private party and intent that the private party would submit those false 
claims to the government248. In addition, lower courts modified their pleading requirements 
to require that plaintiffs make additional allegations when pleading an FCA claim in order to 
survive dispositive motions filed by defendants.249 These changes made it significantly harder 
for plaintiffs to successfully commence claims because the additional standards required 
plaintiffs to plead allegations of defendants' specific intent to make a false statement or 
certification to the government.250 Defendants, on the other hand, were more protected from 
suits that alleged little more than technical regulatory violations251. 
 
Against that new backdrop, Congress swiftly made amendments, which were specifically 
targeted to undo the Supreme Court's decision in Allison Engine and the D.C. Circuit's similar 
decision in Totten252. The 2009 amendments contained in FERA removed from the FCA 
language that the Court relied on in Allison Engine when ruling that a party must intend for a 
claim to be paid by the government in order for liability to attach.253 
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In connection with its various bailout efforts in 2009, the US Administration secured a major 
amendment to the FCA in the form of the elimination of the "presentment" requirement for 
FCA liability254. Previously, only claims presented to an officer or employee of the United 
States federal government could trigger FCA liability255. The Fraud Enforcement and 
Recovery Act of 2009 (FERA) amended the FCA to allow actions based on a claim submitted 
to "any recipient of federal funds, not just a submission to the government itself."256 In 
addition, the FERA legislation eliminated the specific intent requirement previously 
incorporated in the FCA257. The United State Supreme Court in Allison Engine embraced a 
specific intent requirement for FCA liability. Only statements made for the purpose of 
obtaining a payment of governmental funds were deemed actionable258. Under the FERA 
amendments to the FCA, any statement made to obtain money "to be spent or used on the 
Government's behalf or to advance a Government program or interest"259 would now be 
actionable. 
 
These changes have paved the way for a wider range of statements, made in a wider range 
of contexts, to be the basis for a whistle-blower bounty claim. 
A further step was made in March 2010 by signing into law Patient Protection and Affordable 
Care Act (PPACA). The Act made further amendments to the False Claims Act, including: 
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Changes to the Public Disclosure Bar. Under the previous version of the FCA, cases filed by 
private individuals or “relators” could be barred if it was determined that such cases were 
based on a public disclosure of information arising from certain proceedings, such as civil, 
criminal or administrative hearings, or news media reports. As a result, defendants frequently 
used the public disclosure bar as a defence to a plaintiff’s claims and grounds for dismissal of 
the same. PPACA amended the language of the FCA to allow the federal government to have 
the final word on whether a court may dismiss a case based on a public disclosure. The 
language now provides that “the court shall dismiss an action unless opposed by the 
Government, if substantially the same allegations or transaction alleges in the action or claim 
were publicly disclosed.”260 
Original Source Requirement. A plaintiff may overcome the public disclosure bar outlined 
above if they qualify as an “original source,” the definition of which has also been revised by 
PPACA. Previously, an original source must have had “direct and independent knowledge of 
the information on which the allegations are based.” Under PPACA, an original source is now 
someone who has “knowledge that is independent of and materially adds to the publicly 
disclosed allegations or transactions.”261  
Overpayments. FERA redefined “obligation” under the FCA to include “retention of any 
overpayments.” Accordingly, such language imposed FCA liability on any provider who 
received Medicare/Medicaid overpayments (accidentally or otherwise) and fails to return the 
money to the government. However, FERA also raised questions as to what exactly is involved 
in the “retention of overpayments” – for example, how long a provider had to return monies 
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after discovering an overpayment. PPACA clarified the changes to the FCA made by FERA. 
Under PPACA, overpayments under Medicare and Medicaid must be reported and returned 
within 60 days of discovery, or the date a corresponding hospital report is due. Failure to 
timely report and return an overpayment exposes a provider to liability under the FCA262. 
Statutory Anti-Kickback Liability263. The federal AKS is a criminal statute, which makes it 
improper for anyone to solicit, receive, offer or pay remuneration (monetary or otherwise) in 
exchange for referring patients to receive certain services that are paid for by the 
government. Previously, many courts had interpreted the FCA to mean that claims submitted 
as a result of AKS violations were false claims and therefore gave rise to FCA liability (in 
addition to AKS penalties). However, although this was the “majority rule” among courts, 
there were always opportunities for courts to hold otherwise. Importantly, PPACA changed 
the language of the AKS to provide that claims submitted in violation of the AKS automatically 
constitute false claims for purposes of the FCA. Further, the new language of the AKS provides 
that “a person need not have actual knowledge … or specific intent to commit a violation” of 
the AKS. Accordingly, providers will not be able to successfully argue that they did not know 
they were violating the FCA because they were not aware the AKS existed. 
The biggest changes to the body of qui tam legislation were brought about by the Dodd-Frank 
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (its official name tells volumes 
about political environment, in which it was borne to life: “An Act to Promote the Financial 
Stability of the United States by Improving Accountability and Transparency in the Financial 
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System, to End ‘Too Big to Fail’, to Protect the American Taxpayer by Ending Bailouts, to 
Protect Consumers from Abusive Financial Services Practices, and for Other Purposes”264). 
 
The Dodd-frank Act expanded whistle-blower protection and monetary incentives for qui tam 
relators even further than FERA and PPACA265. It also expanded scope of qui tam actions to 
the financial fraud regardless whether the government funds were engaged or not. 
 
Novelties in regard to whistle-blower protection and encouragement spread across Titles VII, 
IX and X of the Dodd-Frank Act in total of 8668 words comprising slightly more than 2.2 per 
cent of the total wording of this statute. 
Section 748 and Section 922 of the Act amended The Commodity Exchange Act of 1936, 7 
U.S.C. 1 et seq. and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78a, et seq., by adding 
respectively Section 23 (“Commodity Whistle-blower Incentives and Protection”) and Section 
21F (“Securities Whistle-blower Incentives and Protection”). As explained in the House 
Conference Report, the addition of the whistle-blower provision was designed to “enhance … 
incentives and protections for whistle-blowers providing information leading to successful … 
enforcement actions”266.  
The information reported under the Act to the SEC or CFTC may involve violations such as 
insider trading, money laundering, accounting fraud, broker-dealer violations and violations 
of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977. The Commissions are authorised to share the 
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information provided by the whistle-blowers with other US government agencies, as well as 
foreign securities authorities and foreign law enforcement. 
The key of the statute’s provisions are summarised below.     
Whistle-blower Award. Sections 23 and 21F of the amended Acts specify that CFTC and SEC 
“shall pay” a financial award or awards to one or more whistle-blowers for voluntarily 
providing original information to the Commissions. The original information provided must 
lead to the Commissions recovering monetary sanctions exceeding $1 million. Monetary 
sanctions include "any monies, including penalties, disgorgement, [restitution267] and interest 
ordered to be paid"268 by the Commissions. Original information is defined to mean 
information that “(A) is derived from the independent knowledge or analysis of a whistle-
blower; (B) is not known to the Commission from any other source […]; and (C) is not 
exclusively derived from an allegation made in a judicial or administrative hearing, in a 
governmental report, hearing, audit, or investigation, or from the news media, unless the 
whistle-blower is a source of the information”269. Section 924 specifically authorises a whistle-
blower to receive an award "regardless of whether a violation of a provision of the securities 
laws, or a rule or regulation thereunder…" underlying the SEC enforcement action "occurred 
prior to the date of enactment" of the provision270. 
Exclusions. Certain whistle-blowers are not entitled to receive the financial award. Those 
excluded include whistle-blowers who (a) are officers or employees of certain government or 
self-regulatory organisations or were officers or employees at the time the information was 
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learned; (b) are convicted of a criminal violation related to the action for which they supplied 
the information; (c) gain the information through performance of an audit required under the 
securities laws; or (d) fail to submit the information to the CFTC or SEC in the form the 
Commissions require. 
Amount of Award. The amount of the financial award to which qualifying whistle-blowers are 
entitled ranges from a guaranteed minimum of 10 per cent to a maximum of 30 per cent of 
the amount of the monetary sanctions that the CFTC or SEC collect in the action. The 
percentage awarded within this range is within the discretion of the Commissions, subject to 
four specified criteria: ‘‘(I) the significance of the information provided by the whistle-blower 
to the success of the covered judicial or administrative action; ‘(II) the degree of assistance 
provided by the whistle-blower and any legal representative of the whistle-blower in a 
covered judicial or administrative action; (III) the programmatic interest of the Commission in 
deterring violations of the securities laws by making awards to whistle-blowers who provide 
information that lead to the successful enforcement of such laws; and (IV) such additional 
relevant factors as the Commission may establish by rule or regulation”271. Notably, a whistle-
blower who is denied the financial award may appeal the Commissions’ decision directly to 
the court of appeals of the United States. A whistle-blower may not, however, appeal the 
amount of an award if it is within the specified range of 10 – 30 per cent of the amount 
collected. 
 
Establishment of Funds. The financial award is to be paid by the CFTC and SEC out of two new 
funds called the “Commodity Futures Trading Commission Customer Protection Fund” and 
“Securities and Exchange Commission Investor Protection Fund” respectively. Certain 
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amounts of monetary sanctions collected by the Commissions are to be deposited into the 
Fund; but if the Fund do not have enough money to pay the required whistle-blower award, 
then the award, effectively, is to be paid out of the monetary sanction that the CFTC and SEC 
collect as a result of the information the whistle-blower provided. 
Whistle-blower Protection. The Act creates whistle-blower protection by prohibiting 
retaliation against an individual who provides information to the CFTC or SEC relating to the 
securities law violation, or who makes required disclosures under the Commodity Exchange 
Act, Securities Exchange Act, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002272 (SOX), or any other regulation 
within the Commissions' jurisdiction, or who participates in an investigation or action of the 
CFTC and SEC related to such original information. Section 748 and Section 922 include certain 
protections for whistle-blowers, including provisions that (a) protect the confidentiality of 
whistle-blowers; (b) expressly prohibit retaliation by employers; and (c) provide a private 
cause of action against a whistle-blower’s employer in the event the whistle-blower is 
discriminated against or discharged. The Act permits civil causes of action for wrongful 
termination, suspension, harassment or other discrimination because the whistle-blower 
engaged in the protected activity of reporting information to the Commissions. If retaliation 
is established, the whistle-blower may recover two times the amount of back pay owed with 
interest, reinstatement of seniority and recovery of litigation costs, including attorneys' fees 
and expert witness fees. Pre-dispute contractual provisions requiring employees to arbitrate 
claims under the Act are now unenforceable. 
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The Act also amends Sarbanes-Oxley whistle-blower protections to include both publicly 
traded companies and their subsidiaries and affiliates whose financial information is included 
in the consolidated financial statements of the publicly traded company. The Act permits 
individuals to bring claims directly in federal court up to ten years after the alleged retaliatory 
conduct (and without Department of Labour involvement as required under SOX). The Act 
also permits a jury trial. 
Section 1057 of the Act creates broad protections to employees in the financial services 
industry who are retaliated against for disclosing information concerning fraudulent or 
unlawful conduct relating to a consumer financial product or service. The financial service 
industry within the meaning of this section of the Act includes organisations that extend 
credit, service or broker loans, organisations that provide financial advisor services and 
organisations that provide credit counselling or consumer reporting information. Claims 
under this part of the Act must be filed initially with Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration of the Department of Labour before litigation. 
The Act further strengthens the anti-retaliation provisions of the Federal False Claims Act. 
Section 1079A of the Act now protects the investigation of potential fraud within the meaning 
of the False Claims Act and prohibits retaliation against the “employee, contractor, or agent 
or associated others"273. 
Rulemaking Authority. The CFTC and SEC are authorised by Section 748 and Section 922 to 
"issue such rules and regulations as may be necessary or appropriate" to implement these 
provisions274. Sections 748 and 924 of the Act require the CTFC and SEC respectively to 
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establish final regulations implementing the whistle-blower programme within 270 days from 
the enactment of the Act. 
The analysis of the whistle-blower provisions of the Financial Reform Act proves the shift from 
protection mode towards rewarding system in which the bounties plays the central part 
among all existing incentives. Having amended and enhanced the protection for whistle-
blowers the new Act by and large does not bring about a revolutionary change in the system 
already established by the Sarbanes-Oxley and other regulatory documents, as well as by the 
practice of their implementation. By putting the bounty system in the centre of the whistle-
blower institution American lawmakers and regulators in fact adopted a unified approach to 
the problem of tackling financial fraud, which brings about financial reward and qui tam 
provisions of the False Claims Act275 in the prosecution of corporate financial fraud. While 
existing system so far has appealed more to the sense of fear or to the moral principles of the 
potential whistle-blowers, the new approach appeals to much more practical and 
materialistic reasons to blow the whistle on fraud. 
 
Remarkable in its own right these amendments signify an expressive coherence of legislative 
and executive branches across party lines in regard to encouraging whistleblowing. 
 
The real-world impact of all those changes in different statutes relating to the qui tam made 
through 2009-2010 was far-reaching. The combination of new definitions serves to cover 
virtually any entity that receives money in any form from the federal government (and 
moreover, does not even receive that money), and it exposes any party who deals with such 
an entity to potential liability under the FCA. Inclusion of a “materiality" requirement in the 
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new language does little to constrain the law because materiality is defined so broadly that it 
covers any action "having a natural tendency to influence, or be capable of influencing, the 
payment or receipt of money or property."276 The truly universal reach of the new statutory 
language is unambiguous and straightforward. By all appearances, the post-2010 FCA has 
become exactly what the plaintiffs in Allison Engine Court were afraid of: an all-purpose 
antifraud statute of the widest scope277. At present qui tam provisions achieved panoramic 
scope, unseen at least since XVI-XVII century England. 
 
Taking this into consideration it would not be difficult to predict, that qui tam laws will be 
subject of more intensive attacks in the future, than at any given period of its millennium old 
history. The strong alliance of the corporate sector and dissenting legal scholars combined 
financial might with intellectual power, challenging qui tam concept in lobbying efforts, 
academic literature, and – most significantly – in courts. The focus of these attacks so far has 
been on the constitutionality of qui tam provisions. 
 
As it was mentioned above, the qui tam legislation has survived all these challenges. However, 
it is too early to claim an unequivocal victory for the qui tam concept. The struggle will 
continue, but at this point it is possible to give a brief overview and sum up the discussion on 
the constitutionality of the qui tam, which at present has been upheld by the courts. 
 
 
Constitutional Pass 
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The precipitous rise of qui tam cases in 2000s prompted coordinated response of corporate 
lobby groups. A number of influential American business organisations, including the 
Financial Services Roundtable, the Association of Corporate Counsel and the Chamber of 
Commerce, formally petitioned the Commodities Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) and 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to implement rules that would significantly restrict 
the scope of qui tam relators’ protections mandated by the laws implementing qui tam 
provisions. Thus, the Roundtable insisted that the CFTC and SEC required whistle-blowers to 
use "employer sponsored" reporting procedures, and also asked the Commissions to approve 
rules that would permit companies to sanction relators whose reports to law enforcement 
agencies caused "harm to the company."278 
It is highly unlikely that after the harshest financial crisis and recession, which coupled with 
tax scandals and excesses of top corporate management to destroy or severely damage the 
big business’ reputation, the current political and regulatory environment will let such 
lobbyists’ efforts result in substantial legislative concessions. However, from the point of view 
of the American lawmakers, the importance of the constitutional issues raised by qui tam 
goes far beyond the significance of the qui tam action itself. These issues go to the heart of 
how power is allocated among the three branches of the federal government. 
 
In fact, the much more formidable challenge of limiting the qui tam activity present academic 
dissidents, who deny constitutionality of qui tam lawsuits279. For the dissenting legal scholars, 
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despite the long history of qui tam activity, its constitutionality is still open to question280. The 
question has revolved around qui tam compatibility to the clauses of two US Constitution’s 
articles – Article II (§2 and §3) and Article III281. Because the qui tam informers themselves 
suffer no injury, they would appear at first blush to lack the "injury in fact" required creating 
Article III standing282. Two other requirements for a qui tam perceived to be necessary to 
prove standing -- being a) attributable to the defendant, and b) amenable to judicial relief283 
-- are constant subjects of constitutional challenge284. 
 
The qui tam statutes also raise separation of powers issues by effectively redistributing 
prosecution and enforcement powers from the executive branch to informers. The "good 
cause" requirement, and limitations on the government's ability to dismiss or settle a qui tam 
action, arguably permit the judicial branch to encroach on executive authority by giving 
federal courts control over, whether the government may intervene in, and terminate, a qui 
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tam action. The prosecutorial powers exercised by informers in pursuing qui tam actions raise 
the issue of whether informers must be appointed in conformity with the Appointments 
Clause of the Article II285. 
 
The critics also pointed out that, in their opinion, qui tam statutes challenged the President’s 
ability to fulfil his responsibilities under the take care clause286. Unlike the appointments 
clause, the take care clause does not vest authority in the President. Instead, it imposes a 
responsibility upon him287. The American Constitution was designed to allocate powers 
among the branches so as to prevent Congress or the courts from undermining or unduly 
interfering with the President’s ability to perform his constitutional duties, including the duty 
to take care to see that the laws are faithfully executed288.  
 
So far federal qui tam statutes have survived all types of constitutional challenges—those 
based on defendants’ rights to have standing and those based on the doctrine of separation 
of powers. 
 
The courts have found the rights required in criminal cases inapplicable, because qui tam 
actions are civil matters289. They have generally rejected standing arguments, because 
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relators stand in the shoes of the United States, in whose name qui tam actions are 
brought290. 
 
The courts have rejected appointments clause arguments, because relators hold no 
appointed office291. 
 
They have rejected take care clause arguments, because the residue of governmental control 
over qui tam actions has been considered constitutionally sufficient292. 
 
The analysis of the courts’ rulings suggests that there is a firm doctrinal justification for 
upholding the constitutionality of the FCA qui tam provisions. The doctrinal justification 
distinguishes cases like Morrison and Buckley, and demonstrates that qui tam actions pose 
less of a threat to the constitutional structure than did the congressional actions struck down 
or upheld in those cases. Having said this, it is worth pointing out that there are two particular 
features of qui tam actions that justify treating them differently than the other constitutional 
cases293. 
 
First, for the reason qui tam disperses power among the citizens rather than concentrating it 
in the hands of a single political branch, the principles underlying the separation of powers 
doctrine are not threatened as they are when, for example, Congress seeks to retain the 
power constitutionally delegated to another branch. 
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Second, qui tam actions are different because they have a very specific and extensive history. 
Qui tam is over fifteen hundred years old. It existed in the American colonies prior to the 
independence, and was part of several statutes enacted by the First Congress. Qui tam 
provisions have been an integral part of the FCA for over hundred and fifty years. 
 
Nearly all of the Article II cases involved efforts by Congress either to aggrandise power for 
itself or to vest power inappropriately in another branch of government. For example, in 
Morrison, Congress gave the judicial branch significant authority related to the independent 
counsel.294 In Buckley, Congress retained for itself the power to appoint members of the 
FEC295. Even in Freytag, in which the Court cautioned against the dispersal of the appointment 
power, the constitutional issue was which branch would wield the power to appoint trial 
judges for tax cases.296 
 
Instead of vesting primary or concurrent responsibility for the enforcement of a statute in 
one of the three branches of government, 297 qui tam provisions disperse that responsibility 
among the citizens. Some commentators have argued that this is a bad idea because it 
decreases political accountability for actions taken in the name of the government: 298 the 
president must stand for election, whereas qui tam informers do not. 
 
                                                          
294 Ibid. 
295 Ibid. 
296 Ibid. 
297 As discussed above, the FCA does give some power that ordinarily would be exercised by the executive branch 
to the judicial branch. Nonetheless, the primary transfer of power is from the executive branch to qui tam 
informers 
298 Lovitt, A., Note, Fight for Your Right to Litigate: Qui Tam, Article II, and the President, 49 Stanford Law Review 
853 (1997), pp. 874-75 
 80 
This argument overlooks the fact that political accountability is neither the only nor the most 
important value served by the separation of powers doctrine. The primary purpose of the 
separation of powers doctrine was to preserve liberty299 by dispersing federal power among 
the three branches. James Madison wrote that "[t]he accumulation of all powers, legislative, 
executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and whether 
hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition of 
tyranny."300  Similarly, Justice Brandeis, dissenting in Myers v. United States,301 wrote: “The 
doctrine of the separation of powers was adopted by the Convention of 1787, not to promote 
efficiency but to preclude the exercise of arbitrary power. The purpose was, not to avoid 
friction, but, by means of the inevitable friction incident to the distribution of the 
governmental powers among three departments, to save the people from autocracy.”302 
 
While this purpose may be subverted by the aggrandisement of or misallocation of power to 
one of the governmental branches, it is not seriously threatened by a dispersal of power 
among the citizens. In a qui tam action, the true party in interest is the citizenry - who, as it is 
repeatedly stated in all US history textbooks – are after all, a "government of the people, by 
the people, [and] for the people.” 303 The executive officials who would be exclusively 
responsible for prosecuting FCA actions absent the qui tam provisions are merely the 
representatives of the people. The FCA empowers citizens to enforce the FCA directly, rather 
                                                          
299 Caminker, supra note 184 at 44, p. 421,  
300 The Federalist, No. 47 (James Madison) [online] Available at: < https://www.gutenberg.org/files/1404/1404-
h/1404-h.htm#link2H_4_0047 > (accessed on 20 June 2013) 
301 272 U.S. 52 (1926) [online] Available at < https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/272/52/case.html > 
(accessed on 17 June 2013) 
302 Ibid. at 293 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) 
303 President Abraham Lincoln, Address at the Dedication of the Cemetery at Gettysburg (Nov. 19, 1863), in Nina 
Baym et al. eds (2011). The Norton Anthology of American Literature, 8th ed., W.W.Norton and Company, p.1579 
 
 81 
than indirectly through their executive branch representatives. This dispersal of power among 
the citizens is not only consistent with, but affirmatively promotes, the purpose of the 
separation of powers doctrine. 
 
Myers and Freytag, of course, cautioned against the diminution and diffusion of the 
appointment power. Implicit in the Freytag Court's analysis was the fear that Congress would 
weaken the executive branch by diffusing executive powers within the executive branch. If 
power is too diffuse, then it is not effectively wielded. In Myers, the diminution of executive 
power was more direct. In both cases, the Court was concerned that by weakening the 
executive branch, Congress would upset the balance of powers among the branches. 
 
The qui tam action, rather than limiting executive power, as in Myers, or diffusing power 
within the executive branch, as in Freytag, instead allocates power from the executive branch 
to the citizenry. The net effect, as in both Myers and Freytag, is to weaken somewhat the 
power of the executive branch. However, Myers and Freytag should be understood as 
standing for the proposition that Congress' ability to diffuse power should not be unlimited. 
If Congress were to attempt to privatise the whole federal law enforcement, for example, that 
could be cause for constitutional concern. Transferring power from a branch of government 
to the citizenry raises fewer constitutional concerns, and should receive less judicial scrutiny, 
than transfers of power from one branch to another.304 A statutory provision that dispersed 
power among the citizens simply did not pose the kind of threat to individual liberty that the 
unchecked power of an executive branch did.  
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The qui tam action, therefore, can be an analogue to citizen suit provisions,305 private suits, 
and corporate shareholder derivatives306, as it disperses power instead of concentrating it. 
While Freytag cautions against such a dispersal of power, dispersal to the citizenry, following 
this logic, should receive less constitutional scrutiny than inter-branch transfers of power. For 
this reason, and because the power transferred by qui tam is far from absolute, qui tam 
legislation should pass constitutional muster. 
The fact that the courts were explicitly reluctant to find any basis to declare the qui tam 
unconstitutional307 does not constitute the ultimate victory of its proponents in this long 
judicial dispute. As one of the strongest qui tam critics pointed out: even the Supreme Court 
may not be always right308. The discussion will continue, mainly in academic literature, but 
also in the courtrooms. The latest constitutional challenge, ACLU v. Holder -- though 
unsuccessful -- brought by the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU)309, shows that the serious 
economic interests presented by both sides of this supposedly theoretical argumentation will 
not let this fight to fade. However, it is telling that so far all recent attempts to bury or 
emasculate qui tam legislation in the USA have not succeeded. 
 
                                                          
305 There are two key differences between qui tam suits and citizen suits. First, the defendant in a qui tam suit 
is a private defendant, while the defendant in a citizens' suit usually is the government. Second, qui tam 
informers whose suit is successful are entitled to money paid to them, while the plaintiff in a citizens' suit is not. 
These distinctions make no constitutional difference. 
306 Caminker, supra 
307 Hamer, supra note 271 at 68, p. 101 
308 Lumm (2010), supra note 265 at 67, p. 533 
309 ACLU v. Holder, No. 09-2086 (4th Cir. March 28, 2011). ACLU alleged that the FCA’s seal provisions violate the 
public’s First Amendment right of access to judicial proceedings. ACLU also alleged that the seal provisions 
violate the First Amendment by “gagging” relators, and infringe on a court’s inherent authority to decide on a 
case-by-case basis whether a particular complaint should be sealed or not. [online] available at: 
<http://www.healthcarelawyerblog.com/2011/03/appeals_court_rejects_aclus_ch.html >  (accessed on 2 May 
2012) 
 83 
 
Conclusions 
 
Historical analysis of the qui tam from the law and economics perspective shows consistent 
patterns observable through its two and a half millennia evolution. 
Qui tam precedes the rise of modern state. Having been borne in antiquity qui tam was a 
common and important feature of law enforcement in Ancient Greece and Rome, medieval 
England and Iceland, colonial North America and later the United States. With nascent, 
underdeveloped and remote administrative bodies qui tam mechanism provided for law 
enforcement throughout the territory of a country, even where central administration never 
exercised a strong presence. 
With an advent of modern states, however, qui tam did not become extinct and died out. 
Rather it was adopted as an ancillary mechanism to the state law enforcement in Common 
Law jurisdictions, and as such it remains active in the United States, enjoying recent revival 
and rise in popularity. Both in the USA and in England qui tam proved to have common 
patterns in its evolution, and the analysis rendered in this chapter, allows drawing some 
conclusions. 
First of all, despite often abuse and scorn, qui tam as a law enforcement mechanism rarely 
provoked popular revolts. The omnipresent opinion that it was widely despised and hated in 
Ancient world and medieval England exaggerates and distorts historical facts. 
The populace was most time acquiescent when qui tam was applied to maintain general law 
and order, observe trade regulations and protect consumers’ interests. It loses public support 
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when used, as it happened in XVIII century England, to control social behavior and impose 
divisive moral standards. 
With growing middle class and forming civil society qui tam’s, popular support develops 
dynamics generally in line with prevailing public mood and political pendulum. It is reasonable 
to assume its growing political sensitivity. 
For the last hundreds years qui tam has been showing a remarkable flexibility and adaptability 
to the needs of the governing bureaucracy, having proven to be a useful tool, subject to 
relevant regulation. 
Though superficially the scope and scale of qui tam authority appear to depend on the 
pervasiveness and activism of the administrative machinery, more evidence given to the 
assumption that budget constrains play more important role in determining the exact place 
of qui tam in law enforcement strategy of the government. However, a further research is 
needed to establish whether the visible correlation implies causation.     
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Chapter II 
Literature Review 
 
The aim of this chapter is to render an analysis of the existing body of knowledge on the qui 
tam legislation and practice, and the legal forms that historically predated it. The main 
challenge for a literature review of the kind is that the existing literature on the subject does 
not provide a detailed and comprehensive analysis of the qui tam as a legal concept, neither 
is profound on a regulatory practice in whistleblower protection and its evolution through 
centuries. For many legal scholars and historians, qui tam -- in a broader sense, that comprises 
statutes and customs, which fit its main characteristics without bearing the name, -- remains 
a subject on the periphery of their studies. 
The majority of works on legal history share the moral reprobation of the contemporary 
chronographers, who often viewed the plaintiffs in qui tam litigation as instrumental in 
suppression of civil liberties and entrenching of tyranny, or a ruthless extortion310. 
The most of American studies on qui tam – and the works of the US scholars quantitatively 
and qualitatively preponderate over other researches on this theme – either focus on 
practical aspects of implementation of the recently enacted qui tam provisions311, or take part 
                                                          
310 Lofberg (1917), infra note 301 at 76; Bonner (1969), supra note 47 at 20; MacDowell (1978), supra note 48 at 
20; Rhodes (1981), infra note 300 at 76; Andrews (1981), supra note 52 at 20; Harvey (1985) infra note 322 at 
80; and (2003), infra note 307 at 77; Whitlark (2014), supra note 72 at 24 
311 For the generally positive view on qui tam see: Boese (2011), supra note 92 at 28; Pierce (2008), infra note 
485 at 110; Kitts (2010), infra note 486 at 110; Boese and McClain (1999), infra note 489 at 110; Bucy (1995), 
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in an ongoing academic discussion on constitutionality of qui tam312. However there are a 
number of outstanding academic publications remarkable both as a source of data and as an 
analytic work. 
Part I of this chapter presents a review of the sources on the historical development of the 
qui tam legislation with particular focus on its history in England and the United States. It 
starts with the scholarly publications analysing the institution of informants in Ancient Athens 
and Rome that preceded qui tam in medieval times. Then it consecutively reviews the works 
on qui tam in Anglo-Saxon and Medieval England, and respective legislation in England in XVII-
XX centuries. The review of the literature on historical development of the qui tam concept 
concludes with the studies on its evolution in British America and the USA. 
Part II reviews literature on qui tam in the contemporary United States, which mostly 
represents two ongoing discussions in American academia regarding qui tam: on its 
constitutionality, and on the role and place of private justice in the US legal system. 
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Part III comprises a review of the academic works on whistle-blowing protection, and the 
relevant legislation in the United States. 
 
Literature on the historical development of the qui tam legislation 
It is remarkable in its own sense, that historians of classical Greece generally ignore the 
sukophantai, regarding them as non-significant actor on the stage of Athenian democracy313. 
Works on the Athenian legal system, on the contrary, give sycophants a prominent place314, 
though often negative. Lofberg (1917) -- the first who provided a detailed analysis of 
sycophancy in a specific monograph315 -- considered them a social “disease”316. He also laid a 
foundation to a mistaken view of sycophancy as a profession, a view that later repeatedly 
appeared in works on Athenian legal system317. 
Osborne (1990), (2003) and (2010) was the first scholar who systemically disproved the 
tradition to call the Athenian sycophants a class of people who carried out prosecution 
motivated solely by pecuniary considerations318. From his point of view, “sycophancy was 
vitally important to the nature and running of Athenian democracy”319. 
Harvey (1990) and (2003) agrees with Osborne that sycophants were a vital element in the 
Athenian democracy, and that “the right of ho boulomenos320 to take action on behalf of an 
                                                          
313 For example, The Oxford History of Classical World (1986) does not have any reference to sycophants 
314 Bonner (1969), supra note 47 at 20; MacDowell (1978), supra note 48 at 20; Rhodes, P.J.,  (1981). A 
Commentary on the Aristotelian Athenaion Politeia, Oxford 
315 Lofberg, J.O. (1917). Sycophancy in Athens. Chicago 
316 Ibid. p.23 
317 Rhodes (1981) defined sycophants as “the men who took advantage of the laws… to make a profession of 
prosecuting, in order to obtain the rewards offered to successful prosecutors…” (supra note 300, pp. 444-445) 
318 Osborne (2003), supra note 62 at 22 
319 Ibid., p.84 
320 “Anyone who wishes” (Todd, S.C. (2003). A Glossary of Athenian Legal Terms, Demos, p.16) 
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injured person was amongst those reforms of Solon from which the common man gained 
most”321. But he strongly disagrees with him that “there was no trace of the profession of the 
sycophant in the orators”322, presenting his arguments in favour of the point of view that 
sukophantai were the people who abused the rights of their fellow citizens, and who made 
their living (or the most conspicuous part of the their living) of prosecution323. 
Among the most recent works, which pay close attention to the role, public accusers 
(sukophantai) played in Ancient Athens the research published in 2011 by Fleck and Hanssen 
is remarkable for a number of reasons. They build up the study on the benefits and costs of 
legal expertise in the most famous ancient democracy on the basis of the earlier works by 
Bonner (1969) and MacDowell (1978), who gave some thought to the place the Athenian law 
provided for sycophants in litigation, and Osborne (2010), who convincingly argued that 
sukophantai could not be viewed as professional prosecutors, but predominantly activist 
citizens324. As Fleck and Hanssen unfold their arguments, the dominant view among the 
scholars in Greek history of the sycophants as a substitute of state police and prosecution in 
the more advanced societies325 becomes less convincing. 
Classical Athens326 was one of history’s most famously democratic and commercially 
successful societies, and the Athenian legal code can be appreciated as the most advanced 
for its time. As MacDowell wrote, “the Athenians’ legal system, though less coherent than the 
                                                          
321 David Harvey, The Sycophant and Sycophancy: Vexatious Redefinition?, p.103 (in Cartledge, P. at al. (2003). 
Nomos: Essays in Athenian Law, Politics and Society. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge) 
322 Harvey, supra, p.114 
323 Ibid., p.116 
324 Osborne (2010), supra note 44 at 20, pp.205-228 
325 Andrews (1981), supra note 52 at 20; Osborne (2003), supra note 62 at 22, and (2010), supra; Harding 
(2015), supra note 55 at 20 
326 Most scholars date the Classical period from circa 480 to circa 323 BC 
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Romans’ a few centuries later, was probably the most comprehensive that any people had 
yet devised”327. But, as Fleck and Hanssen point out, the Athenians consciously eschewed 
legal expertise. The Athenians adjudicated through voting by randomly chosen citizens, with 
injured parties required to act as their own prosecuting attorneys and accused parties 
presenting their own defences – forbidden by law from hiring experts to represent them328. 
 
This was not the result of a general aversion to experts or primitive simplicity of the Athenian 
society. Athens was a complex society and the wealthiest in Ancient Greece, its economy was 
advanced, the demands on its legal system complex, and litigations were frequent and 
prodigious. As Bonner noticed, “litigiousness of Athenians was proverbial.”329 MacDowell 
concludes about Athenians’ attitude towards court procedures: “The lengthiness of the 
allocation procedure and the huge numbers of men included in each jury (in the fifth century 
as well as the fourth) show that they thought it worthwhile to devote an enormous amount 
of time” to the litigation330. And nevertheless, as Fleck and Hanssen write, the Athenians 
chose to disempower a de facto independent court of last resort as their society became more 
complex331. 
 
In their study the American researchers develop a model to analyse a basic trade-off related 
to expertise. As they point out: “The advantage of experts (over non-experts) is that experts 
can produce specialized information more efficiently. A disadvantage can arise, however, if 
experts take advantage of informational asymmetries and/or delegated powers to skew 
                                                          
327 MacDowell, supra note 48 at 20, p.8 
328 Fleck and Hanssen, supra note 45 at 20, p.2 
329 Bonner, supra note 47 at 20, p.96 
330 MacDowell, supra note 48 at 20, p.40 
331 Fleck and Hanssen, supra note 45 at 20, p.2 
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decisions in a manner that benefits [them]… but not society as a whole”332. Modern societies 
accept the trade-off in favour of expertise. But Athenians chose a different way – “they 
designed non-professional, low expertise legal institutions so as to limit opportunities to 
amass power and/or engage in rent-seeking and in order to elicit citizen preferences through 
direct participation in the litigation process”333. And it is exactly where the sukophantai come 
to prominence. As Fleck and Hanssen conclude: “[Their proliferation] reflects the basic nature 
of the expertise related trade-off: Athens could have done more to reduce the number of 
sycophants, but only by weakening the incentive for individuals to invest in public 
prosecution-related expertise (including private information about wrongdoing) that would 
enable them to bring forward socially beneficial cases”334. 
 
Harding (2015) puts the Athenian sukophantai in the context of the struggle between 
oligarchs and democrats that pervaded the political life in Athens throughout Classical and 
early Hellenistic periods. Harding admits that sycophants were a divisive feature of the 
Athenian society, and depending on view, they could be defined as “either civic-minded 
citizens, or interfering busybodies”335. Despite the negative opinion on sycophants prevailing 
in the works of legal historians (Harvey (1985) describes a sycophant as “a professional 
blackmailer, informer and prosecutor”336), for Harding sukophantai were one of the 
important pillars of the Athenian democracy and true guardians of the laws (nomoi)337. For 
this reason they were despised by the oligarchy, and subjected to numerous attacks and 
                                                          
332 Ibid. 
333 Ibid. 
334 Fleck and Hanssen, supra note 45 at 20, p.23 
335 Harding, supra note 55 at 20, p.262 
336 Harvey, F.D. Dona Ferentes: Some Aspects of Bribery in Greek Politics. P.78 (in Cartledge P.A. and Harvey, 
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extermination plans. Notwithstanding, this segment of the ancient democratic society 
survived through centuries due to the entrenched custom based on the fact that most of the 
Athenians strongly believed that every citizen could and – more importantly -- should 
prosecute any infringement of the laws. 
 
One of the earliest sources on the Roman system of prosecution by private citizens, later 
known as delatores or accusatores, can be found in the literary legacy of Marcus Tullius Cicero 
(I century BC), the statesman of the later Republic. In his De Officiis Cicero advances his 
reasoning for the prosecutorial activism of the Roman citizens. In his view, the prime 
motivation of such actions should be a service to the country, and protection against wrongs. 
He does not comment upon the form of reward for such activism, neither does he explicitly 
deny material inducements338. Later Greco-Roman historians Tacitus, Plutarch, Pliny the 
Younger and Suetonius subjected delatores to a sharp criticism, mainly on moral grounds, but 
none of them provided an analysis of the role informants played in an imperial bureaucratic 
machinery of their time339.  
 
In modern time, despite numerous works on Roman history and society, most scholars have 
not given delatores a comprehensive examination.  The majority of works tend to deal with 
delatores only peripherally. However, some works are remarkable in their deep penetration 
inside the minds of Roman informants and environment, in which they acted. Thus, Rogers’ 
study of criminal trials under Tiberius (1935)340 remains an important source of knowledge in 
respect of activities of delatores. But due to his focus on a political narrative he does not set 
                                                          
338 Cicero, supra note 77 at 25 
339 Bunson, supra note 71 at 24 
340 Rogers, R.S. (1935). Criminal Trials and Criminal Legislation under Tiberius. Middletown 
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the phenomenon of delatores in a broader cultural context.  It is a thoughtful study of 
dissidents under Nero by Rudich (1993)341, and also a work in Tacitus by Sinclair (1995)342 that 
made convincing attempts to place delatores in the social and cultural context of their time. 
Robinson (1995)343 in her study of the framework within which the law operated, and the 
nature of criminal responsibility in the late Republic and Empire wrote that Roman criminal 
law relied on a system of prosecution by private citizens, known as delatores. Beginning no 
later than Lex Pedia, which retroactively made criminals of Caesar's assassins; it became 
common for Roman criminal statutes to offer a portion of the defendant's property as a 
reward for a successful prosecution. 
The first systematic and comprehensive analysis of the phenomenon of delatores within 
larger historical, social and political context appeared in a monograph written by Rutledge 
(2001)344. “One would be pressed to find a better or more significant example of an informant 
under the Roman Empire than Judas Iscariot, -- writes Rutledge. -- But Judas was just a part 
of a much large phenomenon of the emperor Tiberius reign, when informants and accusers – 
delatores and accusatores – began their fierce attacks on those who were suspected of 
disloyalty towards the sovereign”345. Those informants, as he points out, were reflective of 
cultural and political values of Roman society, which little changed from Republic to Empire. 
Rutledge provides a detailed study of delatores with the aim to examine the function and role 
of the informants under the Early Principate from Tiberius to Domitian. Though Rutledge 
                                                          
341 Rudich, V. (1993). Political Dissidence under Nero. Routledge, London and New York 
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admits that his work “is only tangentially a legal study”346, the book provides with a perfect 
description of the early qui tam legislation, when an uninjured party is enabled to sue for a 
pecuniary reward derived from a statutory forfeiture as a penalty for transgression of a law. 
Rutledge gives sufficient evidence, that imperial accusatores were necessary for the effective 
workings of the government such as law enforcement and checking corruption in the 
provinces. Following a recent trend of Roman scholars to grant a more favourable and less 
critical view to the imperial rule in Rome he argues that many trials involving informants 
during the early Principate represent an improvement in governance from the republican 
period347. 
Whitlark (2014) provides some vivid anecdotes of successful delatores of the early Principate 
who amassed considerable wealth, gained political influence or simply managed to escape 
persecution for seditious activities by being informants and issuing mainly false accusations. 
He wrote that “the wealth or status that came from informing enabled people to circumvent 
the typical avenues of promotion… and cut across time-honoured loyalties”348. This was the 
reason why public opinion depicted informants as mostly “those arising from the dregs of 
society, including… slaves and freedmen, motivated by the desire for money, status, influence 
or preservation”349. 
The work of Dominik and Hall (2010) is interesting by the analysis of the Roman court 
procedures and how those procedures defined the roles of informants (one who denounces 
the crime, one who witnesses, and one who prosecutes)350. Most of informants were far from 
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illiterate outsiders and societal dregs. In Roman courts they have to show the art of rhetoric 
to defend their cases, a fact that indirectly points to the gradual professionalization of 
delatores351. 
The prime source of information about the private nature of criminal prosecution and 
execution of judgements in early medieval societies in Europe is a Hrafnkels saga352, which 
describes in detail how in the absence of any state administration the members of the 
Icelandic society in the X century used in fact qui tam principles to prosecute offenders. The 
fact that the saga written in the XIII century353 depicts vividly the customs and laws of the 
early medieval Icelandic society shows that the qui tam was well known and regarded as a 
habitual practice on the more developed stages of the Nordic state. 
Attenborough in The Laws of the Earliest English Kings (2013)354 provides the first evidence of 
the qui tam law in Anglo-Saxon England, thus pointing out that English qui tam statutes had 
historical antecedents in Anglo-Saxon law. In 695 A.D., Wihtred, King of Kent, issued a law 
prohibiting labour on the Sabbath, which included what could be described as the first written 
English qui tam enforcement provision: "If a freeman works during the forbidden time 
[between sunset on Saturday evening and sunset on Sunday evening], he shall forfeit his 
healsfang355, and the man who inform against him shall have half the fine, and [the profits 
arising from] the labour”356. 
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Professor Plucknett in Edward I and Criminal Law (1960)357 showed that the rise of a qui tam 
enforcement started prior to the consolidation of authority in the court of a single English 
sovereign358. Plucknett and Lipson in The Economic History of England (1959)359 argued that 
in England even before the Magna Carta common law qui tam provided an efficient way to 
pursue fraud without government prosecutors. In addition, private citizens valued qui tam 
more because it allowed them access to royal courts. The steep rise of qui tam enforcement 
began in earnest 250 years after the Norman Conquest360, and that rise manifested the 
expanding authority of an English monarch. Holdsworth in A History of English Law (1923)361 
gives a broad picture of medieval English and more younger UK legislation, showing 
significance of qui tam action in law enforcement on various stages of evolution of the English 
legal system. 
 
The most comprehensive and profound research on the rise and decline of qui tam in England 
was published by J. Randy Beck in The False Claims Act and the English Eradication of Qui Tam 
Legislation (2000)362. Beck’s work remains the most detailed publication comprising the 
numerous qui tam statutes adopted by the English monarchs in medieval times, and later 
during the Enlightment and Victorian periods. To date his research has been the outstanding 
source of knowledge on the history of qui tam legislation in England and the United Kingdom, 
and as such remains unrivalled. 
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As professor Beck notes, qui tam in England (in his words, “an archaic form of litigation”363) 
served for centuries as the principal means of enforcing a wide range of statutes. England 
moved away from qui tam enforcement in the 1800s and abolished it altogether in 1951 by 
the Common Informers Act. Beck considers the recurring problems that beset English qui tam 
enforcement, the widespread contempt for informers, and the reasons for Parliament's 
eventual eradication of such legislation. Being part of a wider US discussion on the expediency 
and constitutionality of the qui tam in contemporary America the work presents arguments 
against qui tam. Beck gives three reasons to why the legislation was abolished in the UK in 
1951364. 
 
First, in England the qui tam doctrine was initially instituted as a legal adjunct to supplement 
country's insufficient legal machinery in order to bring more offenses to the cognizance of the 
courts. Informers might have been necessary at an earlier time in English history. It was not 
until 1856 that all areas of the country had a police force. The rise of law enforcement, both 
quantitative and qualitative, made that private enterprise function redundant365. 
 
Second, from the point of view of the majority lawmakers at the time of abolishing the qui 
tam laws, the qui tam informer undermined the coherence and homogeneity of the British 
society366. 
 
Third, qui tam legal principles provoked legal conflict with Scotland, for the reason Scots Law 
did not recognise common informer procedure before Union of Parliaments367. 
                                                          
363 Ibid., p. 541 
364 Ibid., pp. 604-608 
365 Ibid., p.606 
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However, in fact, as Beck reluctantly admits, all the reasons above provided just a background 
for the UK members of Parliament. The decision to abolish legislation was made by the 
Parliament primarily to circumvent the still existing XVIII-century pro-faith legislation, which 
banned “amusements” and “entertainment” (including sales of alcohol) on Sundays (Sunday 
Observance Act)368. 
Professor Beck’s work goes beyond historical analysis of qui tam evolution in the UK.  As a 
strong opponent of qui tam legislation he provides analysis of the US and UK qui tam laws 
from the angle of a public interest, building up the case for its abolishing on the grounds that 
this kind of legislation is obsolete, and brings about a significant detrimental potential to 
haunt the whole society. His rationale focuses on an argument that qui tam statutes contain 
an inherent conflict of interest because they afford informers a pecuniary interest that often 
conflicts with public interests at stake in the litigation. He points out to the real world 
problems that stemmed from qui tam litigation in England -- extortion of secret settlements, 
fraudulent accusations, unrestrained pursuit of defendants (often for minor offenses). He 
views these problems as particular manifestations of a more fundamental flaw at the heart 
of a qui tam statute. By offering the successful informer a bounty qui tam legislation provides 
a personal financial interest in the law enforcement process that often conflicts with other 
public interests at stake in the litigation. This conflict of interest causes informers to initiate, 
conduct, and terminate enforcement actions in ways that are harmful to the broader 
community369. 
Beck identifies particular ways in which informers seeking the largest possible bounty have 
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undermined the public interest in English qui tam cases and in cases brought under the qui 
tam legislation in the US: 
 Diverting the public's share of the qui tam recovery370; 
 Imposing unproductive and counterproductive social costs: pursue fraudulent and 
meritless claims, claims based on a mere technical noncompliance with reporting 
requirements that involved no harm to the public interest, file economically harmful 
prosecutions371; 
 Nurturing unlawful conduct372. 
From Beck’s point of view, the fundamental flaw of qui tam legislation is that a qui tam 
informer acts primarily for the sake of the statutory bounty. The informer is “a single-minded 
automaton, programmed to seek out statutory violations and collect forfeitures”373. As Beck 
states, the issues relevant to an informer's pursuit of forfeitures are: first, the likelihood that 
the informer could convince a court that the defendant violated a statute; and, second, the 
ability of the defendant to pay the resulting penalty. This focus on wealth maximisation tends 
to exclude competing considerations. Beck argues, that a financially motivated informer will 
be relatively insensitive both to the goals of a regulatory regime and to the social costs 
imposed by enforcement because neither directly impacts the collection of bounties. This 
insensitivity towards regulatory goals and social costs is borne out in both the English history 
of qui tam enforcement and in modem experience under the US qui tam laws, professor Beck 
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concludes374. 
From his point of view, the inevitability of conflict between the interests of informers and the 
interests of the public -- in certain contexts – has a huge detrimental effect on the society: 
empowering informers to represent the public promises to undermine the public good in 
situations where their interests diverge. The antagonism between the goals of informers and 
those of the public is harmful to the welfare of the community, sums up Beck375. 
His preferred alternative is a state prosecution with the authority of a prosecutorial 
discretion. He argues, that a public prosecutor, contrary to the common informer, lacks a 
direct financial interest in the outcome of a case and is, therefore, more likely to take into 
consideration and to act upon a broader range of public interests than a qui tam informer376. 
Prosecutorial discretion, Becks argues, is one of the most important mechanisms for achieving 
an optimal level of enforcement and avoiding unproductive social costs associated with an 
overzealous implementation of the regulatory regime377.  
Following the earlier works of Block and Sidak378, Parker379, LaFave and Israel380, Abrams381, 
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Breitel382, and a case Wayte v. US383, Beck builds up his argument defending the merits of a 
prosecutorial discretion: 
Public prosecutors are expected to exercise judgment in balancing the various public 
interests at stake in the enforcement process. A prosecutor may decide not to 
challenge conduct that falls within the terms of a statute, if she thinks the public would 
not be well served by an enforcement action. In deciding who to prosecute, she may 
consider the likelihood of a successful outcome in a particular case, the deterrent 
value of the prosecution, the blameworthiness of the particular defendant compared 
to other potential defendants, the extent to which the defendant's conduct implicates 
the policies underlying the statute, the effect of the prosecution on other interests of 
the public, and other similar matters. Prosecutorial discretion permits a case-by-case 
balancing of competing public interests implicated by each potential enforcement 
action. Additionally, it serves as a significant protection of liberty interests, operating 
as a buffer between the individual and the power of the state. Prosecutorial discretion 
also fosters public accountability in the decision-making process384. 
 
Beck regards as a fundamental advantage that in many cases a prosecutor would advance the 
public interest by refraining from filing an enforcement action, notwithstanding statutory 
authorisation to do so. Recognising and acting upon the public interest requires evaluation of 
the policies behind a statutory prohibition and the costs imposed by the enforcement 
process385. 
However, being a realist, Beck has to admit that even public prosecutors do not always act 
from the purest of motives. Public prosecutors sometimes act corruptly, egotistically, from 
partisan motives, or for purposes of career enhancement. But, he argues, a qui tam statute 
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384 Beck (2000), supra note 4 at 8, pp.609-610 
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“intentionally turns prosecutorial decision-making into a mercenary endeavor by purposefully 
inserting personal financial concerns into a process that we normally seek to keep free from 
such complicating influences”386. Through provision of a bounty to a successful informer, a 
system of qui tam enforcement eliminates the personal and public protections afforded by 
prosecutorial discretion. A qui tam statute operates by appealing to the pecuniary interests 
of informers, and therefore, professor Beck concludes, to the extent the informer's personal 
financial interest conflicts with public interests affected by an enforcement action, the public 
interest will be inevitably sacrificed387. 
Professor Beck’s arguments will be closely analysed in Chapter III. 
By the XVII century qui tam in England had acquired such an important status as part of the 
legislation that it became a subject of analyses by two prominent English jurists, who were 
the first to describe and systematise it – Sir Edward Coke and Sir William Blackstone.  
Edward Coke in his Third Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England (1664) devotes a chapter 
“Against Vexatious Relators, Informers, and Promooters upon penal Statutes”388, aimed at 
devising a reform to the legislation designed to control the practices of the activist bounty 
hunters, accustomed to bring lawsuits against their compatriots. Despite strong language 
about delinquent public informers -- turbidum hominum genus389, Lord Coke never advocated 
the abolishing of the qui tam laws. His aim was to improve the implementation of existing qui 
tam legislation, following the number of statutes and royal proclamations aimed at reining in 
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activities of common informers, signed by Queen Elizabeth I and King James I, namely: An Act 
to Redress Disorders in Common Informers (1576)390, An Act for the Continuance and 
Perfecting of Divers Statutes (1587)391, An Act Concerning Informers (1589)392, A Proclamation 
Declaring His Majesties Grace to His Subjects, Touching matters Complained of, as Publique 
Greevances (1621)393, An Act for the Ease of the Subject  concerning the Informacions uppon 
Penall Statutes (1623)394, and A Proclamation for Prevention of Abuses of Informers, Clerkes, 
and Others in Their Prosecutions upon the Lawes, and Statutes of this Realme (1635)395. 
Coke identified four remaining “mischiefs”, which required further legislative redress:  
First, the common informants converted “many penal Laws which were obsolete, and in time 
grown impossible or inconvenient to be performed, into Snares to vex and intangle the 
Subject”396. 
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Second, “common informants, and many times the King’s Attorney drew all informations for 
any offence, in any place within the Realm of England against any penal Law, to some of the 
King’s Courts at Westminster, to the intolerable charge, beration, and trouble of the 
Subject”397. 
Third, “in Informations etc., the offence supposed to be against the penal Law, and to be 
committed in one County, was at the pleasure of the Informer etc. alleged in any County 
where he would, where neither party nor witness was known, against the right institution of 
the Law, that the Jury (for their better notice) should come de vicineto of the place where the 
fact was committed”398. 
Forth, “in divers cases the party Defendant in Informations of Actions upon the Statute were 
driven to plead specially, which was both chargeable and dangerous to him, if his plea were 
not both substantial and formal also”399. 
Lord Coke suggests amendments to be enacted in the relevant laws in a form of a new Act to 
ensure the right balance between a proper law enforcement and prevention of abuse by 
“viperous vermin” among common informants400, who “endeavoured to have eaten out the 
sides of the Church and Common wealth”401. 
Sir William Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of England (1765-1769)402 provide an 
opportunity to analyse a qui tam from the point of view of a XVIII century English scholar who 
lived at the time when qui tam legislation in the UK was in its mature form. By the time 
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Blackstone's Commentaries were published qui tam enforcement had been in common use 
for centuries, and for this reason the work of a prominent English jurist offers an expert view 
on the long term development of qui tam. 
Blackstone addressed qui tam actions on the basis of the law of contracts. The perceived 
contradictions that qui tam actions enforce legislative mandates, while the contracts derive 
contractual obligations from mutual consensual agreement, in Blackstone’s view, however, 
are non-existent. It was from the fundamental social contract, he points out, that the 
obligation to obey a penal statute is derived. Those who violated a penal statute were "bound 
by the fundamental contract of society to obey the directions of the legislature, and pay the 
forfeiture incurred to such persons as the law required”403. 
Blackstone identified three categories of litigants, who might bring and action under the 
terms of a particularly English penal statute. In one group were those aggrieved by the 
defendant’s statutory violation – the victims of the offence. It was a normal legal practice to 
give a cause of action to persons injured by the defendant – a way of enforcement still being 
a common practice. Blackstone also identified the King as a potential litigant under a penal 
statute, presuming officials could pursue a recovery on behalf of a sovereign – also a common 
practice in contemporary UK and US. Those who fell into the third category of litigants were 
royal subjects who could bring a qui tam case404. 
As Blackstone noted, under many English penal statutes, a claim could be prosecuted by “any 
of the king's subjects" who would bring the action. Statutes permitted a person to sue for a 
penalty even if the person had not been injured by the conduct, giving rise to the forfeiture: 
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“Sometimes one part is given to the King, to the poor, or to some public use, and the other 
part to the informer or prosecutor; and the suit is called a qui tam action, because it is brought 
by a person “qui tam pro domino rege, &c., quam pro se ipso in hac parte sequitur [who sues 
on behalf of the King as well as for himself]”405. 
Two important implications following the authority of the qui tam informer to sue "on behalf 
of the King." First, the informer serves as the advocate for public interests that would 
otherwise be advanced by the public servants. If the informer succeeds in a qui tam action, a 
portion of the recovery goes to the treasury or to the fulfilment of some public purpose406. 
Second, by pursuing a qui tam action the informer forecloses a subsequent action by 
government prosecutors alleging the same statutory violation. Except in cases of collusion, 
"the verdict passed upon the defendant in the qui tam suit is a bar to all others, and conclusive 
even to the King himself”407. This is how the qui tam informer stands in the shoes of a 
government attorney. The informer is a self-appointed prosecutor, empowered by law to 
enforce the social contract as if he/she is a government official.  
Blackstone revised qui tam cases in the context of criminal proceedings. A criminal 
prosecution could be commenced by “information” – a procedure available to both the King 
and a qui tam informer408.  The informer has a choice between either civil or criminal qui tam 
action409. English penal statutes offered the informer a variety of procedural means for 
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collecting a statutory forfeiture, including a criminal information or an “action of debt” – a 
form of action typically used in civil contract cases410. 
Blackstone suggests a particular criteria to identify a qui tam statute: 
 The statute defines an offense against the sovereign or proscribes conduct contrary 
to the interests of the public411; 
 A penalty or forfeiture is imposed for violation of the statute412; 
 The statute permits a civil or criminal enforcement action pursued by a private 
party413; 
 The private informer need not be aggrieved and may initiate the action in the absence 
of any distinct, personal injury arising from the challenged conduct414; 
 A successful informer is entitled to a private benefit consisting of part or all of the 
penalty exacted from the defendant415; 
 The outcome of the private informer's enforcement action is binding on the 
government416. 
 
It must be a combination of all abovementioned features that would distinguish a qui tam 
action from other ways of statutory enforcement. 
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The divisive nature of qui tam is reflected by two prominent English jurists and police 
magistrates, who were the first to organise a group of professional detectives in London – the 
Fielding brothers.  
It is worth mentioning that Sir John Fielding built up the first consistent fundamental critique 
of qui tam in England, given from the point of view of social morale. Notably he presided over 
the first professional police force in London in XVIII century417. In his book, co-written with his 
half-brother Henry, Extracts From Such of the Penal Laws, As Particularly Relate to the Peace 
and Good Order on This Metropolis: With Observations for the Better Execution of Some, and 
on the Defects of Others418 he pointed out that the rewards offered to informers had the 
perverse effect of discouraging public-spirited citizens from reporting evidence of crimes. The 
informers were berated for lacking public spiritedness, because they demanded a reward to 
perform the duty of every citizen. Moreover, the informer “is unconcerned about the public 
interest, and he is actuated purely by mercenary motives and his own cupidity419. Fielding 
believed it was wrong for a free country to allow informers to seek redress for their own 
pecuniary advantage in respect of a public wrong in which they had no direct personal 
interests or concern. A wrong to the State should surely be atoned for by a penalty payable 
to the State alone, advocates Fielding420. 
 
The development of qui tam legislation as part of a wider process of adopting English common 
law system in North American colonies is analysed most comprehensively in The History and 
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Development of Qui Tam (1972)421. The research provides a detailed inside view onto the qui 
tam legislation in pre-revolutionary America and early United States. It is often quoted in 
more recent works on qui tam in the US422.  
The research assumes that qui tam as it existed in England could have been received in the 
United States in three ways. First, the common law qui tam action by which an aggrieved 
party sought to redress his injuries may have been adopted generally along with other 
portions of the common law. Secondly, specific English statutes, which could be enforced by 
a qui tam suit, may have been adopted by colonial or state legislatures. Thirdly, American 
legislatures may have used English law as a model for qui tam provisions in American 
statutes423. 
 
The work states, that “no evidence has been found of a common law qui tam suit in our early 
history”424, and most likely that American colonial lawyers were not familiar with the early 
use of qui tam as a common law device to bring a suit in a royal as opposed to local court. 
Although theoretically a non-statutory qui tam may have been adopted together with the rest 
of the English common law, no actual cases to support the theory have been found425, 
conclude the researchers from the Washington University. 
 
On the other hand, the research found “numerous examples of statutory qui tam in early 
American history”426. Many colonies expressly borrowed certain English statutes, which could 
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be enforced by qui tam procedures, while some other statutes were adopted with minor 
modifications427. Moreover, American legislatures did use qui tam provisions similar to those 
found in English statutes, such as the use of informers to enforce penal laws428. However, 
while some statutes permitted informers or aggrieved parties to bring a qui tam case to court 
of justice, other statutes provided rewards to informers without permitting them to sue429. 
 
The research shows, that statutes providing for qui tam suits were common in eighteenth 
century America, and the notion that qui tam was a joinder of public and private interests 
was generally accepted430. It is worth noting, that, as research found, many statutes had been 
interpreted as giving informers the same kind of contingent interest in the penalty as their 
English counterparts. Remarkably, in some instances, legislatures enacted statutes, which 
acknowledged the primacy of the first informer's suit, thereby adopting the English attitude 
towards multiple informers431. The American courts also adopted the English test of whether 
or not a penalty could be recovered in a qui tam suit432. 
 
The research concludes that the reception of English law went beyond the mere recognition 
that an aggrieved party or informer could sue qui tam. The reception extended to an adoption 
of the English qui tam procedures, and “it seems clear that qui tam as it existed in early 
America was virtually identical to English qui tam”433. The colonies and newly established 
states adopted not only the letter, but also the spirit of this English legislation. 
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Literature on qui tam in the contemporary USA 
 
The most comprehensive data on existing US qui tam legislation can be found in seminal book 
by J.T. Boese Civil False Claims and Qui Tam Actions (2011)434. In its latest edition, published 
in 2011, the prolific author on this subject complemented analysis of the federal laws and 
implementation practice by vast data on the growing number of qui tam laws and regulations 
adopted by the states’ legislators. 
With over 30 year practice as a qui tam lawyer, Boese in his bi-annually updated editions 
provides an analysis of all the major and most significant new qui tam cases, which contribute 
to the development of qui tam law in the US. One of the main advantages of the author is his 
ability to take on evolving with a particularly fast pace this area of law, and identify trends 
and analytical distinctions. This ability allowed Boese to categorise various issues in a logical 
fashion. He groups all civil claims act cases into the five most common types, namely: the 
"Mischarge" case435, the "Fraud-in-the-Inducement" or "False Negotiation" case436, the "False 
Certification" case437, the "Substandard Product or Service" case438, and the "Reverse False 
Claim" case439. 
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Boese gives a detailed analysis of a procedure under qui tam cases. In Chapter IV he describes 
the parties in a qui tam case, and provides classification of qui tam plaintiffs (“relators”)440: 
current employees, former employees, competitors and competitors’ employees, multiple 
qui tam plaintiffs, state and local governments, special interest groups, attorneys and law 
firms, government employees, the “professional” qui tam relators. Practice and the 
procedure under the False Claims Act are analysed in the Chapter V441. 
 
Boese pays much attention to the processes of establishing and, remarkably, avoiding liability 
under the qui tam law, based on res judicata and collateral estoppel442. Importantly Boese 
explains what the False Claims Act does not cover. Although false tax returns are almost 
certainly the most common false claim filed with the federal government, the False Claims 
Act expressly excludes such claims from the scope of its coverage. This FCA "tax bar" has been 
held to apply broadly whenever a false claim is made or a benefit is procured under the 
Internal Revenue Code, and is not limited to false income tax claims443. Recently, as Boese 
noticed, New York amended its state FCA to allow qui tam enforcement of tax law 
violations444. 
 
Being a vociferous proponent of the qui tam actions Boese, however, does not provide with 
deep jurisprudential academic insight into complex nature of the legislation, but what he lacks 
is complemented by his unrivalled knowledge of the subject. 
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Preceding adoption of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act in 2010 Boese published 
an article The Past, Present, and Future of Materiality under the False Claims Act445, dedicated 
to the question of materiality as a necessary element for liability under the qui tam law. The 
article significantly contributes to what had been already published on the subject in his 
book446, applying it to a significantly expanding health service. As Boese notes, materiality has 
always been one of the most important debates in the jurisprudence of the civil False Claims 
Act. The questions have traditionally revolved around:  
 Whether materiality was an essential element for FCA liability. 
 If so, how “materiality” would be defined. 
 However defined, how courts would apply this element. 
 
As Boese points out, “the reason this question is so critical is that materiality is the difference 
between innocence and guilt under this quasi-criminal statute”447. Materiality is not an issue 
in such qui tam cases as a hospital that bills Medicare for a “phantom” patient it has never 
treated, or a doctor who treats a Medicare patient and then codes the treatment at a higher 
reimbursement level. The issue of materiality is never litigated in these cases because the 
violation has been obvious—the defendant billed the government for services that it had not 
provided, and such rogue actions constitute the essence of a “false claim”448. 
 
Materiality is a critical determination, however, for cases based on what some courts call 
“legally false” claims contrary to the “factually false” claims as described above. In a case 
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based on a “legally false” claim, or in a “false certification” case, the defendant has provided 
the goods or services to the government or government beneficiary for the agreed upon 
price449. In every FCA case of this nature the court has to address the question whether these 
factually true claims become legally false because of the violation of ancillary legal 
requirements. 
 
As Boese argues, the answer in most cases has depended on the application and definition of 
the requirement of materiality. If and when the ancillary violations are material to the 
government’s decision to pay the claim, concludes Boese, then assuming the necessary 
knowledge or intent requirement has been met the claim is false and the defendant is 
liable450. 
 
Remarkable contribution to the publications on qui tam laws in the United States has been 
given by Stephan Kohn in his meticulously sourced book Qui Tam and False Claim Acts: 
Federal, State and Municipal Qui Tam Laws (2012)451. The book is the second volume in the 
National Whistleblower Center's "Whistle-blower Laws" series.  
 
Kohn outlines all existing US laws that allow private citizens who witness fraud against a 
government entity to file suit "blowing the whistle" on those contractors who produce the 
false claims to the government agencies, and to be awarded a portion of the monies 
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recovered. The book contains the federal False Claims Act, the texts of false claims act 
legislation from 22 states, as well as various city governments, and more importantly the 
recently enacted federal qui tam provisions covering tax fraud.  
 
The False Claims Act: Fraud Against the Government (2010)452, by Phillips & Cohen partner 
Claire M. Sylvia provides a comprehensive treatment of the laws that have developed under 
the US False Claims Act. Cases brought under the act by individuals through qui tam actions 
involve the full range of government programmes, including defence procurement, 
healthcare, housing subsidies, and environmental clean-up. This treatise also discusses 
liability to the government for false claims; liability to private individuals for retaliation; and 
damages and other remedies, including civil penalties, the relator's share, and attorneys' fees 
and costs. Analysis is also given to procedure in qui tam actions, jurisdiction, pleadings, 
discovery, and other pretrial issues, interim remedies, settlement, and dismissal. 
In academic literature the qui tam, particularly the qui tam provisions of the False Claims Act, 
have generated a significant volume of commentary. Qui tam has become part of the three 
ongoing discussions among mostly American (with some contribution from Australian453) 
academics and practicing lawyers: debates on private vs. public justice; so-called “supply-
side” critique of qui tam, and debates on constitutionality of qui tam law in the US. 
The vast body of academic research analyse the qui tam as one of the models of private 
enforcement, and puts it in the context of a discussion on the merits of private comparing 
to public justice454. The debate raises critical questions about the use of private enforcement 
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as a regulatory tool that extend far beyond the FCA, to areas as diverse as employment 
discrimination, environmental, antitrust, securities, and patent law. Champions of Private 
justice point to its rapid growth and impressive results, particularly when it comes to qui tam. 
Thus, David Engstrom in his seminal Harnessing the Private Attorney General: Evidence from 
Qui Tam Litigation (2012)455 considers some seven thousand cases since 1986 with judgments 
approaching three billion dollars annually -- easily rivalling and even eclipsing securities and 
antitrust litigation456 — as evidence of massive corporate fraud committed against the United 
States and, in turn, the need for a robust private enforcement role457. 
 
To date, the most comprehensive analysis of private justice models and qui tam as its 
integrated part has been done in Private Justice (2003) by Pamela Bucy458. Before her work 
private enforcement regimes have been subject to little systematic analysis of private 
enforcer characteristics, much less convincing analysis of the role of private enforcement 
capacity within the regime as a whole. “Private justice actions have grown hodge-podge in 
American jurisprudence throughout the twentieth century, some created by legislatures, 
others by courts”, notes Bucy459. “Today, private justice actions exist in almost every area of 
life that law seeks to regulate. They vary in design, impact, success, disruption to economic 
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stability, and values communicated”460. Bucy has identified private justice as a phenomenon, 
analysed its various models, and assessed its impact as part of a future effective regulation. 
 
The research describes the private justice models currently in use in the US legal system 
(“victim” model461; “common good” model462, comprising citizen suits and qui tam; and 
“hybrid” model463), noting that qui tam is the best in enticing those who have inside 
information about wrongdoing to come forward464. Bucy discusses the substantial systemic 
costs in using the private justice model, and suggests how a private justice paradigm can be 
optimally designed to minimise these costs while also maximising the benefits of private 
justice. She suggests that an optimally designed private justice model should be expanded 
into two areas: protection of the environment and protection of national financial markets465. 
 
Contrary to the prevailing opinion among regulators that private justice actions play no more 
than just supplementary role to public enforcement, professor Bucy advances her vision of 
an optimal regulatory system: 
There is little choice but to embrace private justice as part of any public regulatory 
system. The significant resources private justice brings to regulatory efforts are inside 
information about violations and entrepreneurial legal talent. Of these, the resource 
of inside information is more important. This is an invaluable commodity that the 
regulatory world must pay for466. 
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In another work - Information as a Commodity in the Regulatory World (2002)467 – Bucy 
develops her analysis of the importance of the insider information about wrongdoing – 
“essential commodity”468 for the regulatory world. She argues, that given the increasingly 
global and interconnected world the regulators have no choice but to add a new institutional 
design of private justice to a public regulatory system to boost its effectiveness. 
 
Analyses of the citizen suit private justice action and its juxtaposition with qui tam can be 
found in Blomquist (1988)469, Boyer and Meidinger (1985)470, Gitlen (1995)471, Hodas 
(1995)472, and Lehner (1995)473. They argue that citizen suits as private attorneys general 
contribute to safeguard the enforcement system. Austin (1986)474 focuses on the disruptive 
impact of citizen suits, while Greve (1990)475 and Miller (1984)476, noting industry arguments, 
dismiss them as unpersuasive and unwarranted. Rubenstein (2004)477 offers conceptual 
taxonomy of the term “private attorney general”, describing its origins and use in 
contemporary legal discourse. 
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Particular analyses of securities fraud private justice actions, and qui tam contribution to the 
investigation are given by Alexander (1996)478, Bohn and Choi (1996)479, Coffee (1996)480, 
Coughlin (1998)481, Cox (1997)482, Fallone (1997)483, Grundfest (1994)484, Katz (1990)485, 
Macey and Miller (1991)486, Phillips and Miller (1996)487, and Seligman (1994)488. Seligman 
contends that deputising “private attorneys general” to police fraud on the government is the 
only way to combat “cozy relationships” between government agencies and industry489. 
Schooner (2010)490 assumes that regulatory failure is an important cause of the 2008 financial 
crisis. “Some might argue that the regulatory system failed because of its overactive role in 
financial markets. Others would claim that the regulatory system underestimated and under 
regulated risk. Either way, the regulatory system failed to protect the economy from a 
significant systemic meltdown”, notes professor Schooner491. She focuses specifically on the 
issue of agency enforcement, and proposes a hybrid public/private qui tam model of 
enforcement as a potentially valuable enhancement to systemic risk reform. 
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Some authors argue that private enforcement aids in closing public enforcement gaps. 
Farhang (2010)492 notes, that “lawsuits provide a form of auto-pilot enforcement that will be 
difficult for bureaucrats or future legislative coalitions to subvert, short of passing a new 
law.”493 Stephenson (2005)494 brings an argument that “potential benefit of private 
enforcement suits is that they can correct for agency slack—that is, the tendency of 
government regulators to underenforce certain statutory requirements because of political 
pressure, lobbying by regulated entities, or the laziness or self-interest of the regulators 
themselves.”495 
 
Remarkable contribution to the discussion on optimal balance of public and private 
enforcement has been given in Securities Class Actions in the US Banking Sector: Between 
Investor Protection and Bank Stability (2009)496 by Lucia Dalla Pellegrina and Margherita 
Saraceno, who conducted an interesting study on the indirect positive impact that securities 
class action suits can have on bank stability. Though not dedicated to qui tam this research 
addresses the same question of the private enforcement efficiency. The authors concluded 
that securities class actions may serve as "a Red Flag of bank instability" in that such actions 
tend to focus on banks that take on more risk and those that are less efficient, particularly 
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those with high ratio of bad to good loans and a low interest margin. They argue that the 
securities class action can serve as an effective complement to agency supervision of banks. 
 
The rapid increase in the use of private contractors by the governments contributed to the 
discussion on the dichotomy of private and public enforcement. Private contractors have 
begun to perform functions that, until very recently, were thought of as inherently 
governmental497. As contractors perform more and more characteristically governmental 
functions they are required to meet obligations beyond those of parties doing business solely 
in the private sector. The obligations of contractors have expanded along with their duties. 
Some writers to consider the subject have adopted the view that the increased use of 
contractors is a result of an ideological downsizing of government498, and declared the 
perceived "contractor experiment" to be a failure. The solution offered is simple -- an increase 
in the size of government. However, as Pierce (2008)499 and Kitts (2010)500 note, the 
government's increased reliance on contractors is the result of a complex interplay of factors 
with no simple solution, while private enforcement, and particularly qui tam model, paves 
the way to the rise in efficiency of control over government contracts and its procurement 
system. As Kitts points out, “It is important that all parties who do business with and receive 
money from the federal government understand that the nature of the game has changed ... 
these qui tam provisions are necessary because any attempt to regulate sophisticated 
contractors and other recipients of government funds by written rules alone is destined to 
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fail”501. He goes even further to declare that those that wish to do away with the three-party 
regulatory system created by the qui tam mechanism would prefer a country “dominated by 
the wealthy and powerful, a world where dissenting individuals would be ground under the 
heel of the elite”502. 
 
The vast body of academic research is dedicated to the analyses of the qui tam provisions of 
the American legal system, and the critique of the FCA and Dodd-Frank Act enhancement of 
qui tam as a regulatory mechanism. Among those who take generally positive view on the qui 
tam as a regulatory tool the most cited are Boese and McClain (1999)503, Bucy (1995)504 and 
(1999)505, Callahan and Dworkin (1992)506, Fabrikant and Solomon (1999)507, Helmer 
(2000)508, Meador and Warren (1998)509, Oparil (1989)510, and Phillips (1992)511. Fisch 
(1997)512 expresses strong support for the qui tam regime, and advocates export of qui tam 
mechanism to other regulatory contexts, including securities and antitrust law. Helmer (2000) 
hails FCA’s “spectacular results” and recommends that courts more frequently award 
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“attractive relator’s shares” to incentivise more whistleblowing513. Thompson (2000)514 
surveys qui tam enforcement landscape, and suggests “initial verdict” is it has been 
successful, justifying its expansion to environmental protection. Landy (2010)515 claims FCA’s 
qui tam provisions have been “extraordinarily successful as a regulatory tool”, urging 
Congress to amend FCA to explicitly grant public employees standing to serve as relators.  
 
Among the works published in recent years some are worth particular attention, because 
their authors either close to the mainstream thinking of the American legislative and 
regulatory establishment, or proved to be visionaries in predicting development of the law 
enforcement. 
 
Pamela Bucy has been one of such visionaries. In her Game theory and the Civil Claims Act: 
Iterated Games and Close-knit Groups (2004)516 professor Bucy has applied game theory 
principles identified by Robert Axelrod and Robert Ellickson517 to the qui tam provisions of 
the False Claims Act. She highlights basic principles of game theory identifying two game 
theory concepts especially pertinent to FCA practice: “iterated”, or repeated, games, and 
game playing within “close-knit” groups518. The article then analyses the optimal strategies 
for players of close-knit groups involved in iterated games in the context of the regulatory 
game created by the civil FCA. The optimal strategy that Bucy proposes is a close cooperation 
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between the Department of Justice and the qui tam relators519. She also advocates expansion 
of the FCA model from primarily the government contracting to other areas, such as 
protection of financial and securities markets (what happened in 2010 after enactment of the 
Dodd-Frank Act), and protection of the environment520. 
 
Carrington in Law and Transnational Corruption: the Need for Lincoln’s Law Abroad (2007)521  
points out to the relevance of the American practice of privatised law enforcement to the 
corruption problem in foreign jurisdictions. In his view, this relevance results from the 
historical fact that it is a product of a nineteenth-century culture sharing very limited trust in 
government and its officers. Its cultural situation thus bears some resemblance to the 
situations both in impoverished lands and in the community of nations hoping for 
enforcement of international law prohibiting corrupt practices. It is a system of law 
enforcement that reduces the law's dependence on the integrity of judges, prosecutors, and 
other public servants. “Wherever public integrity is in great doubt, the American experience 
may offer useful instruction”, argues Carrington522. 
 
In his view, Congress could make the False Claims Act process available to foreign 
governments and their citizens. Foreign nationals could be permitted to file qui tam 
proceedings in the name of their governments that have been corrupted by a defendant who 
is subject to the personal jurisdiction of the court in which the action is brought. Congress 
also could prescribe an award of damages commensurate with the damages provisions of the 
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False Claims Act in order to provide individuals and their lawyers, as well as governments, 
with the incentives needed to investigate apparent corrupt practices and to advance their 
claims. Such a foreign subject or citizen could be equipped with procedural rights equal to 
those conferred on American citizens by the US courts (these rights are not generally available 
in courts of most other nations). They include: the "American Rule" that losers do not pay 
winners' attorneys' fees in the absence of specific legislation to the contrary; access to 
contingent-fee lawyers; the right to discover evidence in the United States and abroad; trial 
by jury; a standard of proof requirng no more than a demonstration of probability of guilt; 
and the possibility of a class action when many firms or persons have suffered damage as a 
result of one proven bribe523. 
 
Carrington admits that there must be at least three limitations on the effectiveness of such a 
solo effort by the United States to correct the international problem. One is the limit of the 
long arm of American courts.  Jurisdictional limits would obviously be no problem for suits 
against defendants in the US, but would put out of reach of the deterrent effect all those 
foreign firms not subject to the personal jurisdiction of American courts524. A second 
limitation is the limited ability of American courts to enforce judgments against defendants 
whose assets are beyond the American reach525. A third limitation on the utility of such 
American law is the limited ability of the US government to protect foreign whistle-blowers 
from retaliation to the degree they are able to protect US relators526. 
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Garrett in Dodd-Frank’s Whistle-blower Provision Fails to Go Far Enough: Making the Case for 
a Qui Tam Provision in a Revised Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (2012)527 presents another 
expansionist view on qui tam, arguing for amending FCPA to include qui tam provisions. 
Pointing out that “the reach of Dodd–Frank is substantial”528, professor Garrett in his own 
words, “goes against the general business consensus and argues that Dodd–Frank does not 
go far enough with regard to how the whistle-blower provision is applied to the Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act”529. Dodd–Frank imposes statutory roadblocks and administrative 
hindrances that will prevent the whistle-blower provision from contributing to the 
enforcement of the FCPA, notes Garrett. While Dodd–Frank’s whistle-blower provision rests 
on sound principles in that it recognises the importance of including private citizens in 
detecting financial crimes, argues Garrett, private citizens can contribute more than being 
mere informants. He builds up argument for including a qui tam provision that would allow 
people to sue FCPA violators on behalf of the government, “and for themselves”, thereby 
enforcing the FCPA more effectively530. 
 
There is a substantial body of academic research on a broader set of implications concerning 
proliferating calls to export the qui tam and agency oversight mechanisms to other regulatory 
areas531. 
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Although bounty programmes have expanded, powerful industry lobbies have successfully 
resisted the introduction of qui tam structures outside of the FCA context, at least on the 
federal level, argues Rapp in Mutiny by the Bounties? The Attempt to Reform Wall Street by 
the New Whistle-blower Provisions of the Dodd– Frank Act (2012)532. While whistle-blowers 
were provided with a process for seeking rewards, Dodd-Frank ACT failed to embrace the 
crucial qui tam provisions of the FCA that allow whistle-blowers to litigate cases 
independently from federal action. “Perhaps because of the power of the Wall Street lobby, 
which regularly puts the “Military-Industrial Complex” to shame, whistle-blowers under 
Dodd-Frank will remain spectators in most stages of the enforcement actions triggered by 
their revelations,” writes Rapp533. 
 
Rapp identifies four reasons why the SEC is likely to remain a roadblock to whistle-blowers 
seeking bounties under the new law. First, the SEC will continue to face resource limitations 
in enforcing the programme534. Second, the dual responsibility for whistle-blowers now in 
effect (with the Department of Labour reviewing Sarbanes-Oxley Act retaliation claims and 
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) reviewing claims for bounties) may result in 
relatively less regulatory attention from both agencies535. Third, the SEC has long been 
plagued by allegations of “regulatory capture” by industry536. Fourth, the SEC may continue 
                                                          
and Private Enforcement of Rule 10B-5, 108 Columbia Law Review 1301 (2008) (securities); Schooner (2010), 
supra 476 at 108 (securities and financial regulation); Ventry, Jr., D. J., Whistleblowers and Qui Tam for Tax, 61 
Tax Lawyer 357, 359 (2008) (tax) 
532 Rapp, G. Ch., Mutiny by the Bounties? The Attempt to Reform Wall Street by the New Whistleblower Provisions 
of the Dodd– Frank Act, Brigham Young University Law Review 73 (2012) [online] Available at: 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=2020527> (accessed on 5 September 2013) 
533 Ibid., pp.72-73 
534 Ibid., p.136 
535 Ibid., p.137 
536 Ibid., p.138 
 127 
to view whistle-blower programmes with distaste because they represent an implicit 
challenge to the regulatory Agency’s effectiveness537. The emergence of a whistle-blower is a 
challenge to the legitimacy of a regulator, for information about fraud coming from a whistle-
blower can suggest that regulators are not effectively monitoring their subject industry538. 
Whistle-blowers, notes Rapp, become competitors of the regulatory authorities; as a result, 
regulators tend to be unresponsive to whistle-blower complaints. A qui tam vehicle 
recognises that whistle-blowers’ uneasy partnership, and sometimes outright competition 
with regulators can be leveraged for policy gain539. 
 
Rapp proposes two fixes to Dodd-Frank Act: one would allow the payment of bounties even 
in cases producing nonmonetary sanctions540, and the other would empower whistle-blowers 
to pursue financial fraudsters even if the SEC remains inactive541. However, Rapp remains 
sceptical about the ability of the Congress to adopt a more rigorous and effective qui tam 
provisions: “So far, legislators have shown more interest in creating even more holes in Dodd-
Frank than filling in the ones already present in the statute. Wall Street may have to collapse 
in another bubble a decade from now before policymakers finally get around to adopting a 
more straightforward and effective whistle-blower reward program”542. 
 
Fisher et al. in Privatizing Regulation: Whistleblowing and Bounty Hunting in the Financial 
Services Industries (2001)543 give an enlightened vision of the regulatory development in the 
wake of the financial deregulation in the United States. Though written fifteen years ago the 
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article is remarkable with its correct predictions of the upcoming financial turmoil and 
subsequent evolution of the models of enforcement. After financial modernisation legislation 
(Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act) was enacted in late 1999, the financial services industry in the 
United States has changed dramatically following deregulation and expansion in powers of 
financial institution. In keeping with that deregulation and expanded powers the regulatory 
landscape and enforcement mechanisms also had to change. As Fisher and his co-authors544 
note, “while many applaud this legislation, others point to previous US experience where 
financial deregulation overwhelmed federal regulators and resulted in massive failures of 
financial institutions and, consequently, in huge bailouts.”545 For this reason the authors’ 
focus on the prospect of supplementing regulation with certain forms of private intervention. 
They analyse and compare whistle-blowing model with bounty hunting, finding that 
preoccupation of the whistle-blower laws with protection of employees from discharge or 
other acts of retaliation by the employer proved to be less successful than straightforward 
financial inducements to expose wrongdoing provided by bounty hunting regulation. Like 
whistle-blowers, bounty hunters conserve the government’s investigatory resources by 
identifying wrongdoers. Unlike whistle-blowers, bounty hunters frequently participate 
actively in apprehending and prosecuting offenders, thereby conserving governmental 
policing and prosecutorial resources as well. In order to encourage bounty hunters to play 
such an active role, the article argues, the financial rewards for bounty hunters must be 
substantial while protection from retaliation may not be necessary546. 
 
                                                          
544 Ellen Harshman, William Gillespie, Henry Ordower, Leland Ware and Frederick Yeager 
545 Ibid., p.117 
546 Ibid., pp.136-137 
 129 
As authors conclude, the increased use of bounty hunting models in financial market 
regulation may become essential to enforcement. Bounty hunting, with its threat of 
significant monetary cost and potential individual liability, “compels managers to develop 
efficient internal legal compliance mechanisms”547. Thus bounty hunting, like whistleblowing, 
will have a deterrent effect and a powerful role to play in protecting the integrity of the 
financial markets, however, as articles notes, not to the exclusion of government 
enforcement. As Fisher et al. predict, “whistleblowing… remains largely supplemental and 
serendipitous […] it is far less likely to play a material role in market regulation than is a well-
designed array of bounty payment structures”548. 
 
Besides mostly theoretical works analysing qui tam there are a few published empirical 
studies of qui tam litigation, the majority of those either dedicated to analysis of healthcare 
cases (though large and successful only), or utilise aggregated data published annually by the 
US Department of Justice. However some empirical studies remain outstanding both in their 
scope and ability to grasp the emerging trends. Thus, in States, Statutes, and Fraud: An 
Empirical Study of Emerging State False Claims Acts (2006)549 Barger et al. focus their efforts 
on identifying trends in development of the False Claims Act related legislation (with or 
without qui tam provisions) in US states. The authors present the first comprehensive survey 
of the structure and implications of states’ FCAs and qui tam provisions. The results are based 
on interviews with states’ officials charged with their enforcement. Interviewees were 
questioned regarding investigative resources allocated to false claims cases, the practical 
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application of each individual state qui tam provision, the effectiveness of each provision, the 
impact of federal cases upon state cases, and coordination efforts between federal and state 
offices. They survey concludes with a data backed prediction that the number of statutes 
legislating private enforcement based on FCA, including those with qui tam, will steadily 
increase550. 
 
The above mentioned prediction has proven to be correct, as shows in States, Statutes, and 
Fraud: A Study of Emerging State Efforts to Combat White Collar Crime (2010)551 by Bucy and 
her co-authors552, and in States of Pay: Emerging Trends in State Whistle-blower Bounty 
Schemes (2012)553 by Rapp. In a study conducted in 2009 Bucy and her co-authors analysed 
twenty-four jurisdictions which had false claims laws at the time554: California, Delaware, 
District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Louisiana, Massachusetts, 
Michigan, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, 
Oklahoma, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, and Wisconsin555. Nebraska also had a 
false claims act at the time of the survey, but its law did not contain a qui tam provision556. In 
just two years, as shown by Rapp, an additional sixteen states have passed false claims laws: 
Arizona, Arkansas (no qui tam provision), Colorado, Connecticut, Iowa, Kansas (no qui tam 
provision), Maine (no qui tam provision), Maryland, Minnesota, Missouri (no qui tam 
provision), North Carolina, Oregon (no qui tam provision), South Carolina (no qui tam 
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provision), Utah (no qui tam provision), Vermont (no qui tam provision), and Washington557. 
This brings the total number of jurisdictions with some form of false claims act to forty. 
Alabama had also considered adopting a false claims act in 2001 and again in 2005, but has 
not done so, and no such bill was introduced in the latest legislative sessions, adds Rapp558. 
 
Rapp made two contributions to the literature on bounty-reward schemes. First, he 
endeavoured to provide a typology and analysis of the rapidly developing world of state 
bounty schemes. Second, he analysed the way in which those bounty schemes were 
stimulated by federal law. Federal law, as Rapp points out, typically aims to change state laws 
in one of three ways: either by providing funding for states pursuing certain kinds of policy 
programmes, by conditioning funding for a variety of related matters on state compliance 
with a federal mandate, or by “pre-empting” state regulation through the enactment of a 
federal regulatory scheme559. However, with false claims act, for what may be the first time, 
as concludes Rapp, regular and on-going changes in state law were stimulated by the linkage 
between the strength of the federal FCA and parallel state law provisions560. 
 
In the environmental context, Langpap and Shimshack (2010)561 published a single recent 
empirical study examining public-private interaction by gauging the extent to which private 
enforcement efforts “crowd out” or “crowd in” public enforcement efforts. 
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Kesselheim, Studdert and Mello in Whistle-Blowers’ Experiences in Fraud Litigation Against 
Pharmaceutical Companies (2010)562 analyse profiles of qui tam relators who won large 
recoveries in healthcare cases. Their research documents the outcomes of major 
enforcement actions and describes the schemes, defendants, and whistle-blowers involved. 
It focuses on the scope and characteristics of qui tam fraud litigation, as well as on the whistle-
blowers, their motives and circumstances under which they became qui tam relators. 
 
As the authors note, federal regulators have aggressively prosecuted health care fraud since 
the early 1990s, and were successful in recovering billions of dollars. Nearly all major 
successful cases were qui tam actions, which involved whistle-blowers with inside knowledge 
of the allegedly illegal schemes. The authors obtained an inventory of unsealed federal qui 
tam litigation targeting pharmaceutical companies that was resolved between 1996 and 2005 
from the US Department of Justice and gathered further information from publicly available 
sources. Among 379 cases, $9.3 billion was recovered, with more than $1.0 billion paid to 
whistle-blowers563. Case frequency peaked in 2001, but annual recoveries increased sharply 
from 2002 to 2005564. Whistle-blowers were frequently executives or physicians, and 75% 
were employees of defendant organisations565. The 13 (4%) cases against pharmaceutical 
companies accounted for $3.6 billion (39%) of total recoveries566.  
 
Although the relators in the sample (42 persons in total) all ended up using the qui tam 
mechanism, only six specifically intended to do so, note the authors. The others fell into the 
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qui tam process after seeking lawyers for other reasons (e.g., unfair employment practices) 
or after being encouraged to file a suit by family or friends. Remarkably, every relator 
interviewed during that research stated that the financial bounty offered under the federal 
statute had not motivated his or her participation in the qui tam lawsuit. Reported 
motivations coalesced around four non–mutually exclusive themes: integrity, altruism or 
public safety, justice, and self-preservation. 
 
All relators in the sample for the research received a share of the financial recovery which 
amount ranged from $100,000 to $42 million, with a median of $3 million (net values, in 2009 
dollars)567. The settlements helped alleviate some of the financial and nonfinancial costs of 
the litigation, but the prevailing sentiment among the participants was that the payoff had 
not been worth the personal cost. However, concludes the authors, despite the negative 
experiences and dissatisfaction with levels of financial recovery, most relators still felt that 
what they did was important for ethical and other psychological or spiritual reasons. 
 
Feldman and Lobel in The Incentives Matrix: The Comparative Effectiveness of Rewards, 
Liabilities, Duties and Protections for Reporting Illegality (2010)568 give a further contribution 
to the study of individual motives to report wrongdoing (“social enforcement”, as authors 
choose to define it), as well as the changing societal norms applied to such activism.  As 
authors state, “social enforcement” is becoming a key feature of regulatory policy, when 
statutes increasingly rely on individuals to report misconduct, but the incentives they provide 
to encourage such enforcement vary significantly. “Despite the growing interest in the legal 
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academy and practice in new governance approaches to law and policy, the study of 
individual motivation and behaviour as directly connected to legal design is in its nascent 
stages,” note co-authors569. 
 
The study contributes to the empirical literature about individual and group behaviour, 
including debates on motivational crowding-out, trust, misperception of norms and 
attribution and the ability of individuals to rationally balance the costs and benefits of their 
own decisions, and to assess the behaviour and interests of others570. Using a series of 
experimental surveys of a representative panel of over 2000 employees, Feldman and Lobel 
compare the effect of different regulatory mechanisms - monetary rewards, protective rights, 
positive obligations, and liabilities - on individual motivation and behaviour. By exploring the 
interplay between internal and external enforcement motivation, these experiments provide 
some insights into the comparative advantages of legal mechanisms that incentivise 
compliance and “social enforcement”571.  
 
At the theoretical level, the study contributes to several strands of inquiry, including 
motivational crowding-out effects, framing biases, the existence of a “holier-than-thou” 
effect, and gender differences among social enforcers572. 
 
At the policymaking level, the study offers practical findings about the costs and benefits of 
different regulatory systems, including findings about inadvertent counterproductive effects 
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of certain legal incentives: they indicate that in some cases offering monetary rewards to 
whistle-blowers will lead to less, rather than more, reporting of illegality573. The study implies 
that no one-size-fits-all policy design exists, but rather policymakers must evaluate the full 
scope of psychological and situational factors in order to design the most efficient incentives 
structures574. First, policymakers must assess the nature and severity of the anticipated 
conduct. Where levels of moral outrage are expected to be low, financial rewards will likely 
be a decisive factor, and the inquiry may shift to discovering the true price tag of the reporting 
behaviour575. For inherently offensive misconduct, policy design must take a more nuanced 
approach that integrates the moral dimension of the situation. In such cases, where the 
informant is expected to have a greater ethical stake in the outcome, regulation must fully 
appeal to the informant’s sense of duty. This may mean that “financial incentives are not only 
unnecessary but are counterproductive and offset internal motivations to report” 
wrongdoing576. 
 
The study demonstrates that informed policymakers must factor in the possibility that 
informants may underestimate the role of financial incentives in their own decision to report: 
whereas others are perceived as reporting mainly for money, people tend to perceive their 
own social enforcement actions as more ethically driven577. Moreover, in choosing among the 
various mechanisms available, the study demonstrates that stigma levels attached to 
reporting wrongdoing vary along the selected mechanism578. Concluding, Feldman and Lobel 
note that policymakers must consider the target potential individuals for which the regulatory 
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mechanisms are provided. In particular, gender differences are highly pronounced in the 
realm of whistleblowing and further research should consider the reasons for which women 
care much more than men about anti-retaliation protections579. 
 
Broderick in Qui Tam Provisions and the Public Interest: An Empirical Analysis (2007)580 used 
aggregated data on filings and impositions, as published annually by US Department of 
Justice, to draw conclusions about workings of qui tam regime. These corroborated by data 
conclusions she views as the main contribution to the subject by her research. “Unlike 
previous articles on [qui tam], which have almost completely limited their analysis of this 
question to a theoretical discussion of the value of the qui tam provision of the Federal FCA, 
she writes, this Note uses an empirical approach to study both the Federal Act and similar 
state acts”581. 
 
Based on such analysis, her work argues that while qui tam provisions lead to frivolous suits, 
they still serve the public interest through both enhanced detection and deterrence, although 
the degree to which they serve this interest is not nearly as great as proponents argue582. 
Further, it contends that based on the experiences of both federal and state qui tam 
provisions, these provisions should be amended to minimise the number of frivolous suits 
and capitalise on the most valuable aspects of qui tam provisions583. Specifically, she argues, 
that on the federal level the Attorney General should retain greater control over qui tam 
actions even when he/she does not intervene584, and their use should be limited to medical 
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assistance claims585; and on a state level that greater fact-finding and systematic data 
collection need to be undertaken, both before and after enacting a qui tam provision, so that 
state qui tam provisions can be tailored to the specific needs of each individual state586. 
 
More empirical data about the identities and actions of qui tam relators can be found in 
reports published by National Whistle-blowers Center, such as Impact of Qui Tam Laws on 
Internal Corporate Compliance (2010)587. This report, finding most relators report fraud 
internally before filing qui tam actions588, however, suffers from serious methodological 
shortcomings: while publishing results of analysis of 107 cases between 2007 and 2010, it 
considers only published opinions in which relator asserted retaliation claim under relevant 
provision of FCA589. 
 
Relevant empirical data and initial set of conclusions about Department of Justice 
enforcement strategy in respect of qui tam cases are available in a working paper Coordinated 
Private and Public Enforcement of Law: Deterrence under Qui Tam (2010)590, prepared by 
David Kwok. Some descriptive statistics regarding the role of more experienced qui tam 
relator firms, collected by the same researcher, was published in Does Private Enforcement 
Attract Excessive Litigation? Evidence from the False Claims Act (2012)591. 
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Among those who first provided a well-documented critique of the assumed efficiency of qui 
tam provisions was professor Kovacic. In Whistle-blower Bounty Lawsuits as Monitoring 
Devices in Government Contracting (1996)592 he points out to two closely related 
disadvantages of the enforcement structure established by the False Claims Act. First, 
attempting to curb agency costs in government procurement by deputising private individuals 
can create serious agency problems of its own. Qui tam relators may not invariably act to 
maximise taxpayer interests. In the absence of comparative data on the agency costs of the 
qui tam process with the agency costs of alternative monitoring techniques it is impossible to 
give a proper evaluation to the whistleblower bounty as a monitoring device. The second 
disadvantage is the potential of qui tam monitoring to impede the development of the 
purchaser-supplier partnership and the government’s adoption of “commercial practices” 
that are key aims of a procurement reform593.  
 
In The Civil False Claims Act As a Deterrent to Participation in Government Procurement 
Markets (1998)594 Kovacic noted that “compared with legal regimes used to police fraud in 
commercial contracting, the Civil False Claims Act creates a distinctly powerful mechanism to 
constrain seller conduct”595. The CFCA enforces an unusually wide range of substantive 
requirements, establishes comparatively lesser burdens that prosecuting parties must bear in 
establishing liability for fraud, widely decentralises the decision to prosecute, and punishes 
violations with a combination on minimum monetary penalties for each offence and treble 
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damages for actual harm. As a group, Kovacic argues, they increase the risk that a firm’s 
failure to fulfil contractual promises to the government will be challenged as fraudulent and 
will be a subject to severe punishment596. The article reports the results of a survey to assess 
the impact of CFCA oversight on supplier behaviour. A total of 40 firms representing a mix of 
traditional government contractors responded to questions concerning the effects of CFCA 
requirements. The surveyed firms indicated that contractors regard CFCA oversight as costly, 
substantial burden of doing business with the government. These results, concludes Kovacic, 
“suggest CFCA is likely to impede efforts to induce commercial firms to expand their 
relationships with government purchasing agencies”597.  
 
It is worth noting that from the perspective of the years, which have passed since the articles 
first appeared in public domain none of professor, Kovacic’s predictions have materialised. 
 
Scholarly attention to the flaws of private enforcement in general, and qui tam enforcement 
in particular, has focused primarily on the misalignment between incentives that drive private 
attorneys general and relators and the public good. Gilles (2000)598 and Beck (2000)599 
highlighted the risks of overenforcement by private attorneys in civil rights cases. Thomson 
(2000)600 raised concerns of prosecutorial error in environmental protection cases, bringing 
evidence of under enforcement by private agencies, when the private enforcers fail to bring 
suits that would benefit the common good. Ruhnka, Gac and Boerstler (2000)601 argue that 
                                                          
596 Ibid., pp. 223-235 
597 Ibid., p. 205 
598 Gilles (2000), supra note 517 at 115 
599 Beck (2000), supra note 4 at 8 
600 Thompson, Jr., B.H., The Continuing Innovation of Citizen Enforcement, University of Illinois Law Review 
185-206 (2000) 
601 Ruhnka, J. C., Gac, E. J., and Boerstler, H., Qui Tam Claims: Threat to Voluntary Compliance Programs in 
Healthcare Organizations, 25 Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law 283, 284 (2000) 
 140 
the qui tam provisions of the FCA have the effect of encouraging employees not to report 
misbillings uncovered in internal compliance programmes to their employers for correction, 
but instead to use such information to file qui tam lawsuits against their employers in order 
to share in the recoveries to the government. 
 
Brodley (1995)602 warned of misdirected resources in antitrust litigation sparked by private 
enforcers, the same concern in respect of the securities litigation was expressed by Grundfest 
(1994)603. Stewart and Sunstein (1982)604 argued for judicial control to limit “the perverse 
incentives that drive private enforcers”605. Blomquist (1988)606 and Stephenson (2005)607, on 
the other hand, advocated executive branch control to prevent private enforcers from 
overreaching. The alleged disruptive impact of the False Claims Act on the healthcare has 
been given a detailed analysis in Bucy (2000)608.  
 
Baruch, Boese and Johnson (2011)609 decry in particular the lack of express provisions in the 
FCA prohibiting awards to private employees with a duty to report fraud, such as in-house 
lawyers, auditors, and compliance officers. Remarkably, more than a decade earlier Ruhnka 
et al. (2000) raised relevant concern: “The prospect of corporate inside legal counsel or 
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internal audit staff who are charged with discovering misbilling practices filing a qui tam suit 
against their employer … raises serious issues of breach of fiduciary duties, violation of 
nondisclosure and confidentiality agreements, and violations of accountant-client or 
attorney-client relationships.”610 
 
Dayna Matthew in The Moral Hazard Problem with Privatization of Public Enforcement: The 
Case of Pharmaceutical Fraud (2007)611 analyses the effects that the availability of private 
enforcement brings on the government’s incentives to enforce the regulations, and takes a 
law and economics approach to explore some of the costs that arise when governments rely 
on private enforcement to accomplish the goals of public law. Her analysis focuses on qui tam 
enforcement under the Civil False Claims Act, and is based on a body of empirical data that 
demonstrates the expansive role private qui tam relators have played in enforcing Medicare 
and Medicaid fraud and abuse laws. As professor Matthew notes, nearly all of the largest 
settlements and judgments announced against pharmaceutical defendants during the 
previous three years have involved a qui tam relator612. In 1987, over ninety per cent of FCA 
actions were filed by the government alone, but by 2005, nearly eighty per cent of all new 
FCA actions were filed by private qui tam litigants613. 
 
The article examines the fundamental divergence between private and public incentives in 
FCA prosecutions. “The concept of moral hazard, argues Matthew, provides substantial 
explanatory power to reconceptualise the costs and benefits of private enforcement”614. The 
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availability of private enforcers creates significant opportunities for public prosecutors to over 
enforce. Additionally, the reduction in short term risk causes public prosecutors to reduce the 
care that typically controls their exercise of prosecutorial discretion. 
 
As Matthew’s analysis shows, the government’s abdication of authority under the FCA results 
in over–prosecution and a harmful reduction in the government’s exercise of caution in the 
selection and pursuit of the selected cases. The analysis of pharmaceutical cases, concludes 
Matthew, proves that privatisation of FCA claims is costly. It has hindered the orderly 
development of well-reasoned substantive law and has clearly distorted the market 
incentives and relationships between industry actors. Due to the moral hazard problem that 
arises from that privatisation, FCA claims increasingly attract plaintiffs with questionable 
motives who advance and inadvertently make bad law, which supplants the reasoned 
regulatory regime that should govern government contractors’ conduct615. 
 
Further critique of the qui tam provisions is published in The Ubiquitous False Claims Act: The 
Incongruous Relationship Between a Civil War Era Fraud Statute and the Modern 
Administrative State (2008)616, by Harkins, a practicing lawyer, who criticises private 
enforcement from the perspective of healthcare providers. He argues that False Claims Act 
and current Medicare and Medicaid statutes are incompatible from the legal point of view.  
Rise in administrative law system and administrative bodies turned agencies into “a veritable 
fourth branch of the government”617. With the growth of the administrative state, notes 
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Harkins, has come a concomitant increase in the federal government’s “economic role in 
national life… and with it the opportunities for those receiving government funds” to violate 
one or more of the innumerable regulations governing entitlement to provide government 
benefits618. 
 
But, as argues Harkins, in 1863 the “fourth branch of the government” did not exist, and thus 
was not a source of federal law when the FCA was adopted. Consequently, legitimate 
questions arise about whether or when a claim for payment can be “false and fraudulent” 
under the FCA based on government contractor’s failure to comply with administrative 
regulatory standards of a type unknown to the Civil War Congress (e.g., regulating the 
production process or quality)619. It is fair to say that the question whether violation of such 
a regulation makes a subsequent claim for payment false or fraudulent is a question that 
never would have occurred to the FCA’s authors, states Harkins620. Whether the contractor 
adhered to appropriate or reasonable manufacturing standards would have been irrelevant 
to those who passed the FCA. 
 
In 1863, argues Harkins, the development of the administrative system that occurred in the 
second half of the XX century could not have been foreseen. Nor could congressionally 
imposed limits on judicial review of administrative action have been anticipated621. 
 
As Harkins points out, Medicare and Medicaid benefits generally are provided through private 
contractors (known as providers), who are paid pursuant to the Medicare and Medicaid 
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statutes and accompanying regulations622. These statutes and regulations have been 
described by the Supreme Court as “Byzantine” texts that are “among the most intricate ever 
drafted by Congress”623, describing Medicare as a “massive, complex health and safety 
program… embodied in hundreds of pages of statutes and thousands of pages of often 
interrelated regulations”624. Healthcare providers daily navigate a “morass of bureaucratic 
complexity”, submitting thousands of claims a day to the Medicare and Medicaid 
programmes625. If providers cross one of the lines in these programmes’ “impenetrable 
texts”626, they expose themselves to a potential liability under the FCA. And the financial 
consequences of running afoul of the FCA, warns Harkins, can be extraordinary627. 
 
In conclusion, Harkins points out to judicial discomfort and confusion about applying the FCA 
to heavily regulated entities628. The problem is that “qui tam relators are… less likely than is 
the government to forgo an action arguably based on a mere technical noncompliance with 
reporting requirements that involved no harm to the public fisc”629. The proposed solution is 
to reform FCA so as to curb activity of qui tam relators630. 
 
von Spakovsky and Walsh in Correcting False Claims about the New False Claims Act 
Legislation (2009)631 present a systemic critique of the freshly enhanced FCA qui tam 
provisions632 adding some new arguments to the earlier accusations voiced by the critics of 
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private enforcement that qui tam as a litigation regime run amok and has become a “cottage 
industry,”a “legal gold rush,” and a “great American giveaway” to an undeserving alliance of 
“bounty-seeking” and increasingly “professional” relators and an ever more specialised qui 
tam plaintiffs’ bar633. 
 
von Spakovsky and Walsh argue, that the FCA qui tam provisions:  
 Reduces the primacy in FCA litigation of government prosecutors, investigators, and 
other disinterested professionals working in the public interest; 
 Manufactures needless litigation brought by private plaintiffs and plaintiffs' lawyers 
who are enticed by prospects of striking it rich through FCA lawsuits, not protecting 
the American taxpayer; 
 Increases the number of lawsuits and potential targets of such lawsuits by allowing 
punitive FCA actions to be brought against private entities (such as hospitals, 
universities, and other non-governmental organisations) just because they have 
received unrelated federal funds; 
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 Unfairly permits the government to assert claims that would otherwise be time-barred 
by effectively circumventing ("tolling") the statute of limitations634 by relating back 
the government's intervention to the date that the individual plaintiff filed the original 
qui tam complaint, thereby undermining the ability of a defendant to defend himself; 
 Greatly increases the number of individuals and organisations that can bring 
secondary lawsuits (as well as the number of individuals who may be made defendants 
in those lawsuits) claiming that they were retaliated or discriminated against even if 
they took no steps to actually bring an FCA lawsuit; 
 Allows the Department of Justice to provide information obtained using the federal 
government's law enforcement authority and resources to private parties for use in 
FCA suits against other private parties635. 
 
Some authors add critique or anecdotal evidence. Kolz (2010)636 describes efforts of 
“professional” and “serial whistle-blower”, who has filed multiple qui tam lawsuits. Krause 
(2002)637 argues that “meritless” lawsuits are to blame for increase in volume of qui tam 
litigation. According to Rich (2008)638, “the FCA encourages the government too often to 
stand by and allow relators to exercise nearly complete prosecutorial discretion in their qui 
tam actions.”639 Other works, while considering overall desirability of qui tam legislation, 
nevertheless suggest it must be reformed to the point it may be completely emasculated640. 
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Focusing on the relators and their counsel such pervasive line of criticism advances what 
Engstrom (2012) called a “supply-side” critique of qui tam enforcement641. 
 
In an article on findings of his research Engstrom summarises the typical critique cast on qui 
tam relators and their specialised lawyers642. 
 
Most often opponents of qui tam regard relators as vengeful former employees who use the 
FCA as leverage in garden-variety employment disputes, or as opportunistic profit-seekers 
who deliberately bypass internal compliance systems in the rush to collect bounties, sit on 
evidence of wrongdoing to let the meter run on damages before bringing suit, or (in the case 
of attorney-relators) undercut the giving and receiving of legal advice by using in qui tam suits 
the sort of information which falls within the attorney-client privilege643. 
 
Another common contention is that profit-motivated relators have little useful information 
not already known to the government, and instead file claims that are “parasitic” on already-
existing public investigations or enforcement efforts. Parasitism concerns emerge most 
directly in cases brought by government employees who learn of fraud while on the job, and 
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641 Engstrom (2012), supra note 441 at 105, p.1275 
642 Ibid. 
643 Ibid., pp. 1275-1277 
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courts and commentators have vigorously disagreed about the propriety of allowing such 
suits under the FCA644. 
 
A further tenet of relator-focused critiques focuses on organisational and entity relators who 
deploy the FCA to seek a competitive business advantage or to further an ideological or other 
agenda645. 
 
This latter example relates to a final and critically important tenet of the supply-side critique 
of relators: the claim that an increasing share of qui tam litigation is the work of so-called 
“professional” relators who lack the traditional insider status of qui tam whistle-blowers and 
instead build cases through information derived from private investigative work targeting 
present and past company employees or publicly available sources, including requests based 
on Freedom of Information Act in respect of government agencies646. 
 
The other part of the “supply-side” critique is focused not on relators, but rather on an 
increasingly sophisticated and specialised qui tam relators’ bar647. At present, several dozen 
law firms -- and, according to various estimates, roughly 200 lawyers648 -- advertise that they 
do mostly relator-side representations or even particular types of FCA claims, such as 
healthcare fraud. Most relator-side practice proceeds on a contingent fee basis, with the 
lawyer’s cut often set at 40 per cent649. 
 
                                                          
644 Ibid., p. 1277 
645 Ibid., p. 1278 
646 Ibid., pp. 1279 
647 Ibid., p. 1281 
648 Weinberg, supra note 323, pp. 90-91 
649 Bario, D., A Whistleblower and Its “Pit Bull”, National Law Journal, 7 February 2011, p.n1 (Quoted in Engstrom 
(2012), supra note 441 at 105, p. 1280) 
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The emergence of an organised relators’ bar has stoked complains that qui tam litigation is 
too lawyer-driven. The organised relators’ bar is accused of “trolling for unhappy company 
employees to serve as whistleblowing relators.”650 They are also viewed as “filing mills,” 
bringing large volumes of qui tam claims with an aim to preserving a right to a portion of an 
eventual recovery, but with no intention of assisting the Department of Justice651. 
 
Specialised qui tam lawyers are also blamed for their role in developing so-called 
“certification” claims652.  
 
A final tenet of the “supply-side” critique taps into longstanding concerns about clientelism 
between public and private enforcers in private enforcement regimes. Just as relator-side law 
firm websites advertise their experience in qui tam enforcement, they also frequently note 
the past experience of their lawyers with relevant government agencies. Such claims have 
fuelled the suspicion that qui tam revival has lead to the development of an organised 
relators’ bar made up of former government lawyers who previously litigated False Claims Act 
cases, and so are especially effective at “enticing” the Department of Justice to intervene in 
qui tam cases653. 
 
By carrying out the first large-scale empirical study654 of the qui tam regime Engstrom’s 
analysis focuses on three main areas: 
                                                          
650 Engstrom (2012), supra, p. 1283 
651 Ibid., p. 1284 
652 The claims in which a relator alleges that a federal funding recipient falsely implied certification of compliance 
with a separate statutory or regulatory requirement as a condition of receiving federal funds, rendering “false” 
any claim made for that funding 
653 Ibid., p. 1285 
654 An original data set encompassed more than 4,000 unsealed qui tam lawsuits filed between 1986 and 2011 
(Ibid., p. 1249) 
 150 
 The role of specialised enforcers (including repeat relators, the organised qui tam 
relators’ bar, and former Department of Justice insiders) in the qui tam litigation; 
 Evidence of clientelism and capture among specialised enforcers; 
 Whether or not the role of enforcer specialisation has changed over time. 
 
The survey’s core findings provide a more nuanced portrait of qui tam litigation. 
 
Contrary to a popular critique, specialised qui tam firms appear to play a positive role in the 
system, enjoying higher litigation success rates and surfacing larger frauds compared to less 
experienced litigants655. As Engstrom notes, “the story for repeat relators -- meaning the 
plaintiffs themselves -- is more complicated”656, but his conclusion is largely the same657. 
Repeat relators win less often than one-shotters, but they offset lower win rates by obtaining 
substantially larger sums (“impositions”) when they succeed658. “Critics of ‘professional’ 
relators, it seems, have it mostly wrong”, concludes Engstrom659. 
 
The law review literature containing studies, which addressed the constitutionality of the qui 
tam mechanism is particularly vast. The academic discussion was sparked in 1986, after the 
Congress amended the False Claims Act to enhance its qui tam provisions, and gradually faded 
away when all attempts to challenge constitutionality of the revised FCA in courts had been 
lost660, and the legislators had clearly shown their intent to further employ the qui tam 
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mechanism in Dodd-Frank and Affordable Care Acts. At present it seems that all three 
branches of the US Government agree on the utility and constitutionality of the qui tam as 
the most efficient model of the private enforcement, and the academic interest has shifted 
elsewhere. 
 
The qui tam provisions of the False Claims Act implicate four constitutional doctrines: the 
Separation of powers doctrine (Articles I, II and III), the Standing doctrine (Article III), the Take 
Care Clause (Article II, Section 3), and the Appointments Clause (Article II, Section 2). As one 
scholar has pointed out, these disparate constitutional doctrines are "merely different 
doctrinal lenses through which commentators and courts look at the central problem with qui 
tam: someone other than the executive branch is litigating in the name of the United 
States"661. 
 
                                                          
In United States ex rel. Colucci v. Beth Israel Med. Ctr., 603 F. Supp. 2d 677 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) the Court found that 
False Claims Act actions survived death of relator because they were primarily remedial. 
 
In 2009 the plaintiffs brought a constitutional challenge against the provisions of the FCA that require the 
complaint to be sealed for up to 60 days so the government can decide whether to intervene and allow the 
government to move the court for extensions. They argued the provisions violate the First Amendment by 
infringing on the public's right of access to judicial proceedings and the qui tam relators' right to speak about 
their complaint, and that mandatory sealing strips the courts' inherent ability to decide whether to seal on a 
case-by-case basis, thus violating the division of powers. In 2011 case, American Civil Liberties Union v. Holder, 
No. 09-2086 (4th Cir. March 28, 2011), the appeals court held that the sealing provisions addressed a compelling 
government interest of protecting the integrity of qui tam actions, and “do not violate the First Amendment or 
the separation of powers”. The court further held the FCA provisions do not intrude on judicial self-
administration. 
In United States ex rel. Drakeford v. Tuomey, No. 13-2219 (4th Cir. July 2, 2015), the Fourth Circuit affirmed a 
FCA verdict against a hospital in South Carolina. The Tuomey case in over 10 years of litigation resulted in a $237 
million fine. The Court rejected Tuomey’s arguments that an award so large constituted an unconstitutionally 
excessive fine. Earlier, in United States v. Vill. of Island Park No. 90 CV992 (ILG) (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 3, 2008) the Court 
determined that the Excessive Fines Clause did not apply because the False Claims Act was remedial. In Cook 
County v. United States ex rel. Chandler, 5 38 U.S. 119, 130 (2003) the Court ruled that treble damages “have a 
compensatory side, serving remedial purposes in addition to punitive objectives”. 
661 Lovitt (1997), supra note 284 at 71, p. 859 
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The arguments of the academic camp that oppose qui tam are repetitive, and generally end 
up with an explicit or implicit conclusion that nobody else, but the executive branch is allowed 
to litigate in the name of the USA. Thus, Edgar (1991)662 and Blanch (1993)663 give a 
paradigmatic argument that the False Claims Act qui tam provision violates Article III of the 
US Constitution by granting a cause of action to individuals who have suffered no “injury in 
fact” and thus lack constitutional standing. They both conclude that the qui tam provisions of 
the FCA are unconstitutional. Blanch also argues that the qui tam provision violates the 
Appointments Clause of Article II of the Constitution by allowing individuals who are not 
properly appointed officers of the US to litigate on behalf of the US. This leads him to the 
conclusion that the qui tam mechanism violates the separation of powers principle by 
stripping the executive branch of its responsibility to “take care that the Laws be faithfully 
executed”664. His verdict is that despite their long history, the FCA qui tam provisions are out 
of step with modern constitutional jurisprudence and should be held unconstitutional665. 
 
Johnston (1994)666 adds up to the critique based on the separation of powers doctrine. He 
argues that the qui tam provisions of the FCA are unconstitutional to the extent that they vest 
prosecutorial discretion in executive-branch employees. This conclusion derives from the 
separation-of-powers doctrine and the underlying theory that the President is the unitary 
repository of the executive power. As Johnston argues, examination of case law and academic 
commentary demonstrates that the government's power of prosecution is constitutionally 
committed to the Executive, and that he or agents under his control must wield it in a unitary 
                                                          
662 Edgar (1991), supra note 265 at 67 
663 Blanch (1993), supra note 265 at 67 
664 US Constitution, Article II, &3 
665 Blanch, supra note 265 at 67 
666 Johnston (1994), supra note 265 at 67 
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manner. Executive-branch employees are the agents of the government in collecting 
information on false claims, and the President must retain ultimate discretion over the use of 
prosecutorial power by any member of the executive branch. Accordingly, concludes 
Johnston, Congress's vesting of prosecutorial discretion in employees of the executive branch 
through statutory qui tam actions removes the President's constitutionally mandated control 
over prosecution and by doing so violates the separation of powers doctrine667. 
 
Gausewitz Berner (2001)668 returns to the discussion about the collision between the standing 
doctrine and the qui tam practice after the Supreme Court’s decision in Vermont Agency of 
Natural Resources v. United States ex rel. Stevens669 regarded as a notable victory for the 
proponents of qui tam. Through the analysis of the standing doctrine and what it implies 
about constitutional separation of powers the author criticises the Stevens decision for 
allowing a private uninjured plaintiff to bring suit for an injury suffered by the government, 
even if the government has concluded that the suit is without merit. “In allowing self-
appointment by the whistle-blower … the Court has tampered with the separation of powers 
and sidestepped the prosecutorial procedures of the Executive branch, which work to 
advance public policy rather than to achieve personal pecuniary gain.”670 By allowing a private 
citizen to take a duty of the Executive branch and by accepting that private citizens may 
appoint themselves (although appointment is another responsibility reserved by the 
                                                          
667 Ibid., pp. 626-630 
668 Gausewitz Berner, N., Note, The Uninjured Plaintiff: Constitutional Standing of Qui Tam Plaintiffs After 
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669 529 U.S. 765 (2000) 
670 Gausewitz Berner, supra note 654 at 143 
 154 
Constitution to the Executive), the Legislative branch has transgressed the separation of 
powers concludes Gauzewitz Berner671.  
 
Some scholars engaged in a discussion on the difference between the citizen suit statutes and 
the qui tam legislation, building up an argument that contrary to the citizen suit a qui tam 
model is unconstitutional672. As Feola (2003)673 argues, there are three fundamental 
differences between citizen suit statutes and the FCA. First, the citizen suit statutes provide 
the government with an unqualified right to intervene once a private citizen has commenced 
litigation. Second, these statutes allow citizens to sue on their "own behalf", and thus they 
have been assigned a private right, whereas the FCA only allows relators to sue in the name 
of the government. Then Feola builds up the following argument: FCA relators are not suing 
to redress a private injury, they are essentially acting as the government's agents, but suing 
in the name of the government is equivalent to enforcing a public right, and enforcing a public 
right is a core executive function674. Third difference between the citizen suit and qui tam, 
argues Feola, is that individuals enforcing citizen suits have no incentive to bring the suit other 
than to protect the health and welfare of similarly situated persons675. Unlike the FCA's 
bounty provisions, citizen suits do not explicitly provide damages to be awarded to the 
individual. Since the FCA does not contain the same type of safeguards to government 
involvement as citizen suits provide, concludes the author, the comparison is inappropriate. 
 
                                                          
671 Ibid. 
672 Krent, H.J and Shenkman, E.G., Of Citizen Suits and Citizen Sunstein, 91 Michigan Law Review 1793, 1820-21 
(1993), critique of Sunstein, C.R., What’s Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, “Injuries,” and Article III, 91 
Michigan Law Review 163 (1992) and Sunstein, C.R., Standing and the Privatization of Public Law, 88 Columbia 
Law Review 1432 (1988) 
673 Feola (2003), supra note 265 at 67 
674 Ibid., p. 166 
675 Ibid. 
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The opposing camp of the defendants of qui tam in the US produced the robust defence of 
the constitutionality of qui tam legislation. Caminker in The Constitutionality of Qui Tam 
Actions (1989)676, addressing the doctrinal challenges in distinguishing between “the 
accepted” citizens' suit and “the suspect” qui tam suit, points out that the distinction between 
private and public interest representation is conceptually infirm677. The public is composed of 
individuals, so any injury to the "public at large" can be reconceptualised as an injury to each 
constituent member (“albeit one that is ubiquitous and perhaps intangible in nature”678). 
Referring to Sunstein679 Caminker notes that there exists no pre-legal, empirical sense in 
which a particular injury must be viewed as inherently "public" in nature680. 
In Caminker’s view, the question of the qui tam’s constitutionality reflects a larger theme – 
whether the US Constitution empowers only the Executive branch to define and then secure 
through litigation the interests of the United States, or the constitutional system imposes 
upon the Branches a degree of overlapping responsibility, thus permitting the Congress to 
diffuse this power and authorise private citizens to represent the United States in Federal 
litigation681. 
 
Caminker concludes that the authorisation of qui tam actions remains a constitutionally 
acceptable means by which Congress may shape and secure the interests of the nation. The 
Congress' power to create new legal interests enforceable by private citizens in Federal court 
                                                          
676 Caminker (1989), supra note 184 at 44 
677 Ibid., p. 346 
678 Ibid. 
679 Sunstein (1988), supra note 658 at 144 
680 Caminker, supra note 184 at 44, p. 346 
681 Ibid., p. 348 
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is not bounded by a public/private distinction -- Congress may entitle private citizens through 
qui tam actions to enforce legal interests granted the United States on its behalf682. 
 
A little more than ten years later Bales in A Constitutional Defense of Qui Tam (2001)683 
developed his argument along the line exploited by Caminker. The analysis suggests that 
there is a firm doctrinal justification for upholding the constitutionality of the FCA qui tam 
provisions, argues Bales. Because qui tam disperses power among the citizens rather than 
concentrating it in the hands of a single political branch, the principles underlying the 
separation of powers doctrine are not threatened as they are when, for example, Congress 
seeks to retain the power constitutionally apportioned to another branch684. 
 
Some commentators, notes Bales, have argued that this is a bad idea to disperse that 
responsibility among the citizens because it decreases political accountability for actions 
taken in the name of the government685: the president must stand for election, whereas qui 
tam informers do not686. While this argument is not without merit, comments professor Bales, 
it overlooks the fact that political accountability is neither the only nor the most important 
value served by the separation of powers doctrine687. The primary purpose of the separation 
of powers doctrine was to preserve liberty688 by dispersing federal power among the three 
branches. “While this purpose may be subverted by the aggrandizement of or misallocation 
of power to one of the governmental branches, it is not seriously threatened by a dispersal 
                                                          
682 Ibid., pp. 387-388 
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of power among the citizens”, argues Bales689. In a qui tam action, the true party in interest 
is the citizenry -- the FCA empowers citizens to enforce the FCA directly, rather than indirectly 
through their executive branch representatives. This dispersal of power among the citizens, 
in Bales view, is not only consistent with, but affirmatively promotes, the purpose of the 
separation of powers doctrine690. The net effect, concludes author, is to weaken somewhat 
the power of the executive branch. If Congress were to attempt to privatise all federal law 
enforcement that certainly would be cause for constitutional concern, but transferring power 
from a branch of government to the citizens raises fewer constitutional concerns, and should 
receive less judicial scrutiny, than transfers of power from one branch to another, argues 
Bales691. The qui tam action, therefore, should be analogised to citizen suit provisions, private 
suits, and corporate shareholder derivatives -- it disperses power instead of concentrating it, 
concludes professor Bales692 with reference to Sunstein693. Viewed through this lens, 
particularly in light of the fact that the power transferred by qui tam is far from absolute, 
argues Bales, qui tam should definitely pass constitutional muster694. 
 
Hartnett (1999)695 gives the discussion on the standing doctrine a new angle by arguing that 
the right of the government to bring criminal prosecutions depends not on any injury in fact 
to the government, but on the customary and statutory power of law enforcement officials 
to initiate criminal proceedings696. The attorneys general, both public and private, he 
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concludes, act on behalf of the public at large rather than to remedy an injury in fact to their 
own legally cognizable interests, and the statutory authorisation is sufficient to enable them 
to do so697. 
 
The note by Averill (1999)698 is interesting by foreshowing the future trend in the 
development of the whistle-blower legislation. Averill proposes that the anti-retaliation 
provision of the False Claims Act should be expanded to protect from retaliation any 
individual who exposes fraud perpetrated on the United States government or who assists in 
a governmental investigation. He demonstrates that the hypothetical outcome resulting from 
the proposed amendment would have provided the whistle-blower a judicial remedy for the 
damages he suffered due to retaliation. 
 
An earlier note by Park (1991)699 analyses the merits of the competing litigation and cause of 
action theories. It argues that adopting either as a bright line test would lead to perverse 
consequences in some cases. Park illustrates those effects by applying the theories to 
situations in which the application of procedural rules, res judicata, and constitutional 
doctrines turn on the governmental or private status of the plaintiff. The author concludes 
that the situational context in which the status issue arises best determines the theory, which 
should be applied. 
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Bucy (2002)700 addresses constitutional issues raised by private justice, and predictably for 
her stance as a proponent of private justice argues that private justice complies with 
constitutional mandates. She concludes that the expansion of the FCA private justice model 
beyond the FCA’s fraud-upon-the-government context is supported by constitutional history 
and theory701. 
 
Hamer (1997)702 reviews the interim results of court hearings on the constitutionality of the 
qui tam. To date, Hamer notes, defendants have not succeeded in challenging the 
constitutionality of the qui tam provisions. The courts are understandably reluctant to find 
any basis for declaring the Act unconstitutional. He argues that although the theories used by 
courts to reject standing challenges have differed, the assignment theory seems to be the 
most appropriate basis for recognising relator standing. Further, Hamer points out, the qui 
tam provisions are consistent with the control theory enunciated by the Supreme Court in 
Morrison v. Olson703. 
 
Ho (1999)704 describes the "real party in interest" doctrine and considers its role in courts' 
analysis of whether states may invoke their sovereign immunity to escape lawsuits based on 
the False Claims Act. He explains why a “real party in interest” analysis is incorrect in this 
context, and argues that courts should instead focus on the party possessing primary 
responsibility to prosecute an FCA action in determining whether a state can invoke 
immunity. 
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Morrison (2005)705 presents a work, which can be regarded as an example of academic 
vigilantism. He examines what he views as a new constitutional challenge to the private 
attorney general. The presumed challenge arises from Nike v. Kasky, a case ostensibly about 
the Supreme Court's commercial speech doctrine706. During proceedings in an amicus brief in 
support of Nike the Solicitor General of the United States urged the Court to adopt a special 
First Amendment limitation on private attorneys general707. Specifically, he argued that the 
First Amendment should prohibit private plaintiffs from enforcing speech regulations except 
to the extent they seek compensation for their own individual injuries708. At the same time, 
the Solicitor general maintained there should be no bar to direct government enforcement of 
identical regulations even in the absence of any showing of injury709. As Morrison summarises, 
the Solicitor General invited the Court to distinguish between publicly and privately enforced 
speech regulations, and to announce a rule generally preferring the former to the latter710. 
 
Morrison argues that a categorical First Amendment preference for public over private 
enforcement cannot be squared with existing free speech doctrine or the principles 
underlying it: to the contrary, as a general matter, the First Amendment properly regards 
private enforcement of speech-related laws as neither more nor less threatening to free 
expression than public enforcement711. However, Morrison goes further suggesting that the 
distinction between public and private enforcement urged in Nike is more than merely an 
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unpersuasive First Amendment argument. Rather, he argues, it should be viewed against the 
backdrop of a number of efforts by the Supreme Court over the last decade to limit the power 
and influence of private attorneys general in a whole range of substantive areas, while leaving 
the government a relatively free hand to enforce the laws directly712. “To the extent this new 
public/private distinction seems attractive to the Court despite its doctrinal shortcomings, 
concludes Morrison, the reason may be that it seems to offer a novel means of advancing the 
Court's policy-preferred end of elevating public over private enforcement. And that 
preference may, in turn, reflect a more fundamental hostility to regulation itself”713. 
 
Comment in the Harvard Law Review (2000)714 and Nguyen (2005)715 address the Eleventh 
Amendment defence in qui tam lawsuits. As authors note, over the past years, the circuits 
have considered whether the Eleventh Amendment bars suits against states by qui tam 
plaintiffs when the Department of Justice chooses not to intervene. In United States ex rel. 
Stevens v. Vermont Agency of Natural Resources the first four circuits to reach the issue716 
concluded that qui tam actions were effectively suits by the United States, and that the states' 
sovereign immunity therefore did not apply. In United States ex rel. Foulds v. Texas Tech 
University717, the Fifth Circuit broke ranks, and held that the Constitution bars qui tam actions 
                                                          
712 Ibid., pp. 618-630 
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against states when the Justice Department does not actively participate718. In reaching its 
decision, the Fifth Circuit reasoned that the states' consent to be sued by the United States 
was conditioned on such suits being conducted by federal officers719. As Harvard Law Review 
argues, this conclusion contradicts the early history of federal law enforcement, in which 
public prosecution played only a small role720: it would not have made sense for states at the 
Constitutional Convention to insist on public prosecution as a condition of waiving immunity 
given that the states would not necessarily have anticipated the creation of federal public 
prosecutors to conduct the government's suits721. As authors conclude, the Fifth Circuit's rule 
disserves both the financial interests of the states and comity between state and federal 
governments722, and "hypothetical Eleventh Amendment jurisdiction" should be 
renounced723. 
 
Sturycz (2009)724 and Lumm (2010)725 take part in a scholarly discussion on qui tam with 
comments addressing the question whether qui tam provisions lead to hike in the volume of 
litigation and its economic cost. As Sturycz notes, in the instance where a False Claims Act qui 
tam claim is brought after a prior private claim was decided, close analysis of the relator-
government relationship under the FCA indicates that the individual's suit under that statute 
ought not to be precluded. Since the interest held by a relator who sues under the FCA is 
distinct from any private interest that he may have previously litigated, the "identical parties" 
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element of claim preclusion cannot be met under current law, he argues. In theory, Sturycz 
admits, this revelation could open the floodgates of repetitious suits by individuals -- first 
under their private interests, and subsequently as FCA relators representing the government's 
interests. The FCA's text, however, allows the government discretion to prevent such 
repetitious litigation by giving the government sufficient control to temper any such efforts 
while also furthering Congress' stated goal of encouraging private individuals to expose and 
prosecute those who defraud the government, concludes Sturycz726. 
 
Lumm examines the latest developments in the law of private whistle-blower enforcement 
under the provisions of the False Claims Act, and analyses the risks associated with 
broadening the scope of the FCA to expose an ever-increasing number of parties to potential 
liability under the Act. He concludes that the constantly broadening scope of potential liability 
under the qui tam provisions, and the multimillion-dollar rewards available by statute to the 
private parties bringing suit, will serve to increase the volume of litigation under the FCA. As 
a result, argues Lumm, operational and transactional costs will rise, primarily in the health 
care context, as new classes of potential defendants take measures to limit their liability 
exposure. 
 
More arguments of the scholarly discussion on constitutional issues involving the qui tam 
provisions of the False Claims Act can be found also in Senagore (2007)727, Gilles (2001)728, 
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Shane (2000)729, Morgan and Popham (1998)730, Johnston (1994)731, Robertson (1994)732, 
Blanch (1993)733, Edgar (1990)734 and Lee (1990)735. 
 
 
Academic literature on whistleblowing and whistle-blowers’ protection 
 
The academic literature on whistleblowing is vast, but patchy due to its conceptual 
incoherence. The term “whistleblowing” is too wide in its scope embracing different academic 
concepts from those supportive of private enforcement to those, which decry private justice. 
This part reviews the literature on whistle-blowing only when it falls into one of the two 
groups: the works analysing whistleblowing in general disregarding whether it is a key 
constituent element of a private enforcement mechanism or it is not; and the works which 
separate whistle-blowing as a civic activity from private justice, viewing it as a decent moral 
behavioural model opposite to the pecuniary motivated qui tam mechanism or irresponsible 
citizen suit. 
 
Ebersole (2011)736 is characteristically typical in his critique of the expansion of the False 
Claims Act qui tam provisions, though he places his criticism within a broader sceptical view 
of whistleblowing. By expanding anti-retaliation protection and monetary incentives, Dodd-
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Frank enacts a new bounty programme, which very likely may be a misguided monetary 
incentive, argues Ebersole. In his view, Dodd-Frank's implications bring to light plausible 
alternatives to whistle-blower reporting for enforcing securities fraud, and highlight the 
importance of thoughtful business practices. Ebersole gives internal corporate procedures a 
priority over any form of a legislative initiatives encouraging whistleblowing. Notwithstanding 
any efforts to influence administrative rulemaking through public comment or legislative 
action through lobbying, he points out, businesses can and should promote compliance by 
taking steps: firstly, by preventing fraud and encouraging internal detection; secondly, by 
avoiding whistle-blower retaliation once fraud has been detected; and, thirdly, by complying 
specifically with the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act ("FCPA"). 
 
Ebersole’s recommendations do not seem to be novel from the point made by Elliston et al. 
in 1985737. After stating that external fraud reporting can "embarrass the company by 
washing their dirty laundry in public”738, the authors recommend businesses to review their 
internal controls to prevent fraud and encourage internal reporting, if fraud does occur. 
 
A number of academic works published within a span of twenty years after Elliston et al. prove 
that nothing much new has been born since by a corporate friendly, pro-internal control 
academic mind. Thus, Johnston (2003)739 insists that “employees uncovering fraud must 
balance a duty to society with organisational loyalty”740. Winfield (1994)741 argues that proper 
internal controls and communication systems can serve as "a corporate safety net" against 
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fraud, and render whistleblowing virtually unnecessary742. While Cavico (2004)743 points out 
that employees are often reluctant to report fraud due to uncertainty regarding potential 
retaliation and condemnation by their peers, Dowling (2006)744 suggests that knowledge of 
prohibited activity and reporting procedures may encourage employees to report fraud 
internally. Miceli and Near (1984)745, point out that whistle-blowers may first report internally 
because they are not aware of incentives or options for external reporting746. However, as a 
research carried out by the National Whistle-blower Center in 2010747 shows, whistle-blowers 
usually report internally before reporting externally, even in the case of qui tam whistle-
blowers, which are incentivised by a reward. 
 
Some researchers point their criticism to the growing complexity of the burdensome 
legislation encouraging whistleblowing. Delikat and Phillips (2010)748 outline measures 
businesses can implement to comply with Sarbanes-Oxley Act, and point out that internal 
controls designed to avoid whistle-blower retaliation are getting more important with an 
increasing number of whistle-blowers likely to result from additional whistle-blower 
incentives. Morvillo and Robertson (2011)749 note that additional controls to prevent whistle-
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blower retaliation and burdensome explanations to the SEC regarding the outcome of internal 
investigations “may be necessary due to the threat of increased whistle-blower reporting”750. 
They argue that new compliance burdens may be unnecessarily duplicative in light of other 
fraud detection measures already in place -- including external audits, internal audits and 
existing internal controls751. Bowen et al. (2012)752 point out that among additional costs 
which should be taken into consideration (and which routinely fall out of analyses) an SEC 
action following whistle-blower report may incur, there are such as a damage to the 
organisational reputation, decrease of the shareholder wealth, rise of monetary penalties, 
additional costs of corporate legal defence, and lost leniency for corporate self-reporting. 
 
Wiener (2011)753 argues that protecting whistle-blowers reflects a careful balancing act. On 
the one hand, there is the desire to protect employees, to encourage disclosure, and to 
discourage corporations from engaging in fraud. On the other hand, he notes, compliance 
costs time and money. Significant increase in incentives bears risk of self-interested 
employees filing false reports in pursuit of bounties, or disgruntled ex-employees are seeking 
revenge on their old employers754. In his view, the piecemeal expansion of whistle-blower 
protections (a “statutory quagmire”755) only begets more piecemeal expansions, and a 
substantial overhaul of the underlying legislative rational becomes less likely. He advocates a 
movement towards “a comprehensive, unified, and properly incentivised system”, which 
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751 Ibid. 
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would be invaluable in preventing future financial crises756. Lobel (2009)757 adds to this a 
noteworthy corporate inside: a deteriorating organisational culture has a cascading effect on 
internal compliance because employees are more likely to report fraud internally in 
organisations with an ethical culture, in which case there is less fear of retaliation758. 
 
Macey in Getting the Word about Fraud: a Theoretical Analysis of Whistleblowing and Insider 
Trading (2007)759 offers a thought provoking unorthodox advance in the theory that both 
whistleblowing and insider trading are best analysed as involving rights in the same inchoate 
intellectual property: valuable information. Macey suggests that whistleblowing and one 
particular kind of insider trading – “insider trading on the basis of information about 
corporate corruption, corporate fraud or other illegal corporate conduct”760 -- are analytically 
and functionally indistinguishable as responses to corporate pathologies such as fraud and 
corruption. This, he argues, explains why whistle-blowers are sometimes viewed with 
suspicion and distrust, not only by their colleagues, but also by regulators and journalists761. 
 
Macey paints a complicated picture of a dubious merit to be a whistle-blower: “When giant 
businesses like Enron, Adelphia, or WorldCom are brought to their knees by whistle-blowers, 
innocent people are harmed. The innocent employees, small suppliers, local communities, 
and philanthropic organisations that depended on these firms suffer as much, if not more, 
than the firm's largely diversified investor base. These groups single out the whistle-blower 
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as the source of their trouble”762. Moreover, adds Macey, revelations by whistle-blowers can 
be embarrassing to regulators, prosecutors, and others who are supposed to be on alert for 
fraudulent corporate activity. 
 
Conversely, notes Macey, it also is the case that inside traders sometimes have fared 
surprisingly well in the courts -- in particular, in cases where insider trading leads to the same 
revelations about incipient fraud as whistleblowing would, courts can be remarkably 
accepting of such trading763. 
 
In his article, professor Macey argues, that whether one has the right to blow the whistle on 
somebody else and whether one has the right to trade on the basis of non-public information 
ultimately depends on whether the persons engaging in the conduct have a rightful property 
interest in the information they are using764. If they do, concludes Macey, then the conduct, 
whether characterised as whistleblowing or insider trading, should be not only legally 
permissible, but affirmatively encouraged765. By contrast, in situations where the person 
doing the trading or the whistleblowing has no legitimate property interest in the 
information, the behaviour should be illegal.766 
 
Austen-Smith and Feddersen (2008)767 and Depoorter and De Mot (2011)768 are interesting in 
their application of economic analysis to the analysis of the legal phenomena. 
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As Austen-Smith and Feddersen note, the highly secretive and premeditated nature of such 
crimes as corruption and fraud, prime witnesses are themselves often implicated in the 
fraudulent transaction. Promises of immunity and whistleblowing rewards are often required 
to resolve the information asymmetries. These insights have set a trend, the authors 
conclude, both in scholarship and law enforcement practice, towards reward-based 
approaches (carrots), as an alternative or complement to punishment based deterrence 
(sticks)769. Applying the False Claims Act as an analytical framework, the authors provide a 
critical review of the efficiency limitations of whistle blowing. The formal model developed in 
their work, reveals a gap between social and private incentives in whistleblowing, both with 
regard to the decision to pursue litigation and the timing of whistleblowing. First, while the 
insiders will blow the whistle whenever their expected recovery exceeds the expected costs 
of litigation, enforcement agencies seek to optimise enforcement in the long run. The 
autonomy of whistle-blowers to pursue claims without government involvement, weakens 
the government’s bargaining position, and obstructs the government’s ability to weigh in 
wider factors of enforcement, argue the authors770. Second, whenever rewards are tied to 
recovery, bounty awards create a perverse incentive whereby fraudulent practices are not 
terminated at a socially optimal point in time. The potential race among whistle-blowers 
cannot mitigate this effect fully because the stigma and loss of opportunities on the job 
market act as internal constraints on whistleblowing, the research concludes771. 
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Depoorter and De Mot start with a statement that whistleblowing is widely reported, 
economically significant and can be extremely costly to the whistle-blowers. In order to better 
understand the circumstances under which decision to blow the whistle is made, they 
develop a model of whistleblowing involving a manager and an employee. Each has a privately 
known type that specifies the relative weight placed on social rather than personal payoffs772. 
The manager chooses a whistleblowing policy consisting of conditional penalties for various 
employee actions. The employee observes the policy and chooses between saying nothing, 
revealing a (privately observed) socially costly violation to the manager, or whistleblowing773. 
Given common knowledge of manager types the authors characterise equilibrium 
whistleblowing policies and employee behaviour. They show that there may be a 
nonmonotonic relationship between the severity of the violation and the likelihood of 
whistleblowing774. When manager types are private information the model provides sufficient 
conditions for a separating equilibrium. Managerial choice of whistleblowing policies thus 
proves to be a key element in a model, and serves a dual purpose: providing incentives for 
reporting violations and providing information to employees regarding the willingness of the 
manager to fix violations that are privately reported775. 
An interesting contribution to the analysis of economic costs of whistleblowing for an 
individual was made by Maarten De Schepper (2009)776. Potential whistle-blowers would 
weigh the possibility of a reward against a number of opposing considerations: the likelihood 
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of information they submitted actually being used, and whether the use would result in a 
successful legal proceeding; whether they would lose their own income; whether they would 
incur personal legal liability for their own part in the scheme; whether they would lose their 
anonymity; whether they would become a target of retaliation in the workplace and subject 
of alienation from colleagues. There is a threat that they are will be blacklisted by the peer 
companies and will lose not only the current income, but also any future income in the well-
paid financial sector. The author presents a formula, which as he argues, provides a 
mathematical verification of the personal cost to step against the employer. The key message 
of this work is that whistle-blowing might well be classified as a form of occupational suicide; 
therefore high reward is required to solve the basic problem that it is too expensive to an 
employee to guard the law. 
Among the most important recent publications stands the 2010 Who Blows the Whistle on 
Corporate Fraud? by Alexander Dyck, Adair Morse and Luigi Zingales777 from the Chicago 
School of Law and Economics. In attempt to identify the most effective mechanisms for 
detecting corporate fraud Dyck, Morse and Zingales conducted the most profound and 
complex study to date of all reported fraud cases in large American companies between 1996 
and 2006. The key question they had asked themselves later made the title of their research 
paper -- “Who blows the whistle on corporate fraud?” The study has found that fraud 
detection does not rely on obvious actors (investors, SEC, auditors), but takes a village of 
several non-traditional players (employees and media) with surprisingly effective role of 
industry regulators778. 
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The carried out by the authors’ analysis of whistle-blowers’ incentives suggests that positive 
reputational and career incentives tend to be weak779. On the contrary, monetary incentives 
seem to work well, without the negative side effects often attributed to them. Moreover, as 
the study shows, monetary incentives for fraud revelation play a role regardless of the 
severity of the fraud. In particular, in healthcare (an industry where the government employs 
a bounty system for whistle-blowers through qui tam provision) 41 per cent of frauds are 
brought to light by employees. This contrasts with only 14 per cent of cases detected by 
employees in all other industries780. 
 
The data provided by the study allows the authors to test the still dominant views on who 
should detect financial fraud. While, the legal view claims fraud detection belongs to auditors 
and securities regulators, the private litigation view attributes it to law firms. And the finance 
view argues that monitoring should be done by those with residual claims (equity and debt 
holders) or their agents (analysts and auditors)781. 
 
The study provides no support neither for the legal view, since the SEC accounts for only 7 
per cent of the cases and auditors -- for 10 per cent, nor for the private litigation view (3 per 
cent of the cases)782. Finance view also finds a weak support: debt holders were rare; equity 
holders play only a trivial role, having detected just 3 per cent of the cases783. Equity holders’ 
agents (auditors and analysts) collectively account for 24 per cent of the cases analysed784. 
But the actors with no residual claims in the firms involved and therefore are traditionally 
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considered as much less important players in the corporate governance arena, turned out to 
play a key role in fraud detection: employees (17 per cent of the cases), non-financial market 
regulators (13 per cent), and the media (24 per cent)785. 
 
The same authors made a step further in their most recent research paper How Pervasive is 
Corporate Fraud? (2013)786. Using the dataset of frauds from the previous research787, Dyck, 
Morse and Zingales developed a comprehensive sample of frauds from Security Class Action 
cases. The frauds include those involving financial misrepresentations, but not limited to 
those. The sample relies on the fact that the security class action system provides strong 
incentives (for attorneys and shareholders) to file suit whenever a fraud that is likely to have 
a material impact is revealed788. 
 
With the dataset the authors tackled the question of unobservable fraud by appealing to basic 
probability rules for guidance of going from observed data of the joint event of engaging in 
fraud and being caught, to the actual variable of interest, the probability of engaging in fraud 
regardless of whether the perpetrators are caught or not789. The identification strategy 
employed exploits circumstances in which the likelihood of being caught increases 
significantly. By comparing the differences in detection in this special circumstance, and in 
normal circumstances, the authors produced an estimate of the iceberg (i.e. the normal 
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detection likelihood), and then go a next step to estimate the unconditional pervasiveness of 
engaging in fraud790. 
 
The authors take advantage of the natural experiment created by the demise of Arthur 
Andersen that forced all firms that previously had Andersen as their auditor to seek another 
auditor791. The scandal enhanced the incentives of new auditors to be active. As a result, Dyck 
et al. have found that the incidence of fraud detection by auditors goes up by a multiple of 
close to four792. This gives a sense of how much undetected fraud exists more generally, with 
the iceberg being 3 times bigger under the water than above the water. Thus the authors 
arrive at their best estimate that 14.5 per cent of large publicly traded corporations engage 
in fraud793, with a very conservative lower bound estimate close to 5.6 per cent794. 
 
The next step of the research was to estimate the social costs of fraud. Dyck et al. construct 
a new measure of the cost of fraud, which they define to be equal to the difference between 
the enterprise value after the fraud is revealed and what the enterprise value of the company 
would have been in the absence of fraud795. Using this approach, the authors estimate that 
the median loss is 20.4 per cent of the enterprise value of the fraud companies (the firms’ 
enterprise value prior to the beginning of fraud was set as the benchmark)796. Putting the 
estimate of the extent of fraud with the estimate of the cost per firm of fraud, the research 
produces an estimate of the social cost of fraud for these firms as a percentage of their 
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enterprise value. The final price tag turns out to be 3 per cent of enterprise value of all large 
corporations797. 
Though for Luigi Zingales qui tam and whistle-blower protection have never been in the 
centre of his scientific interests, his works such as The Costs and Benefits of Financial Market 
Regulation (2004)798 and The Future of Security Regulation (2009)799 regard whistle-blower 
incentives as a cost effective way to tackle corporate fraud.  
A significant research into the effectiveness of whistle-blower rewards has been published by 
the Texas Tech University in 2010. Its author Derek Dalton applied Theory of Planned 
Behaviour (Ajzen, 1991) to the published in 1993 Schultz et al. model explaining whistle-
blower intentions, and predicting whistle-blower behaviour. As a result a more 
comprehensive model has been developed, accounting for the perceived degree of difficulty 
to report wrongdoing (perceived behaviour control), and the potential benefits that may 
result from an individual’s decision to report wrongdoing800. 
 
 
Conclusions 
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The accrued body of research on qui tam comprises a significant number of academic 
publications, mostly articles, which focus on relatively narrow aspects of this phenomenon, 
with majority directly or indirectly engaged in academic discussion on constitutionality of qui 
tam legislation. So far qui tam has survived all judicial challenges, and legislative branch shows 
no signal that it is ready to downscale it, or revise existing legislation to limit its scope, or 
somehow else reconfigure. Thus, from practical point of view, academic challenges to qui tam 
remain exercise in theoretical reasoning. Historical analysis of the qui tam legislation in 
America leaves no doubt that the framers of American Constitution were familiar with 
relevant statutes, which had been enacted by British colonies in North America long before 
the Revolution. Soon after framing the Constitution the same Congress enacted a number of 
qui tam statutes, giving by that fact a proof that the founding fathers of the United States 
viewed qui tam as a normal practice. 
The review of the earlier scholarly publications on qui tam in England, carried out for the 
purposes of this research, has discovered that the views on qui tam set forth by Sir Edward 
Coke in late XVI – early XVII centuries had been widely misread, giving mistaken impression 
of him as a hardline critic of the practice common in his time. His often quoted “viperous 
vermin” derogatory description of some delators refers to what he viewed as their abuse of 
the otherwise noble practice. Lord Coke’s work was called upon to promote remedies to 
redress violations, and the popular in later literature derogatory term cannot be attributed to 
a much broader, in his view, group of law enforcement activists of the time. 
Even in its entirety, academic literature on qui tam gives a patchy picture and does not favour 
a holistic approach. But a significant number of narrow focused works provide with deep 
analysis on the chosen topic, and the growing number of research turns to analysis and 
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interpretation of the meticulously collected data. As a general rule, however, predominant 
are the works, which are high in theory and low in statistically valid data. This leaves a broad 
niche for a further research in the field. 
Of those research papers not dedicated to the constitutionality debates, a relative majority 
choose law and economics perspective as their methodological framework. Though most law 
and economics research of qui tam do it assuming it is a viable and socially valuable legal 
concept, division of opinion among American academics would rather follow a frontier 
separating more statist and less statist foundational assumptions – with more scepticism 
among the former, and more enthusiasm among the latter. 
 
Summarising the rendered above literature review, it must be admitted that so far only a few 
researchers showed consistent interest in historical perspective in their works on qui tam. 
Absent are attempts to explore a broader context, in which this law enforcement mechanism 
has been evolving through the millennia, developing a high degree of sensitivity to political, 
economical and societal changes. The analysis carried out in the next chapter is the first 
attempt of the kind. 
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Chapter III 
Law and Economics Analysis of Qui Tam Legal Concept 
 
The conceptual framework of this research is based on the economic analysis of law (also 
known as Law and Economics)801. Economic concepts are used to explain the effects of laws, 
to assess which legal rules are economically efficient, and to predict which legal rules will be 
promulgated. 
Economic analysis of law can be characterised as the most advanced methodological tool for 
legal policymaking and structural analysis of existing and projected legal institutions, and 
concepts. Legal rules are scrutinised under aspects of allocation efficiency including 
transaction costs, the problems of externality and risk, distributional consequences and 
incentive compatibility. 
Economic analysis of law derives from several different intellectual traditions in economics. 
Ronald Coase802 and Guido Calabresi803 are generally identified as the first who applied the 
tools of microeconomic theory to the analysis of legal rules and institutions. Their seminal 
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articles were published respectively in 1960 and 1961. However Commons (1924)804 and Hale 
(1952)805 among others had brought economic thinking to the study of law in the 1910s and 
1920s. 
Another famous contributor to the theory was American economist Gary Becker806. Despite 
being credited as a first economic imperialist, actively promoting economic methods as a 
framework to analyse most of human activities, his frame of reference – rational choice 
theory of economics is understood to be rigorous, powerful and persuasive in analysing if not 
all, but at least a number of legal issues related to criminal justice.  
Richard Posner in 1973807 brought about the debate around the philosophical foundations of 
economic analysis of law. He made two claims: (I) Common law legal rules are, in fact, 
efficient; and (II) Legal rules ought to be efficient. In both claims, “efficient” means 
maximisation of the social willingness-to-pay. In the course of the controversy, two more 
claims were later articulated by Kornhauser (1984, 1985)808: (III) Legal processes select for 
efficient rules; and (IV) individuals respond to legal rules economically. The former provoked 
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a wide spread criticism809, but Kornhauser identified the last, behavioural claim, as the central 
one. 
The typical model in economic analysis of law assumes that public officials conscientiously 
apply the legal rule under study. The public officials do not identify the rule that would best 
promote their own preferences, and then apply (or not apply) that rule. As the theory argues, 
they “conscientiously” apply the rule that “ought” to govern the event. If the effects of the 
legal rule are the central focus of some inquiry, the incentives and behaviour of public officials 
who enforce that rule may be of less interest810. 
In terms of law and economics the latest amendments to the qui tam legislation in the 
Financial Reform Act can be assessed as a triumph of a combination of normative economic 
analysis811 and legal positivism812, which appears to have become the dominant approach of 
the President Obama’s administration. While positive law and economics seeks explain the 
law, or the legal system, as it is, normative law and economics seeks to describe how the law 
or the legal system should be, providing by far the progressive camp of a political class with a 
strong reformist agenda. But the the government’s practicians should tread carefully when 
applying these reforms, as Hylton, a normative jurist himself, pointed, “the normative law 
and economics approach … reflects at bottom an arrogant belief in the power of theory to 
                                                          
809 Krecke, E. The Nihilism of the Economic Analysis of Law, Austrian Scholars Conference, 2001. Ludwig von 
Mises Institute   
810 Ibid. 
811 Bentham, J., (1928). A Comment on the Commentaries: A Criticism of William Blackstone’s Commentaries on 
the Laws of England. Charles W. Everett ed., Oxford: Clarendon Press [online] Available at < 
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812 Holmes, O.W., (2009). The Common Law. Republication of the 1st original edition (1881). Chicago: American 
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provide useful policies for reforming complicated institutions”813. From this point of view the 
US financial reform epitomises the upper hand of a Pigouvian approach over Coase814, when 
the former seeks to improve the deeply flawed markets, as it sees them, by designing the 
perfect legislation. Being a strong advocate of a government intervention, British economist 
Pigou set a framework governing the current US work on regulation: an externality makes 
competitive market outcome inefficient, only a Government intervention can fix the 
problem815. 
 
However surprisingly it is, but at least one part of the legislation shows strong influence of 
the opposite legal concept, in due course of the Coasean argument that the market 
imperfections may derive from the flaws in regulatory environment, therefore there is no 
need to create a new legislation, but to amend the existing one -- the biggest gain can be 
probably obtained by eliminating the negative effects of pre-existing regulation816. This 
approach is visible in those provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act, which refer to the incentives to 
encourage whistle-blowers, who report financial fraud817. 
The qui tam legislation clearly relates to the ideas of the Chicago School law and economics, 
which long argues that a reward system for corporate whistle-blowers can provide a very low 
cost alternative to external monitoring systems, while other forms of regulation have more 
dubious effect818. It is worth mentioning that the relation to the Chicago School views does 
not necessarily mean adherence to the fundamentalist strong-form rationality assumption 
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that has become a defining characteristic of this school819. This research adopts the 
framework, developed by Guido Calabresi, where a man stands weakly rational – rational, but 
subject to some pretty consistent deviations820. 
As Luigi Zingales points out, contrary to popular misconception, Coase never subscribed to 
the extreme laissez faire821. In his 1960 article he states “there is no reason why, on occasion, 
such governmental administrative regulation should not lead to an improvement in economic 
efficiency.”822 Yet, Coase’s argument makes the case for regulation much more difficult to 
prove. 
 
This research will revisit this debate with modern eyes. Consistent with Coase’s position, it 
will analyse the potential costs and benefits of the qui tam regulation. The most important 
costs of regulation are the resources spent to comply with it (Franks et al., 1998)823 and the 
burden imposed to firms that should not have been regulated, but nevertheless, are subject 
to it (Hart, 2004)824. 
 
Regulation improves outcome when enforcing contracts is very costly (Posner, 1998)825 or 
when limited liability restricts the ability to punish deviants (Shavell, 1984)826. Regulation has 
a role also when contracts are incomplete and renegotiation is hampered, as it is often the 
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case in financial markets where one party to the contracts (the shareholders) is often too 
dispersed to be able to coordinate (an important point first raised by Zingales, 2004)827. 
 
Some argue that economic analysis of law denounces any political intervention828. However, 
as Rajam and Zingales829 argued in their article, the starting point of their theory is that 
financial development is not a natural outcome of market forces, but requires political 
intervention. The Government needs to create the essential ingredients of developed 
markets, which includes respect for property rights, an accounting and disclosure system that 
promotes transparency, a legal system that enforces arm’s length contracts cheaply, and a 
regulatory infrastructure that protects consumers, promotes competition, and controls 
egregious risk-taking. 
 
The government has the ability to co-ordinate standards, and to enforce non-monetary 
punishments such as jail terms, that give it some advantage in regulating and policing. Some 
research showed evidence that government intervention was beneficial for financial systems. 
La Porta et al. (1997)830, for instance, show that laws protecting investors are an important 
determinant of financial development across countries. Similarly, in their study of the 
evolution of the Czech and Polish financial systems, Glaeser et al. (2003)831 argue that the 
peremptory laissez faire attitude of the Czech government ion 1990s deprived the market of 
the legal and regulatory infrastructure necessary for financial development. 
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It is sensible for the purposes to develop a framework to analyse qui tam regulation, how law 
and economics evaluate consequences and externalities of the newly enacted regulation.  As 
Arrow (1972) states832, economic activity needs trust. Following Guiso et al. (2001)833, trust is 
described as the posterior beliefs about the integrity of the system. Such a belief comes in 
part from the observed data, but in part from people’s prior beliefs. Generic trust towards 
other people can predict the trust towards the stock market and the investment in the stock 
market (Guiso et al. (2008))834. To the extent that government regulation on qui tam can 
affect this level of generalised trust, it can improve or degrade stock market participation. 
One way a government can affect people’s trust is through a rigorous enforcement of existing 
rules. Salient events tend to weight heavily in people’s mind. Thus, while highly publicised 
individual cases of fraud can have a negative effect on trust, highly publicised cases of 
enforcement can have a positive effect. In a cross-section of countries, Aghion et al. (2008)835 
show that higher mistrust leads to a higher demand for government intervention. But a 
similar relationship also exists in the time series. After every major crisis, the demand for 
government intervention increases. For example, after the 1929 crisis, there was a large 
demand for intervention. The same is true after the Enron and WorldCom scandals. And the 
same is true after financial crisis of 2007-2011. Lack of government activities is perceived as 
indifference, while some intervention can engender hope that the system will improve and 
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so raise the level of trust. As Hochberg et al., (2009)836 point out, though it is hard to prove 
causality, but the passage of Sarbanes Oxley was followed by an increase in the general trust 
towards the stock market. 
 
It is worth mentioning that not so long ago a new body of research emerged in the context of 
the economic analysis of law that challenged some of its important assumptions.  
Thus far, the economic literature maintained the standard assumption, that economic agents 
were rational and made choices that maximise their own welfare. However, a growing body 
of research has challenged this assumption. Mandrian and Shea (2001)837, for instance, show 
that people are much more likely to participate in a retirement plan when the default rule is 
that they are enrolled rather than when the default rule is that they are not enrolled, even if 
they are free to switch. Given the life altering effect of this decision, it is hard to rationalise 
the effect of such a tiny shift in the cost of the decision. Using this evidence, Thaler and 
Sunstein (2003)838 argue in favour of a strategic choice of default options aimed at maximising 
social welfare. If these options are simply a default, which the parties involved can change at 
no cost; their strategy comes at no real cost to individual freedom. For this reason, they label 
it “libertarian paternalism”. As other research shows, even this very bland form of paternalism 
seems to impact final outcomes (Thaler and Bernartzi (2004)839). 
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These works support the previous research by Hersch Shefrin, who is regarded as one of the 
founders of the behavioural economic movement. He argues that behavioural economic 
theories emerged when advances made by psychologists came to the attention of 
economists, and it happened in his view in 1982 when Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic and Amos 
Tversky published their book, Judgement Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases840. 
 
From the point of view of qui tam analysis, it is remarkable how Shefrin identifies three main 
factors in behavioural economics: Heuristic driven bias; Frame dependence; and Inefficient 
markets841. 
 
The behavioural economic framework may be promising when applied to the analysis of the 
recent emphasis on material rewarding whistle-blowers, which amounted to a paradigm shift 
in regulatory approach to whistleblowing as a political, economic and legal phenomenon. As 
it is shown in the research, the US regulatory framework before 2010 focused mainly on the 
measures to protect whistle-blowers from retaliation whether in the form of tough or subtle 
harassment or by firing them. At the moment the regulatory policy seems to evaluating a 
further increase in scope of a bounty based approach to encouraging whistleblowing. The 
bounty system has the advantage of decentralising the problem of enforcement, which apart 
from tackling the inevitable bureaucratic inaptitude significantly reduces its costs. With 
respect to more traditional forms of monitoring and regulatory control such a system 
presumably has two advantages. First, it does not require setting up a costly structure. 
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Second, by creating competition for enforcement, it reduces the chances that the potential 
enforcer is bought off. In more details this will be elaborated below in this chapter. 
 
The main approach of the economic analysis of law -- to use standard microeconomic tools in 
order to explain the logic of jurisprudence as strive for efficiency – has long been criticised 
both from outside and within that school842. Using sophisticated models, this school sought 
to show the mechanisms by which the law encourages economically efficient social 
behaviour. The law and economics theories operate, out of necessity, at a relatively high level 
of abstraction, applying elaborated mathematical models to derive precise quantitative 
predictions for overall normative assessments. However, such simplifying assumptions, as 
critics point out, seem to create a substantial risk of overlooking essential aspects of the 
analysed area of inquiry, and may generate predictions of little relevance to the actual 
circumstances843. 
For the reason, “the social sciences have to deal with structures of essential complexity, 
whose characteristic properties can be exhibited only by models made up of relatively great 
numbers of variables,”844 such assumptions leave many important questions unanswered. As 
Morrison emphasised, mathematics, in excess, blurs our perception of economic and legal 
institutions845. Ronald Coase himself was sceptical about the rational choice theory -- one of 
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the pillars of the economic analysis of law. In 1988 he said: “When economists find that they 
are unable to analyse what is happening in the real world, they invent an imaginary world 
which they are capable of handling”846. 
Some economists within that school of thought long ago came to question the rationality 
assumption on which economic theory is built. Ulen (1999)847,
 
for instance, criticises 
traditional rational choice theory for being unable to provide legal economists with a 
methodical account of the fallibility of human reason. He makes the success of future law and 
economics dependent on the development of a more complex and complete theory of human 
decision-making, which combines rational choice theory with coherent insights of human 
fallibility. Such a theory, in his view, would be vastly more satisfying than rational choice 
theory in order to serve as a foundation for the elaboration of legal systems, whose goal it is 
to create incentives for individuals to act efficiently848. 
The same logic has led this research to employ more flexible methodological framework, than 
the original wave of law and economics suggested. It employs a more behavioral approach, 
taking into account some of the sociological and political aspects of a legal phenomenon. In 
this respect the applied frame of reference drifts away from a rigid cage of the Chicago-school 
“scientific” framework towards more Calabresian reading of the law and economics, the one 
that melds “political” concepts – like interpersonal comparison of utility and justice849 -- onto 
neoclassical economics. In search of the more efficient model of deterrence, the behavioral 
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approach allows incorporating a Mertonian structural-functional idea of deviance and 
anomie850 in the analysis of white-collar crime. 
The applied theoretical framework shares with the Austrian perspective the view of a 
society’s legal system as closely related to the subjective preferences and the conduct of the 
individuals who constitute that society. The evolution of such a system is open-ended and 
unpredictable, though it is possible to identify prevailing trends and make predictions. It is a 
framework of the earlier Austrians though, namely Friedrich Hayek, who contrary to the 
popular view never completely rejected a rational choice theory – one of a pillars of law and 
economics. What he rejected was “rationalism” with its ignorance of the agents’ perspective, 
which, in Hayek's view, could easily lead to the overestimation of rational planning and 
control, in terms of their abilities to effectively shape the societal development.851 Hayekian 
vision is that it is not clear what the original purpose of the law was852, because the law 
emerges as the result of “human action, not human design”853. Legal rules and institutions 
are determined as part of an on-going social learning and adaptation process which operates 
through trial and error, experimentation, imitation and compromise. 
The sprawling pervasive nature of the qui tam legal mechanism, and its ability to change legal 
mandates through the decisions of courts, exploring and bringing forward innovation, 
perfectly fits into Austrian understanding of law and how the law applies. The pluralistic 
conceptual framework, which distance itself from elaborate mathematical modeling, allows 
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the multi-layered analysis of this research to adopt for its purposes both behavioural 
economics and new governance theory without compromising on the premises of the rational 
choice theory and economic efficiency of law. As it was noted, legal theory today is much 
more of an amalgam of theoretical approaches854. An approach with direct relevance to a 
particular problem can be often irrelevant to other problems.  
A qui tam mechanism is applied mainly to the problem of crimes conducted within big 
corporations, where agents represent a very specific social group with very calculative minds 
and often distorted work ethic, where financial success elevates to the ultimate reward, or 
“utility” in terms of economic analysis of law. In this area of public life law and economics 
provides a useful analytical framework, particularly when sufficiently flexible to employ the 
Merton’s theory of deviance. 
The analysis proceeds as follows.  
First, qui tam mechanism positioned within the context of public-private enforcement and 
then successively analysed by modelling effective regulatory enforcement policy and more 
robust deterrence built on broad-based inclusion of complex factors affecting behaviour of 
potential whistle-blowers. The model then has been tried to find an optimal cost-effective 
equilibrium of agency based and private based enforcement. The final part of the chapter is 
dedicated to the analysis of the first empirical evidence of the way the recent rise in 
whistleblowing activity affected the corporate world.  
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Analysing Qui Tam in the Context of Public vs. Private Enforcement 
 
In an era of diminished public resources prompted by the severe economic crisis many bodies 
of US Government are being forced to take drastic measures to address stringent budgetary 
constraints. As budgets of law enforcement around the countries affected be the recent crisis 
have been either scaled back or strictly limited the enforcement capacities have been 
narrowed. One conceivable response is the outsourcing, including the prosecution function. 
In fact, “prosecution outsourcing currently is utilized in surprising measure by jurisdictions in 
the United States”855. Advocates of outsourcing cite efficiency, enhanced service, and cost 
savings as rationales for the private performance of these criminal justice functions. 
 
This is not something new for the US regulatory system. As Glover notes, it “is unique in that 
it expressly relies on a diffuse set of regulators, including private parties, rather than on a 
centralised bureaucracy for the effectuation of its substantive aims”856. In contrast with 
traditional view of private enforcement as an ad hoc supplement to public law, some forms 
of that private regulation are integral to the structure of the contemporary American 
administrative state. The most important (and massive) is private litigation and the 
mechanisms that enable it are not merely add-ons to the US regulatory regime, much less are 
they fundamentally at odds with it. Qui tam is another historical model of private 
enforcement. The part below will try to offer some systemic view of qui tam as private (or 
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more precisely dual private/public) enforcement mechanism by providing elements of a 
conceptual framework for tailoring to the contours of particular regulatory regimes. This 
framework seeks a most effective way to align private enforcement mechanisms with the 
regulatory and public goals. 
 
The debate over private versus public enforcement of laws is part of the economic analysis of 
law. It focuses mainly on one aspect of the optimal structure of law, namely, who should be 
the actor initiating and prosecuting the enforcement. Other aspects of an optimal legal 
system include857: 
 Governing by the law or simply by social norms 
 The optimal timing of legal intervention (before an act, after an act or after harm has 
occurred)  
 The optimal form of legal intervention (prevention, imposition of fines, liability for 
harm, imprisonment). 
The discussion of the enforcement issue in law and economics commenced with an argument 
by Becker and Stigler (1974)858 in favour of private enforcement of laws in areas typically 
reserved to public enforcement, such as criminal law and tax law. They detected “a major 
error of the theory of rules” in the assumption that “rules provide any guidance or incentive 
to their enforcement”, and asked, if “society does not pretend to be able to designate who 
the bakers should be – this is left to personal aptitudes and tastes. Why should enforcers of 
laws be chosen differently?”859 
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Becker and Stigler proposed a system under which “anyone could enforce statutes and 
receive as compensation a fine levied against convicted violators”860. If violators cannot pay 
the fine, the state would impose on them some non-monetary punishment and compensate 
those enforcing the law. If persons are acquitted of charges, they would be compensated by 
those who took them to court. Impoverished enforcers would be required to post a bond or 
some other kind of “malpractice” insurance.861 The right to use violence when enforcing the 
law would be granted to some licensed firms862. 
 
According to the authors, such system would offer some significant advantages over public 
enforcement. With compensation set at the right level, the incentives to enforce the law 
would be as high as the incentives of prospective violators to break the law, thus solving one 
of the major problems of the traditional system of public enforcement.863 Also, at this level 
of compensation there would be no danger of collusion between the violator and the enforcer 
of the law against the public for the enforcers could not be corrupted.864 As a result 
competitive market for law enforcement would evolve: specialised firms would lower the 
overall enforcement costs of society, taking advantage of technological innovation if this 
promises to enhance the efficiency of law enforcement.865 
 
Landes and Posner (1975)866 critically responded to Becker and Stigler advocating for private 
enforcement of laws. Focusing on the area of criminal law, they showed that a system of 
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private enforcement would not be as efficient as a system of optimal public enforcement save 
by chance867. On the contrary, they argued, it would lead to over-enforcement868. 
 
It is worth noting that from an economic standpoint, optimal law enforcement is not equal to 
maximum law enforcement. Rather, optimal law enforcement minimises the sum harm to 
society caused by perpetrators and total enforcement costs869. 
 
Assuming that perpetrators will choose to violate the law when the expected benefits from 
breaking the law are higher than the expected costs, all the society must do to reduce 
violations is to raise the “price” of breaking the law beyond the expected benefits of breaking 
the law870. This “price” P(f,p) is a function of the sanction f imposed on the violator (monetary 
or non-monetary) and the probability p of apprehension and conviction. Seen from the 
perspective of the perpetrator, the price can be raised by increasing a) the likelihood of 
apprehension, b) the severity of the sanction, c) both. 
 
From the viewpoint of society, the calculation is slightly different. Assuming some fixed 
optimal price P* is sufficient to deter violations, the rational legislator will choose the 
combination of f and p which minimises enforcement costs. Since the actual process of law 
enforcement is costly, this combination is likely to include a relatively high monetary sanction 
f and a relatively low probability of apprehension and conviction p871. However, regulators 
may not simply choose an infinitely high monetary sanction as f. The higher this sanction the 
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more people will only notionally be deterred by it as they will not be able to pay the fee. 
Therefore, as pointed out Friedman (1984)872, the higher the monetary sanction the higher 
the need for some supplementary non-monetary sanction such as imprisonment, which by 
default is more costly for society than the monetary sanction. 
 
However, a system of private enforcement of laws will not permit regulators to undertake 
such “high sanction/ low probability strategy”. The reason is that in a system of private 
enforcement regulators can only adjust one variable -- f -- to achieve optimal enforcement, 
but they cannot control p. If regulators raise f, private enforcers cannot distinguish whether 
this is due to an increase in the value of law enforcement relative to other activities, or an 
effort to lower p and save enforcement costs. Thus, private enforcers are likely to increase 
the resources devoted to law enforcement when in a system of optimal public enforcement 
those resources would be reduced.  
 
Landes and Posner stressed that their analysis should not be taken as a case for preferring 
public over private enforcement because this would require a comparison between private 
and actual, not optimal public enforcement873. Although their analysis has been contested 
and refined by other scholars in subsequent works874, they generally agree that the choice 
between public and private enforcement means searching for a “second-best” solution, 
                                                          
872 Friedman, D.D., Efficient Institutions for the Private Enforcement of Law, 13 Journal of Legal Studies 379-397 
(1984), p.381 
873 Landes and Posner (1975), supra note 838 at 179, p. 15  
874 Polinsky, A.M. Private versus Public Enforcement of Fines, 9 Journal of Legal Studies 105-127 (1980); 
Friedman, supra note 844 
 197 
requiring complex considerations of various criteria, including the factual context of 
regulation875. 
 
Following Landes and Posner analysis a framework of criteria for a second-best solution can 
be built up with proposed by Lars Klohn focused on enforcement costs as a major factor to 
be considered when choosing between public and private enforcement876. The Landes-Posner 
over-enforcement theorem holds only if the probability of enforcement is sufficiently low. If 
the probability of enforcement is unity, there can hardly be any over-enforcement. Therefore, 
in the Landes-Posner model, private enforcement becomes more attractive as enforcement 
costs decrease, holding everything else constant877. 
 
In a real world, both private and public enforcement have several specific costs attached to 
them, points Klohn878. Enforcement costs mainly consist of information costs necessary to 
detect whether, to what extent and by whom a law has been broken, and the costs of 
prosecuting and sanctioning the perpetrator. Public enforcement requires some centralised 
system of information gathering, whereas private enforcement relies on a “de-centralised” 
system, in which violations of the law will be detected by some individual who has an 
incentive to enforce the law. Both systems have advantages and disadvantages879. 
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As Polinsky showed880, a centralised public system is very costly in regard of the collection of 
information. On the other hand, such system can achieve economies of scale, as for example 
in the case of a central registry for criminal offenders. Though, as Klohn remarks, a system of 
central information gathering can suffer from specific diseconomies of scale due to multiple 
layers of decision-making and reviews within an administrative body881. 
To be sure, a monopolistic private enforcer might achieve any economies of scale achieved 
by a centralised system of public enforcement as well882. However, given that a system of 
central information gathering is superior to a de-centralised system, it is highly doubtful 
whether society should entrust a private monopolist with this task. First, any centralised 
information collection system raises questions of data protection and accountability. Second, 
society runs the risk of becoming dependent on the monopolist, giving it an opportunity to 
overcharge for its service. 
So it makes sense to assume that the aggregate of private individuals usually has an 
informational advantage over a central agency, simply because the agency lacks resources to 
gather all the information that the dispersed public can collect883. In some areas of law, 
private individuals seem to have a “natural” informational advantage. In contract law, the 
contracting parties are the first to know whether a breach of contract has occurred or is likely 
to occur in the future884. The same is true for many torts – car accidents, nuisance cases, and 
neighbour disputes. In criminal law, Klohn argues, there is no such informational advantage 
for private enforcers, or even a “natural” informational disadvantage885: most crimes are 
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committed by people who intend to hide their identity. Moreover, in these situations a 
centralised system of information gathering can achieve great economies of scale by setting 
up a database collecting data about repeat offenders886. 
 
In a next step comes an analysis of enforcement incentives. It may be presumed that they 
are optimal when the incentives of the person enforcing the law are perfectly aligned with 
the socially desirable incentives to enforce the law -- when the marginal social benefits from 
enforcing the law are equal to marginal social enforcement costs. A misalignment of 
incentives can occur under both private and public enforcement. 
 
The central incentive-problem with public enforcement of laws is that the enforcer’s personal 
interest in enforcing the law is usually lower than society’s interest887.  Public service 
employees usually receive a fixed salary and do not gain directly from enforcing the law. This 
poses an “omnipresent threat of collusion between the violator of the law and the public 
enforcement agent”888. The former has an incentive to pay up to the expected fine (or the 
monetary equivalent of a non-monetary sanction) to evade punishment889. On the other 
hand, public servants can be overly eager to enforce the law. They might prosecute cases 
according to the public attention these cases promise to bring890. They might seek to 
maximise their budget as opposed to optimally enforce the law. And they might be “captured” 
- discriminate against political enemies and favouring political friends when enforcing the 
law891. If there is the danger of capture, granting private enforcement rights discourages the 
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regulated industry to lobby for a cut in the agency’s budget or to otherwise weaken the 
agency’s enforcement ability. Granting private enforcement rights, however, does give the 
regulated industry an incentive to lobby for laxer regulation.  
 
It is almost apparent, that private incentives to enforce the law seem to be optimal when 
private parties are the victims of the violation of the law. In this case, the probability of 
enforcement approaches unity, if the expected benefits from law enforcement exceed the 
expected costs892. Those affected by the law violation often have a competitive advantage in 
weighing these costs and benefits, at least when the social interest in bringing suit is strongly 
correlated with the private interest of potential plaintiffs. However, even when private 
enforcers are the victims of a violation of the law, their enforcement incentives might not be 
socially optimal for a number of reasons. 
 
First arise the compensation problems.  
 
If the law makes use of only non-monetary sanctions such as imprisonment to deter 
wrongdoers, especially in cases when the expected damage from breaking the law is large, 
there will be under-enforcement by private enforcers because they will usually not be able to 
cover their enforcement costs893. 
 
For successful enforcement three conditions seem to be necessary. First, the incentives of 
private enforcers might be set at the right level if the state provides them with some 
monetary compensation894. This compensation would have to be as high as the costs of 
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punishment for the perpetrator, because otherwise there would arise the opportunity of 
collusion between the perpetrator and enforcer to the detriment of the public895. If the 
compensation to private enforcers were increased to this level, however, the danger of 
under-enforcement would be replaced with the problem of over-enforcement, because 
private enforcers would try to increase p when regulators actually want to reduce p to 
minimise the total social loss from crime896. 
 
Second, setting compensation at the right level involves a valuation problem. Regulators 
would have to determine the money value of evading prison to the average perpetrator. 
While it is assumed that such value can be determined in economic models897, it is highly 
debatable whether such valuation is possible in the real world. 
 
Third, the above-mentioned argument assumes that private parties will be driven to enforce 
the law only for monetary rewards. Therefore, the problem of under-enforcement might be 
mitigated, if the people are driven by some desire for fairness, as is the case in some areas of 
law such as environmental law898. 
 
However, there is one more complication. When the violation of the law causes negative 
externalities without directly affecting any person who could be defined as a victim 
(“victimless crimes” such as drug trafficking or insider trading899), private parties may not have 
the right incentives to enforce the law. Since there is no compensation to be gained from the 
suit (or since such consideration would not be identical to social harm), profit-driven private 
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enforcers would require some additional compensation to be collected from the perpetrator, 
such as punitive damages, or through subsidies by the public. To set enforcement incentives 
at the right level, especially to avoid over-enforcement, regulators would drive themselves in 
a quandary to constantly solve very complicated calculations such as measuring the external 
damage from drug use or the monetary value of a loss in faith in the integrity of capital 
markets.  
 
Next come collective action problems.  
 
In a system of competitive private enforcement900 a collective action problem arises when 
several private plaintiffs engage in a wasteful “race to the courts”901. If the expected reward 
is high enough, numerous private individuals may have an incentive to invest in preparing a 
suit even though enforcement by a single party may suffice, thus duplicating enforcement 
costs. Co-ordination could remedy the problem, but might not be feasible due to individually 
rational strategic behaviour. 
 
In other environment, under a system of profit-driven private enforcement902 parties will find 
it worthwhile to file suits even on unreasonable grounds, if the suit has a positive expected 
net value. They might bring “strike suits”903 just for their nuisance value, which depends on 
many considerations apart from the legal grounds of the claim, such as the danger of bad 
publicity or the expected litigation costs. While this danger is present in public enforcement 
of laws as well, it does not seem as high because public law enforcers do not profit monetarily 
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from their enforcement, have a limited budget, and are held politically accountable for their 
actions. 
 
Agency problems also complicate the system of private incentives to enforce the law. 
 
If private enforcement of laws involves an agency relationship, such as between plaintiffs and 
attorneys in a class action, there is the danger of perverse incentives for the agent. For 
example, the attorneys have an incentive to settle a lawsuit on terms unfavourable for the 
plaintiffs if the settlement involves generous attorney fees904. 
 
Finally the complex issues of the enforcement policy must be analysed by clearly identifying 
advantages and disadvantages of private and public enforcement. 
 
Some scholars -- Stewart and Sunstein (1982)905, Blomquist (1989)906, Bucy (2002)907, Klohn 
(2010)908 -- argue that in terms of cooperation and self-regulation private enforcement 
renders it almost impossible to cooperate with regulated industries and to incentivise 
regulated industries to adopt self-regulation. It is true that private litigation remedies the 
capture problem when an agency is inclined to collude with those regulated against society. 
However, if there are alternative means to cope with the capture problem, private 
enforcement may engender an overemphasis on coercion and deterrence at the expense of 
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negotiation and cooperation909. Also, it discourages companies to seek a cooperative solution 
when violations have occurred910. 
  
Another disadvantage of private enforcement, as long assumed, is that it renders almost 
impossible to exercise discretion not to enforce the law when non-enforcement is beneficial 
to society911. This point assumes that laws are usually over inclusive. Taken literally, they 
cover cases, which the legislator would have chosen not to cover, if it had known the 
particular case in advance. The economic explanation for over inclusion is that it is very costly 
to tailor a rule exactly to the conduct intended to be forbidden. Such tailoring is left to ex-
post adjudication of individual cases by the courts.  
 
Private enforcers have no incentive to exercise discretion with regard to over inclusive laws. 
Profit-driven private enforcers will seize the opportunity to enforce the law any time a 
positive return on the investment of enforcement costs can be expected.912 In contrast, a 
public enforcement agency can choose not to enforce the law in cases in which the social 
costs of enforcing the law exceed its benefits. This happens every day, when “the police 
overlook minor infractions of the traffic code; building inspectors ignore violations of building-
code provisions that, if enforced, would prevent the construction of new buildings in urban 
areas; air traffic controllers permit the airlines to violate excessively stringent safety 
regulations involving the spacing of aircraft landing and taking off from airports”913. Such 
discretionary non-enforcement can reduce the social costs of over inclusion without a 
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corresponding increase in under inclusion914. Non-profit-driven private enforcers915 may be 
motivated to engage in socially beneficial discretionary non-enforcement, too. However, this 
holds only, if such non-enforcement conforms to their moral or political convictions916. 
 
It is reasonable to object that under a classic separation of powers, tailoring over inclusive 
rules is left to the courts and not to the public agencies, but this is not an economic argument. 
From an economic standpoint, giving discretion to the court to tailor a rule ex post simply 
means that the power not to enforce overly inclusive law is shifted to another official body917.  
Agencies may have some comparative advantages for such tailoring because they are more 
familiar with the regulated activity and can act faster. Moreover, agencies can act before, and 
not after, the fact, thus preventing certain cases from ever going to court918. 
 
Economic analysis of law does not provide an unequivocal and conclusive argument in favour 
of either private or public enforcement. Concluding it is necessary to consider the effects of 
both mechanisms on the legal process to summarise the advantages and disadvantages of 
each of them.  
 
The case for private enforcement of laws assumes that private actors bring more suits to court 
than public agencies, giving the judiciary more opportunities to refine vague and general 
standards contained in the law. This can create a public good and might well be worth the 
litigation costs not internalised by the plaintiffs919. This is a consideration that can be taken 
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into account by public enforcement agencies when exercising discretion not to enforce a law. 
However, some scholars argue that private parties are more likely than agencies to develop 
novel legal theories, creative approaches to dispute settlement and new techniques of 
investigation and proof920. For example, the prevailing view is that the most important US 
antitrust law decisions by the Supreme Court were initiated by private litigation921. Another 
advantage of a private enforcement is that it effectively addresses the agency problem 
engendered by an administrative drift of law enforcement or other government bodies. 
 
These fears have long been cited as a defence of the qui tam ability to vest prosecutorial 
authority to individuals on behalf of the government. When the executive branch fails to 
investigate and prosecute as a result of too cozy relationships with the regulated sectors, 
trade associations or individual companies, the individual may pursue the case in court 
subject to dismissal by the court. From the judicial branch perspective, the real shift might be 
not to the relators, but to the courts that exercise ultimate authority.   
The proponents of the private litigation as an antidote to the government’s inaptitude place 
a great deal of faith in the judiciary as immune to agency capture. The assumption is that the 
judiciary is not subject to outside influence and enforcement constraints the way that 
agencies are. While this may be correct, the conclusion requires more theoretical and 
empirical grounding than has been so far provided922. Such faith (under-theorised, but 
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consistent in academic literature) in courts as outside guardians of proper incentives is not 
unique to this case. Posner and Vermeule have noted that this faith — which they derive from 
the so-called inside-outside problem — pervades much of legal scholarship923. As Posner and 
Vermeule point out, it may very well be true that courts have more public-spirited and less 
selfish motives than other government actors, or that the institutional structure constrains 
their self-driven motives more, but that point should not be assumed without further 
foundational support924. 
 
On the other hand, an “incompetent, overworked, or inexperienced private counsel, whose 
interest may diverge from the public interest, may be generating case precedent that restricts 
government regulators”925. Assuming that private enforcement entails costs not borne by 
private plaintiffs (especially litigation costs in a system of publicly subsidised courts), private 
plaintiffs have an incentive for excessive litigation926. This danger is especially notable, if 
private parties derive benefits from litigation, which, from a social perspective, do not justify 
additional enforcement costs. Under profit-driven private enforcement of laws, these 
benefits may include not only the monetary recovery from the suit, but also any benefits 
derived from harassing and damaging the reputation of private competitors and the like. 
Under the non-profit-driven private enforcement, such benefits might include “the notoriety 
and increased membership that a public interest group may gain from a large number of high-
profile cases”927. While this danger exists in a system of public enforcement of laws as well, it 
does not seem as severe because public agencies have a limited budget and can be held 
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accountable for excessive litigation. Finally, in a system of private litigation the risk of 
erroneous decisions may increase because courts must decide sometimes difficult issues 
without the benefit of another public body reviewing the case first. 
 
It is also possible that if courts defer to government agencies, they could indirectly be 
captured by the industry. Government agencies or departments are captured by the industry, 
and when and where the court defers to the government, the court has thus been 
captured928. 
 
Without a conclusive argument in favour of either private or public enforcement it is 
reasonable to make an assumption that the combined model of private-public enforcement 
is the optimal solution in pursuit of efficiency. In some areas, the most effective law 
enforcement may imply a division of labour: private enforces dedicate their resources to 
detect and prosecute those types of violations where public enforcers lack resources, abilities 
to collect necessary information, or incentives. Qui tam presents an example of such 
cooperative model when it acts as a dual plaintiff mechanism, but at the same time it holds 
an alternative ability to pursue prosecution by a private enforcer in case a government agent 
is captured or shows inaptitude of whatever else reason. This ability to effectively curb a 
bureaucratic drift of law enforcement and those governmental departments, which engage 
private contractors or make procurement for the government, holds qui tam unique. 
 
In the next sections a qui tam law enforcement model will be analysed form the law and 
economics perspective in its capacity as a tool that provides legislative and judicial branches 
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of the government with ability to overcome inaptitude of its executive, and optimise expenses 
related to law enforcement and deterrence. 
 
 
 
 
Applying Coasean Framework to the Law Enforcement  
 
The theory of the firm developed by Coase can prove that a federal scheme that delegates a 
law enforcement role to private actors, such as the qui tam action, allows Congress to 
intelligently structure federal law enforcement in a way that makes the best economic sense. 
Like the private firm, government can weigh the relative costs of different institutional 
arrangements and minimise those costs. When Congress does so, it is acting for another 
legitimate purpose. Such delegations help to optimise costs of enforcement, raise the crime 
detection rate, built up effective deterrence, and mitigate an administrative drift underlying 
inaptitude of law enforcement.  
 
In his famous essay The Nature of the Firm929, Coase broaches a central question to 
microeconomics: Why do people form firms that allocate the resources of production through 
internal management decisions instead of market transactions?930 A firm that needs cleaning 
services can set an example. The firm can fulfil this need in many ways, but three options 
illustrate the point. Option One lies at one extreme: the firm could make a new contract for 
                                                          
929 Coase, R.H., The Nature of the Firm, 4 Economica 16 386–405 (1937), [online]. Available at: < 
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1468-0335.1937.tb00002.x/epdf > (accessed on 9 February 2010) 
930 Coase defines a firm as follows: "The distinguishing mark of the firm is the supersession of the price 
mechanism… Within a firm… market transactions are eliminated, and in place of the complicated market 
structure with exchange transactions is substituted the entrepreneur-co-ordinator, who directs production" 
Ibid., [online] 
 210 
each and every cleaning task. If managers need to have its premises to get cleaned, they 
would enter the relevant market and negotiate a cleaning contract. Under this option, the 
market allocates the firm's cleaning work among different cleaners. 
 
Option Two lies at the other extreme: instead of contracting out each cleaning assignment, 
the firm hires the cleaners as employees.931 Under this option, the firm obtains help through 
a single market transaction -- hiring the cleaners -- and the firm's administrators allocate the 
resources. 
 
Option Three presents a combination of the first two: the firm contracts with an agency for 
periodic cleaning services. The agency's fee will vary depending upon the firm's history of the 
cleaners’ engagement. Under this option, both the market and the firm administrators 
allocate resources. 
 
The three options illustrate how either the market or firm administrators may allocate 
resources to varying degrees. Through that Coase sought to explain why a firm would opt for 
one method of allocation over another. He offered a straightforward answer: "The main 
reason why it is profitable to establish a firm would seem to be that there is a cost of using 
the price mechanism."932 Negotiating and concluding a market transaction is costly. Coase 
identified several types of transaction costs: the cost "of discovering what the relevant prices 
are";933 "It]he costs of negotiating and concluding a separate contract for each exchange 
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transaction which takes place on a market";934 and the inability to make long-term contracts 
that will reduce the risk of periodic market fluctuations.935 Thus, in some cases, it might be 
cheaper for a firm to perform a task in house than to repeatedly engage in market 
transactions. 
 
While comparing Option One to Option Two the firm will pursue the following logic. Under 
Option One, the firm would have to contact, negotiate with, and contract with a cleaner every 
time it wanted to have its premises cleaned up. The multiple market transactions would waste 
valuable managers’ time, which would be spent securing cleaner’s help instead of providing 
profit-generating services.936 Under Option Two, the firm must either divert managers’ time 
to administrating and allocating cleaners’ work or hire another manager to perform that 
function. The question then becomes whether the manager’s time lost to contracting in 
Option One is greater than the cost of administering cleaners in Option Two. The question for 
the firm, then, becomes whether the cost of hiring cleaners as employees is less than the cost 
of contracting with a cleaning agency. 
 
Firms perform the same cost comparison in deciding whether to organise other tasks in house 
or through market transactions. A rational firm's choice will rest on the relative cost of each 
option, which includes the transaction costs of each choice. According to Coase, this cost 
comparison dictates the structure and size of a firm. 
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The next logical step is to assume that the government does act like the firm described by 
Ronald Coase. This assumption may bear the risk of criticism that it is irrelevant to compare 
the firm to the state, when the latter can never be forced out of business and bankrupted, 
like the former, due to the unique money printing authority. Consequently, a government 
would be indifferent to Coasean transaction costs, being able to expand its own costs 
infinitely at parity to the cost of printing. For this reason, Keynesian economic models exclude 
probability of government shut down as a result of unbearable debt937, and political scientists 
deny the prospect of government bankruptcy due to its power as a sovereign938. 
This is a serious argument, which merits discussion prior to further development of the 
analysis. 
The term bankruptcy in the sense it is widely used in respect of the government refers 
primarily to a limited legal procedure following bankruptcy under which the assets of the 
bankrupt can be formally seized to satisfy the claims of creditors. Indeed, it is impossible to 
imagine the seizure of US government assets upon request of its offended creditors. 
However, there are various ways, in which the sovereign may repudiate on its obligations 
without framing it as default, considerate euphemisms have been contrived to describe such 
forms of sovereign bankruptcy: from inflation, financial repression, currency debasement, to 
forcible conversions, lowering coupon rates, and unilateral reduction of principal939. 
According to Reinhart and Rogoff (2008), in over 200 years since 1800 there were about 250 
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sovereign defaults in the world940, a number that correlates with the estimates of Tomz and 
Wright (2007)941, who identified 250 defaults in 106 countries defaulted since the end of the 
Napoleonic Wars. Among those governments the majority defaulted more than once -- the 
most common defaulters were Ecuador, Costa Rica, Mexico, Uruguay and Venezuela, each of 
which experienced at least 8 distinct spells of default942. Beers and Nadeau (2015) recently 
presented even higher estimates of sovereign defaults – between 1975 and 2014 141 
countries repudiated their debt, most of them did it at least twice943. The United States did 
not escape that fate: American government defaulted four times in its history – in 1779, 1782, 
1862, 1934 and, most surprisingly, in 1979944. Only a small group of countries (UK included) 
honoured their debt obligations impeccably945. However, in 1946 UK secured a long-term 
$3,75 bln loan on favourable terms from the USA, plus another $1.19 was provided by 
Canada946. The loans amounted to over 30 per cent of the total UK GDP for that year947, and 
effectively saved financial system of the country from imminent default948. 
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When a country maintains control over its monetary system, and due to its size and resources 
remains self-sufficient, it may stay afloat even being a serial defaulter, like Argentina or 
Venezuela. A smaller country with limited resources and restricted ability to monetise its debt 
can become insolvent, and end up under a sort of receivership, like Greece under effective 
financial control of the Troika after 2010949. In fact, Greece remotely resembles an insolvent 
company dependent on the debt financing, which filed for a bankruptcy protection under 
Chapter 11 of US Bankruptcy Code to survive as a going concern950. If governments keep full 
control over their printing press they may attempt to inflate away the debt, but as history 
shows quite often at their own peril. Hanke and Krus (2012) identified 56 well-documented 
episodes of hyperinflation in the world, which all with a sole exception of a revolutionary 
France had occurred in XX and XXI centuries951. And not always governments may go away 
with it. Hyperinflations lead to financial collapses, which inevitably end up with ousting the 
incumbent governments through revolutions, civil wars, military coups or early parliamentary 
elections952. Which in business parlance means being forced out of business. In extreme 
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cases, the whole countries may consequently disintegrate (Somalia since early 1990s)953, and 
even disappear in perpetuity (USSR, Yugoslavia)954. 
The above-mentioned examples lead to the conclusion that even a full control over its 
monetary policy and unrestricted excess to the printing press cannot save the governments 
(and sometimes states) from financial and political collapse. It stands to reason that latest 
Keynesian macroeconomic models include such elements as debt sustainability level955 – even 
addressing a financial system of the US, the true “indispensable nation”956. 
On the other hand, an insolvent company even after default on some or even all its debt, and 
repudiation of contractual payments may stay in business, and even avoid filing for 
bankruptcy. The latest financial crisis of 2007-2008 and subsequent recession of 2008-2012 
enriched business history with such cases957. 
                                                          
953 Barrington, L., (2006). After Independence: Making and Protecting the Nation in Postcolonial and 
Postcommunist States, University of Michigan Press; Shillington, K., (2005). Encyclopedia of African history, CRC 
Press 
954 Silber, L. and Little, A., (1997). Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation, Penguin Books; Finlan, A., (2004). The Collapse 
of Yugoslavia 1991-1999. Osprey Publishing 
955 See: Levy-Yeyati, E., and Panizza. U. The Elusive Costs of Sovereign Defaults. 1 Journal of Development 
Economics 94 95–105 (2011); Ghosh, A., Kim, J., Mendoza, E., Ostry, J. and Qureshi. M. Fiscal Fatigue, Fiscal 
Space, and Debt Sustainability in Advanced Economies. The Economic Journal 123 (566) F4–F30 (2013); De Paoli, 
B., Hoggarth, G. and Saporta, V. Output Costs of Sovereign Crises: Some Empirical Estimates. Bank of England 
Working Paper 362, Bank of England, London (2009); Acharya, V., I. Drechsler, and Schnabl, P. A Pyrrhic Victory? 
Bank Bailouts and Sovereign Credit Risk. 6 Journal of Finance 69 2689–739, (2014); Baldacci, E., I. Petrova, N., 
Belhocine, G. Dobrescu, and Mazraani, S. 2011. Assessing Fiscal Space, IMF Working Paper 11/100, International 
Monetary Fund, Washington, (2011); Debortoli, D., and Nunes, R. Fiscal Policy Under Loose Commitment.  3 
Journal of Economic Theory 145 1005–32, (2010); Ostry, J., Ghosh, A. and and Espinoza, R. When Should Public 
Debt Be Reduced? International Monetary Fund, June 2015 [online] available at: < 
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/sdn/2015/sdn1510.pdf  > (accessed on 14 September 2015) 
956 Madeleine Albright, US Secretary of State. NBC's Today Show (19 February 1998) [online], available at: < 
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957 Kindleberger, Ch. P. and Aliber, R. Z., (2005). Manias, Panics, and Crashes: A History of Financial Crises, 5th 
ed., John Wiley & Sons, Inc.; Financial Institutions: A State-Dependent Sensitivity Value-at-Risk (SDSVaR) 
Approach, Working Paper, EBS; Adrian, T., and Shin, H. S., Liquidity and Leverage, 19 Journal of Financial 
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 216 
To sum up, the assumption that Coasean analysis of firm can be applied to governments is 
justified, and there are more similarities between governments and companies than meet the 
eye. Every theory rests on a set of assumptions to select the core of the phenomena from 
their periphery, and as Milton Friedman put his methodological principle, the robustness of a 
theory should be tested not by the realism of its assumptions, but by the accuracy of its 
predictions958. From this perspective, the Coasean conceptual framework – with all its 
limitations – has proved its relevance. 
So, assume that the central government sometimes decides to perform one task in house and 
contract out another task based on the relative costs of those choices. Like a Coasean firm, 
government is an association of individuals formed to pursue certain goals. One of these 
numerous goals is enforcing various regulatory schemes. Assuming that the government has 
already made its decision on what regulatory scheme should exist; its officials then got a 
charge of its enactment.  
 
If the government acts like a Coasean firm, it will decide based on the relative costs of the 
options, including transaction costs. To make efficient decisions the government might 
consider a number of factors. First of all, how in-house enforcement affects its staff needs. 
Any regulatory scheme must address the twin goals of detecting and deterring violations. In 
deciding whether to observe the law, as economic analysis of law assumes959, the rational 
                                                          
15 Oxford Review of Economic Policy 3 (1999) 80–97; Gennaioli, N., Martin, A., and Rossi, S. (2011). Sovereign 
Default, Domestic Banks and Financial Institutions, Working paper, CREI; Schularick, M., and Taylor, A. M., Credit 
Booms Gone Bust: Monetary Policy, Leverage Cycles, and Financial Crises, 1870-2008. 102 American Economic 
Review 2 (2012) 1029–1061 
958 Friedman, M. “The Methodology of Positive Economics”, in Friedman, M. (1953). Essays in Positive 
Economics, University of Chicago Press, p.3 
959 Posner (2014), supra note 793 at 169, p. 242 ("In order to design a set of optimal criminal sanctions, we need 
a model of the criminal's behavior. The model can be very simple: A person commits a crime because the 
expected benefits of the crime to him exceed the expected costs."). The rational potential perpetrator will also 
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member of society will weigh the expected cost of cheating (the probability of getting caught 
times the penalty/cost of getting caught) against the expected benefit of cheating (the 
probability of not getting caught times the amount of material gain). Consequently, one way 
to deter violations is to raise the probability of detection, or to lower the probability of non-
detection through imposing strict liability for acts detrimental to the well being of the general 
populace960. To do so, the government could increase the number of checks, audits, 
personnel, and boost other efforts aiming at raising the likelihood of detection. If 
enforcement is performed in house, the government must hire enough professionals to 
perform the needed actions. 
 
In addition to the quantity of enforcement actions the government might consider also 
significant qualitative changes. To adequately enforce the laws the government must conduct 
enforcement in a manner likely to detect violations. Otherwise, its actions will not increase 
the risk of detection and thus will not deter violations. Consequently the law enforcement 
becomes more rigorous, time consuming and engaging more employees (and more well-paid 
ones among them).  As a result, labour will be one cost of in-house enforcement.961 Labour 
itself has many cost components, wages and benefits being the most obvious. For example, 
recruiting and hiring employees costs money, as does monitoring and evaluating employee 
performance. If the government has enough employees, it might need an entire department 
                                                          
weigh the cost of strategies for avoiding detection or punishment, such as bribery and intimidation. See Becker 
and Stigler (1974), supra note 830 at 178 
960 Becker, G.S. Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, in Becker, G.S., and Landes, W.M., eds., (1974). 
Essays in the Economics of Crime and Punishment, pp.1-14: "If the aim simply were deterrence, the probability 
of conviction ... could be raised close to 1, and punishments... could be made to exceed the gain: in this way the 
number of offenses ... could be reduced almost at will." Another way is to increase the penalty for the violation. 
As Professor Becker argues, however, increases in probability of detection and punishment have other effects 
on society that must be accounted for in modeling criminal law enforcement. Ibid., pp. 14-18 
961 For factors affecting the efficacy of law enforcement, see Becker and Stigler (1974), supra note 830 at 178, 
pp. 2-5 
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devoted to employment matters. In fact, the government will face some of the same labour 
costs as a private company962. 
 
In-house enforcement will also impose travel and monitoring costs. The government must 
either pay for travel to investigate violations in remote places, or maintain regional field 
offices that police those locations. Either option carries costs. For the traveling employee, the 
government bears travel and lodging costs, as well as the cost of policing employee 
reimbursements to prevent fraud. For the field office, the government bears the cost of 
acquiring and maintaining the remote facility, as well as monitoring the work of employees 
at the remote site. 
 
Second, in case of white-collar crime the government might consider contracts with 
accounting firms to conduct audits, and law firms to bring enforcement actions963. The 
government could either hire these firms on an on-going basis, for a specified period of time, 
or on a case-by-case basis. Or employ another solution – to delegate these functions to 
private citizens through the qui tam action. Each option has transaction costs -- the out-of-
pocket expenses and opportunity cost of identifying, negotiating, and contracting with the 
                                                          
962 The government also faces some costs not faced by private firms and does not face some costs faced by 
private firms. On the former, the government must not violate the Constitution when dealing with employees 
For example, the government must accord its employees procedural due process before disciplining or 
terminating them. (Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976). However, the government may exempt itself 
from some laws that it imposes on private employers. For example, governments enjoy sovereign immunity 
from civil liability. See Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1994) (defining the scope of the United States's 
tort liability) 
963 For the first fifty years under the Constitution, the United States Government relied on private lawyers to 
prosecute federal crimes. See Conner, R., et al., The Office of U.S. Attorney and Putblic Safety: A Brief History 
Prepared for the "Changing Role of U.S. Attorneys' Offices in Public Safety" Symposium, 28 The Capital University 
Law Review 753 (2000); Waxman, S.P., Twins at Birth: Civil Rights and the Role of the Solicitor General, 75 
Indiana Law Journal 1297 (2000) 
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private firms. Also, the government would face agency costs -- the costs of monitoring the 
private firms so that they do not make wasteful or fraudulent charges to the government. 
 
Third, the government might consider some mix of in-house and outside enforcement efforts. 
It could hire private accounting firms to conduct audits and leave enforcement actions to 
government lawyers. Employing the government lawyers would bring the costs associated 
with in-house enforcement, while contracting with the private accounting firm would pose 
the transaction and agency costs of outside enforcement. 
 
The precise combination of in-house and outside contracting the Coasean government will 
select upon calculating the costs each option brings. The optimal mix of in-house and outside 
enforcement will depend on the costs associated with various enforcement contexts. 
Following Coasean framework, the sum of these costs will ultimately determine the size of 
the law enforcement bodies of the government. 
 
The analysis rendered above shows that Coasean framework proves a robust tool in modelling 
government’s approach to cost optimisation in general, and to optimisation of the costs 
related to law enforcement. The choice the government faces is similar to the choice made 
by any firm – do some function in house, to outsourse, or to mix in-house and outside 
contractors to pursue some task. In real life a decision about optimal design of law 
enforcement has to be made within some particular context, and is influenced by political, 
economical and societal environment, but an underlying logic of the decision will remain the 
same – cost optimisation through public, private or mixed public-private model. In the next 
sections this logic will be applied to more complicated context dependent real life modelling 
of the role qui tam can play in law enforcement. 
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Modelling a Qui Tam Mechanism within Regulatory Enforcement Policy 
 
In a wake of a severe economic crisis the law enforcement faces a number of challenges the 
predominant traditional model of enforcement proved insufficient to effectively address: 
 The stringent budget limitations on providing financing even to the most important 
areas of law enforcement 
 The significantly increased government involvement in corporate sector as a result of: 
o bail-outs of banks and rise in government backing of loss making businesses 
deemed to be too systemically important to go bust 
o dramatic rise in government involvement in health industry following the 
enactment of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act964 
 The strong public request to tackle financial and -- broader -- corporate white-collar 
crime, particularly related to government procurement 
 The objective limitations to employ the sufficient number of highly-skilled 
professionals to effectively conduct investigations of sophisticated corporate fraud 
 Limited ability of the government led prosecution to obtain sensitive information 
crucial to success in delicate investigations of highly complicated corporate cases 
 The administrative capture as part of a broader government agency problem resulting 
from growing interconnectedness between administration and ever-rising number of 
state contractors. 
 
                                                          
964 Public Law 111-148 March, 23 2010 
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As the analysis below proves the qui tam model of enforcement can effectively address all 
these challenges in a flexible way combining the advantages of both private and public justice 
while mitigating their respective weaknesses. Private enforcers may not always have a big 
picture view of law enforcement, but their collective efforts may allow public enforcers to 
better utilise limited resources. Having efficient tackling of government fraud as an example, 
the qui tam mechanism provides inside into the optimal design of a coordinated enforcement 
regime. The coordination of public and private enforcement efforts makes particular sense in 
the area of financial crimes within a complex economy. Following the concern regarding 
relative enforcement costs from Polinsky (1980)965, detection alone of such crimes may be 
the most difficult and costly step of the enforcement process. 
 
Without sensitive information, a government law enforcement agency concerned about 
deterrence has a very difficult problem in determining the sufficiency of its enforcement 
efforts. Prompt detection by public authorities may require intrusive and costly monitoring 
techniques that could generate hostility, and have already provoked a political backlash with 
massive lobbing campaigns. In contrast, existing employees within such businesses and 
organisations have regular, real-time access to the information about potential legal 
violations. From the government perspective, personal detection by such employees is nearly 
costless, although for them to reveal this personal knowledge and pursue enforcement action 
is a very different story. 
 
The cost/benefit analysis of a qui tam model within a broader analysis of deterrent efficiency 
provides guidance in search of the most cost effective enforcement mechanism. Following 
                                                          
965 Polinsky (1980), supra note 846 at 181 
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the Becker model of crime966, in which the potential fraudsters are contractors, providing 
some services or goods, with the federal government compensates them financially, there 
may be various motivations leading a contractor to commit fraud. Nonetheless, as an 
ostensibly profit maximising entity considering an economic crime, the Becker’s model has 
relevance to the contractor's decision process. Building up on the Becker’s work Kwok 
(2009)967 developed a model comprising qui tam relators. 
 
In his model, the contractors are distinguished only on the size of the government contract 
they hold. Thus, the cumulative distribution of contracts is determined exogenously. One can 
interpret the distribution to be some technical distribution of contracts that leads to the 
optimum provision of services. The amount of contracts is understood as the opportunity for 
fraud given the contractual relationship with the government. For example, if some 
contractors are doctors filing for Medicare reimbursement, they may be filing numerous 
claims on behalf of a number of different patients. Since the opportunity for fraud extends 
across the various claims, their contracts’ amount would be the sum of the limits of Medicare 
reimbursement for those patients. 
 
Each contractor, having been allocated a particular contract amount, then chooses the 
amount of fraud to commit. The maximum amount of fraud a contractor can commit 
represents a situation in which it claims to perform all services or provide all goods but 
actually does nothing besides collecting federal money. If the contractor opts to properly fulfil 
the contract according to its terms, it loses profit. It is assumed a competitive situation such 
that performance of the contract, either in part or in whole, results in no profit to the 
                                                          
966 Becker and Stigler (1974), supra note 830 at 178 
967 Kwok (2010), supra note 576 at 127 [online] 
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contractor. Thus, the contractor's only opportunity for profit lies in committing fraud. 
Although some researchers might view fraud as simply a transfer rather than a net loss for 
society, in his model Kwok assumes that the net loss to society is at least as large as the 
amount of fraud. 
 
The risk neutral contractors, facing their decision on the amount of fraud to commit, are 
concerned about the probability of detection and punishment. If their fraud is discovered and 
punished, they will lose the amount of fraud times a damage multiplier. For the False Claims 
Act, treble damages and penalties is the only loss they suffer. There is no reputational loss, 
nor loss associated with the overall value of the contract. It is assumed that the contractor is 
not judgment proof, thus the penalty is meaningful. 
 
The probability of detection and punishment of a contractor is a function of a contract fraud. 
The probability is an abstraction of the entire detection and judicial process. The model 
emphasises the role of the relators in stepping forward with their knowledge of the fraud. It 
is assumed that the relators’ decisions are based upon the amount of fraud and that their 
chance of success in relating does not depend on the amount of fraud. The relator's action is 
always honest, accurately revealing fraud. Thus, if relators reveal their knowledge of the 
fraud, they will face some future professional and social stigma as whistle-blowers, which do 
not depend upon the amount of fraud. The relators receive benefits corresponding to the 
amount of the fraud: both in terms of the bounty percentage paid after successful litigation 
and the psychological benefits of helping to stop large levels of fraud. Thus, as the level of 
fraud increases, the relators are more likely to act. Notably, the contractors have no ability to 
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hide or fight the relators’ actions; their only method of decreasing the detection and penalty 
is to drop the amount of fraud. 
 
The model shows that when a contractor chooses fraud as a way to gain profit, relator relates 
successfully with given probability of success, which causes a contractor to lose profit. Then 
the contractor, knowing the probability of exposure, has a decision rule to maximise expected 
net profit in choosing more fraud with an unavoidable subsequent exposure by the relator. 
The model shows that private enforcement through the qui tam relators tends to deter high 
levels of fraud while leaving low levels of fraud untouched, thus, avoiding excessive 
litigation968. However, the downside is that under conditions when government resources are 
limited a significant number of modest in scope or marginal fraudulent actions will remain 
without countering. This points out to a flaw in law enforcement, which fails to deter crime 
below a given level, if the government is not added to the model. As it was pointed out above, 
prosecutorial discretion enhances efficiency of spending under limited budgets. 
 
Analysing the role of the government, and its response aiming at increasing enforcement 
efficiency under pressure of limited resources, Kwok considers four possible objective 
functions for its regulator969. The fraud itself is viewed as a proxy for the net harm to society 
caused by the fraud, and the government’s simplified aim is to minimise fraud. 
 
The first objective function -- Minimise expected total fraud -- corresponds to a strong focus 
on deterrence. Once a contractor commits fraud, society sustains the loss, regardless of ex-
post detection or remediation. The fact that a contractor is successfully held liable for fraud 
                                                          
968 For the details of a Kwok model of qui tam enforcement see infra 
969 In the model the government regulator is a hypothetical unified administrative body 
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after the fact does not make a significant difference to the government, preoccupied by 
prevention over imposition. 
 
The second objective function -- Minimise total expected unrecovered fraud -- also focuses 
on deterrence, but it distinguishes between fraud that is detected and the one undetected. If 
fraud is successfully detected, this objective function suggests that the post-detection 
remediation is sufficient to offset the harm incurred by the commission of fraud. The 
calculation excludes the welfare of the contractors held liable for the fraud, as they will bear 
a substantial loss through this process. 
 
The third objective function -- Maximise expected total fraud recovery – stands similar to 
second option. This function suggests that the government can offset the losses due to fraud 
by recovering money from defendants. It is distinct, however, in what it considers the cost of 
paying the bounty to the successful relator. This option’s objective can be referred as a mixed 
deterrence and compensation. 
 
The fourth objective function -- Maximise expected fraud recovery – presumes a bureaucratic 
body that narrowly focused strictly on fraud recovery. It does not consider the deterred fraud 
as part of its set of goals. 
 
The next step in developing the effective enforcement model is to analyse the possible 
adjustments the government regulator can undertake.  
 
The first, and probably an over simplistic solution, is to increase a damage multiplier. The 
traditional optimal deterrence argument is to maximise the penalty, since the penalty loss is 
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born primarily by the offender and does not require costly investment (in comparison to 
increasing the chance of detection). Increasing the damage multiplier would depress the 
expected value of fraud to the contractors. The ideal for deterrence would be to calibrate the 
penalty to the full wealth of the defendant, but considering the defendant's wealth in 
determining damages is a way to nowhere after the US Supreme Court ruling on the State 
Farm970. The FCA is a treble damages statute, so formal adjustments would require legislative 
change, but government officials might push for more expansive interpretation of damage 
estimates that would effectively increase the perceived multiplier. Nonetheless, besides the 
limitations under Supreme Court jurisprudence for high damage multipliers in civil litigation, 
one of the unintended consequences may be a reduction in a number of government 
contractors scared away by the severity of potential damages, with subsequent drop in 
competition leading to the rise in contractual prices971.  
 
The most strategically effective, but also the most complicated, would be a policy aimed at 
increase in the probability of fraud detection. The probability of detection and success in a 
model is a function of the amount of the fraud. The fact that the probability of detection can 
be calibrated to the level of harm allows the regulator to bypass wealth constraints in 
deterrence, assuming that it can raise detection to sufficient levels satisfying the reciprocal 
                                                          
970 The Supreme Court stated: “The wealth of a defendant cannot justify an otherwise unconstitutional punitive 
damages award.” (State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003)) The Court 
then noted, however, that while “[w]ealth provides an open-ended basis for inflating awards when the 
defendant is wealthy that does not make its use unlawful or inappropriate; it simply means that this factor 
cannot make up for the failure of other factors, such as reprehensibility, to constrain significantly an award that 
purports to punish a defendant’s conduct.” Ibid. See: Orr, L.C., Making a Case for Wealth-Calibrated Punitive 
Damages. 37 Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review 1739 (2004) [online], Available at: 
<http://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/llr/vol37/iss5/10> (accessed on 27 June 2015); Hylton, K.N., A Theory of 
Wealth and Punitive Damages. (forthcoming) [online], Available at: 
<https://www.bu.edu/law/faculty/scholarship/workingpapers/documents/HyltonKWealthPunitives2REV.pdf> 
(accessed on 27 June 2015) 
971 Kovacic (1996), supra note 578 at 128; and (1998), supra note 580 at 128 
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standard. The relator receives a bounty payment equal to a portion of the detected fraud. To 
increase the probability the government might adjust the relator's share of the recovery (in 
theory, up to the entire amount of the current treble damages). A higher share of the recovery 
might cause marginal relators to step forward with information. 
 
A government operating under objective options 1 or 2 may grant relators the full amount of 
the recovery, since the government's share of the recovery is not part of the objective 
function. Other considerations might limit this full grant. Firstly, the government, if it does 
not receive any funds, might be concerned about backroom deals between relators and 
contractors. Secondly, it may face a challenge of being overloaded by a wave of tips. 
 
It is at this point, where the Kwok’s model attracts most academic criticism. Not all 
researchers in the field share his approach that concludes with an optimistic sequence: the 
higher rewards increase reporting, that leads to increased enforcement, and therefore 
increased deterrence972.  
 
A basic rational-choice perspective assumes that whistleblowers gamble the personal and 
professional cost of reporting misconduct against potential payouts. Where rewards are too 
low or uncertain or retaliation protections too anemic, the system will not generate enough 
tips973. Providing too many incentives or protections, however, risks overloading the system, 
                                                          
972 Casey, A.J. and Niblett, A., Noise Reduction: The Screening Value of Qui Tam, 91 Washington University Law 
Review 5 (2014), p. 1175; Also: Engstrom, D.F., Whither Whistleblowing? Bounty Regimes, Regulatory Context, 
and the Challenge of Optimal Design, 15 Theoretical Inquiries in Law (2014) 605-633 
973 Rose, A., Better Bounty Hunting: How the SEC’s New Whistleblower Program Changes the Securities Fraud 
Class Action Debate, 108 Northwestern University Law Review 4 (2014) 1235-1302; Ferziger, M.J. and Currell, 
D.G., Snitching for Dollars: The Economics and Public Policy of Federal Civil Bounty Programs, University of Illinois 
Law Review (1999) 1141 
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overwhelming an agency tasked with sifting good and bad tips974. As Engstrom points out, the 
concern is not just about higher administrative or other transaction costs that push the social 
cost of enforcement beyond its benefit975. In his words, “it is a deeper, and paradoxical 
one”976. A budget-constrained agency that enjoys a surge of tips faces a choice: either to 
ignore some of them and, using a triage approach, to focus efforts on a subset of tips; or to 
allocate fewer investigative resources to each of the additional tips, thus degrading the 
accuracy of its screening efforts. The perverse result is that by reducing the certainty with 
which wrongdoing is detected and therefore the probability that any given malfeasor will be 
made to internalise the costs of its misconduct, more whistleblowing may eventually yield 
less overall deterrence977.  
Kaplow and Shavell developed a model, showing that lower adjudicatory accuracy -- whether 
false positives or false negatives -- lowers deterrent effects978. The theory that more 
whistleblowing may bring about decrease in deterrence rests on an assumption that there is 
a point at which additional tips will decrease the likelihood that a firm’s misconduct will be 
accurately identified and sanctioned more than they increase the probability that the firm’s 
misconduct is the subject of a tip at all. But as Engstrom comments, from a social planner 
perspective, the more important concern in this regard may be the social optimality of the 
deterrence additional tips yield. These additional tips may, by reducing the accuracy of an 
agency’s decision to enforce, create social loss by deterring socially productive and 
                                                          
974 Ferziger and Currell, supra, p. 1172 
975 Engstrom, supra note 978 at 613 
976 Ibid. 
977 Casey and Niblett, supra note 972 at 1172 
978 Kaplow, L. and Shavell, S., Accuracy in the Determination of Liability, 37 The Journal of Law and Economics 1 
(1994) 1-15 
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completely legal activity, offsetting welfare gains from deterred misconduct979. Notably the 
analysis becomes more complicated when the model allows the agency to allocate its scarce 
resources between investigatory and enforcement effort. It deviates from the Kwok model’s 
option 1 and 2 analyses at the point, when an agency is allowed to receive some portion of 
the monetary fines it imposes, thus making analysis overelaborated980.  
However, when Casey and Niblett insightfully connect tip volume, sanction certainty, and 
deterrence, they come to the conclusion that a qui tam mechanism will yield systematically 
better information than a simple cash-for-information reward system981. They view 
advantage of the qui tam in inherent to the FCA’s qui tam structure loss-contingent costs rule: 
the costs of reporting misconduct, and not just the benefits of doing so, are dependent on 
relator’s success via the reverse fee-shift for frivolous claims, stipulated by the False Claims 
Act982. Provided by a qui tam regime’s deployment of plaintiff-side counsel necessarily 
delivers higher-quality information. Relators have strong incentives to engage in careful pre-
filing inquiry to distinguish their tips from the pack or avoid pouring valuable resources into 
hopeless cases983. In more details the role of law firms specialising in qui tam litigation is 
analysed in this section below. 
Under option 3, the marginal responsiveness of the relators to increased bounty share 
                                                          
979 Engstrom, supra note 978 at 614 
980 Kaplow and Shavell, supra note 978 at 10  
981 Casey and Niblett, supra note 972 at 1174 
982 Ibid.; As opposed to the English rule, which routinely permits fee-shifting, in the US attorney’s fees generally 
are not a recoverable cost of litigation “absent explicit congressional authorization”. See, Key Tronic Corp. v. 
United States, 511 U.S. 809, 814-815 (1994) (holding that the phrase “any other necessary costs of response 
incurred by any other person” in §107 of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and 
Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. §9607, does not include attorneys’ fees). As stated in Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. 
Wilderness Society, “In the United States, the prevailing litigant is ordinarily not entitled to collect a reasonable 
attorneys’ fee from the loser.” (421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975) 
983 Rose, supra note 973 at 1279; Engstrom, supra note 441 at 105 
 230 
becomes important. To the extent the relators are motivated by the actual amount of the 
fraud rather than their particular share of the recovery, increasing their bounty share might 
not make sense to such a government. One example of such a relator would be a well-to-do 
idealist whose concern is primarily stopping large fraudsters. That in fact was a predominant 
way the regulators pursued in battling the fraud throughout the last hundred years, and that 
policy of moral encouragement of whistle-blowers proved to be a limited success. 
Recently, however, an emerging literature exploring the complex interaction of material and 
moral incentives to report wrongdoing, have shed a new light on the possibility that material 
rewards may “crowd out” moralistic motivation to surface information about misconduct -- 
particularly where bounties are relatively small. The underlying logic of this hypothesis is that 
offering bounties reduces the moral valence of the misconduct by commodifying the system. 
This assumption might be more plausible where rewards are low, which both commodities 
the system and at the same time signals that the misconduct is not severe enough to warrant 
a substantial payout984.  
This crowd-out effect can set what amounts to a lower-bound on the efficient reward level: 
offering rewards below this level will produce no net increase in tips’ volume, or their quality, 
and at greater cost to the government; or, worse, a net decrease in revealed information. 
Feldman and Lobel in their research confirmed that reporting levels were “even lower than 
situations where no incentive was present” where their survey respondents were offered a 
                                                          
984 Feldman and Lobel, supra note 568, at 1155 (reporting experimental findings that low monetary incentives 
“crowd out, or suppress, internal moral motivation”). For more law and economics analysis, see Titmuss, R., 
(1997). The Gift Relationship: From Human Blood to Social Policy. New Press; Mellstrom, C. and Johannesson, 
M., Crowding Out in Blood Donation: Was Titmuss Right? 6 Journal of the European Economic Association 4 
(2008) 845-863 (more skeptical about crowding out effect) 
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low reward and had a low perception of the misconduct’s severity985. In this case again, 
rewards and protection from retaliation — though both shape the whistleblower cost-benefit 
calculus — may not be perfect substitutes. Under limited circumstances where the crowd-out 
risk is present, fortifying retaliation protections may in theory draw more information into 
the system than raising rewards. As Engstrom speculated, “the best way to achieve an optimal 
amount of information revelation in some regulatory regimes may be not to offer bounties at 
all”986. At present no research can prove that the ethics-based calculus of moralistic 
whistleblowers will generate systematically better information about misconduct than the 
instrumental calculus of materialistic whistleblowers.   
Outside of manipulating the relator's reward share, the government might be able to shift the 
probability of success through procedural or resource benefits, thus enticing greater relator 
participation. A government that shares information resources provides assurances regarding 
confidentiality and security, or helps in the settlement/negotiating process may induce higher 
probabilities of people becoming relators. But as shown over the last 15 years after the 
enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the effectiveness of such policy was remarkably 
modest987. 
 
The third available policy to increase fraud deterrent, according to the model, will be the 
optimisation of contract distribution. Under this regime, it is in the society's interest to avoid 
any contracts in which potential fraud may exceed the expected social value. The simple way 
to achieve this is to maximise contract sizes. A similar result will be achieved through 
consolidation of liability for fraud, when government deliberately reduces its contractors’ 
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base to a smaller number of large corporations, and concurrently generously extends their 
liability for fraud, for example, by adopting the longer statutes of limitations that would help 
magnify the amount of fraud liability. 
 
The trade off would be deviation from the theoretically optimal contract base, as society 
would be receiving less value from these contracts. This may be, as shown above, due to 
reduced competitiveness of the market, and the reduced diversity of contractors that can 
precisely satisfy a broad range of desirable attributes such as ownership diversity, capability, 
and geography. 
 
Beyond the technical constraints, increasing liability for fraud is also constrained by 
defendant’s liquidity. If the statute of limitations is relatively large, a company may become 
effectively judgment proof due to the accumulating liability for large damages the company 
would not be capable to cover. 
 
As the model shows, the most viable answer to the political, economic and societal necessity 
to increase the fraud detection and deterrence without recourse to additional budget 
financing the Coasean government can offer is to widen the scope and scale of qui tam 
mechanism. 
 
Regulation scholars have often observed that budgetary limitations are a core and recurring 
constraint on the administrative state’s enforcement capacity988. The growing disparity 
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between salaries offered by the government and remuneration packages available for skilled 
employees in the private sector restricts the government’s ability to recruit and to retain the 
thousands of highly skilled people needed to perform investigations of corporate fraud. And 
the scope of this fraud increases following the growing intervention of the state in the 
economy and society. The only way for the government to attract the highly skilled people it 
needs to compete intellectually with corporate white-collar perpetrators989 is by increasing 
significantly the high end of the government salary scale, and presently it is a zero probability 
that Congress can be persuaded to enact into law a new salary structure with a high end that 
allows government to hire and to retain the kind of workforce the government seeks to 
employ to perform the complex investigations in house990. 
 
The solution is to establish a qui tam as a standard mechanism of prosecuting corporate crime 
beyond the confines of fraud against government, thus encouraging private enforcement to 
employ vastly more resources, and potentially mobilising private relators and plaintiffs’ 
attorneys in numbers that sufficiently enhance agency capacity both quantitatively and 
qualitatively991. Such development embodies the concept of private-public enforcement 
model, which from law and economics perspective offers the most efficient solution to tackle 
white-collar crime. 
 
The above rendered theoretical reasoning has been corroborated by some empirical 
evidence. As showed by the first large-scale empirical study of the qui tam regime since -- 
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after a long period of desuetude -- Congress substantially amended and revived the FCA in 
1986992, the growing number of law firms specialising in qui tam litigation plays generally 
positive role in law enforcement993. 
 
Using an original data set encompassing more than four thousand unsealed qui tam lawsuits 
filed between 1986 and 2011 — from the most routine and least visible cases to the 
blockbuster, nine-figure settlements — the analysis provided a remarkable portrait of qui tam 
litigation that goes well beyond existing mostly theoretical studies and some anecdotal 
accounts. By focusing on the role of expertise and specialisation among qui tam enforcers the 
research quantified the repeat-play advantage among qui tam counsel by reporting litigation 
outcomes broken out across four tiers of relator counsel: “Super” repeat firms (forty or more 
cases across the period 1986–2011), “Heavy” repeat firms (10-39 cases), “Regular” repeat 
firms (2-9 cases), and “One-Shot” firms994. The success of the counsel was measured by the 
Department of Justice (DoJ) intervention rate (as proof of robustness of evidence collected), 
and imposition rate (as measure of public significance). 
Both intervention and imposition rates show a clear downward cascade from more to less 
experienced qui tam relator counsel, with “Super” counsel roughly 1.5 times more likely to 
win DoJ intervention (37.1% versus 22.6%) and achieve impositions (40.7% versus 29.0%)995. 
The substantial differences in imposition sizes were even more significant: “Super” counsel 
have achieved impositions that are roughly four to five times that of one-shotter counsel, 
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whether calculated on a per-win basis ($28.6 million versus $7.3 million), or a per-filing basis 
($11.7 million versus $2.1 million)996. And more experienced firms bring larger cases, 
achieving an average of $1.8 million and $0.6 million more for every ten cases in the firm’s 
past case portfolio on a per-win and per-filing basis, respectively997. 
Counsel specialisation and experience proved to be an important factor of success within the 
qui tam regime. 
The data also shows a fledgling trend of concentration at the top end of the organised 
relators’ bar, with the top ten firms accounting for substantially more filings (625) than the 
next fifteen firms (484)998. Top relator firms (twenty-five or more filings) are roughly 4% more 
likely to win DoJ intervention and 3% more likely to win impositions, and also achieve 
impositions that are roughly $12 million and $4 million larger on a per-win and per-filing basis, 
respectively, with all results statistically significant999. 
 
The research provides substantial empirical evidence to draw some conclusions in respect of 
the critique the qui tam legal practice attracted from some legal scholars1000. 
 
First, a claim that more experienced firms are turning into “filing mills” has not been 
substantiated so far. Rather the opposite, such firms bring in with deeper specialisation better 
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expertise, broader understanding of the respective sector, professional skills, which yield 
higher quality of filings, and subsequently secure higher rate of success. 
 
Second, professionalisation in the form of the so-called repeat relators does not provide 
strong evidence to the claim that they present an obvious drag on the qui tam system. Repeat 
relators are, all else equal, significantly less likely to win intervention from the Department of 
Justice, or impositions. But when they win, they achieve substantially larger impositions than 
one-shotters. The result is that repeat relators recover $5.4 million more than one-shotters 
per case filing1001. 
 
Third, concern about “revolving door” capture turned out to be exaggerated. It seems that 
former DoJ insiders are more likely indeed to achieve intervention of the enforcement 
agency, but allocation of scarce enforcement resources by the Department appears to be 
generating lower returns in cases initiated by its former employees. Holding all other variables 
(including firm experience) steady, the models imply that relator counsel with prior DoJ 
experience are roughly 17% more likely to win its intervention and impositions1002. But as data 
shows, when they win, former DoJ insiders achieve impositions that are $10.6 million and 
$3.4 million smaller on a per-win and per-filing basis, respectively, than those achieved by 
their non-insider counterparts, with both results statistically significant1003. In qui tam 
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litigation the key role to play is designed for the insider from the company-perpetrator, and 
not for the law enforcement insider. Coupled with a high entry barrier and potential 
additional costs if lost the qui tam mechanism has in-built limits on overzealous enforcement. 
The qui tam enforcement can actually increase the efficient use of scarce administrative 
resources by allowing administrators to focus enforcement efforts on low-level violations that 
do not provide adequate incentives for private enforcement, while resting assured that those 
that do will be prosecuted by private litigants1004. The next section will focus the analysis to 
the factors and circumstances that affect the decision of those who play the key roles in 
private law enforcement -- potential litigants in qui tam cases, or simple whistle blowers 
under bounty regime -- to come forward. 
 
 
Economic Analysis of Qui Tam Relators’ Behaviour 
 
 
For traditional economic analysis of law, the starting point of predicting behaviour is the belief 
that individuals respond to rewards and sanctions in a remarkably standard manner. 
According to this traditional view, individuals will report non-compliance, if the benefits from 
legal rewards, or the costs of legal liability, exceed the costs of reporting1005. However, social 
scientists increasingly recognise that the motivation for compliance, as well as reporting non-
compliance, frequently complicates a simplistic cost-benefit analysis1006. Instead, as recent 
behavioural studies show, people appear to evaluate legal compliance under a more nuanced 
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cost-benefit scale that includes elements that are foreign to pure economic analyses: duty 
and legitimacy1007. It would be a mistake though to assume that altruistic motivation and high 
moral ground at least partly deny purely materialistic rationale. The picture turned out to be 
even more complicated, with more consideration given to the context, where a range of 
factors - individual, organisational, and legal environments – may impact decision-making of 
a potential whistle-blower/relator1008. This logic intercepts with the Austrian conceptual 
framework in social, economic and legal analyses. 
 
In Austrian perspective, a society’s legal system has no existence apart from the subjective 
preferences and the conduct of the individuals who constitute that society. The evolution of 
such a system is open-ended and unpredictable. In Hayek’s vision, it is not clear what the 
original purpose of the law was1009, because the law emerges as the result of “human action, 
not human design”1010. Legal rules and institutions are determined as part of an on-going 
social learning and adaptation process which operates through trial and error, 
experimentation, imitation and compromise. 
At the same time, the economic behavioural approach is being increasingly affected by the 
new governance theory in socio-legal studies, which rejects the idea that employee behaviour 
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within organisations is “reducible to individuals and their characteristics.”1011 It further rejects 
the idea that institutions are simply the object of regulation. Instead, the lens of new 
governance theory is a systemic mapping of the range of possibilities in the interaction 
between regulation and regulated parties1012. New governance scholars call for an 
understanding of the regulatory process as consisting of a range of possible tools and 
mechanisms, each with its comparative advantages and costs. The new governance lens thus 
helps to frame the inquiry about the possible incentives that can be applied by law to 
encourage certain behaviours, including reporting fraud. 
 
As a result the economic method goes beyond individual behavioural analysis, which 
presumes the behaviour is shaped by isolated decisions of individuals. The institutional and 
legal environment also affects those decisions1013. At the moment the organisational theorists 
have come to consensus that “structures, processes, and tasks are opportunity structures for 
misconduct because they provide (a) normative support for misconduct, (b) the means for 
carrying out violations, and (c) concealment that minimises detection and sanctioning.”1014 
For example, studies show that organisations, which constantly pressure their employees to 
meet unreasonable expectations, can lead employees to resort to illegal means to achieve 
these goals1015. Similarly, recent studies point to counterproductive effects of regulation, 
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when the regulatory action is perceived as illegitimate and creates resistance within private 
actors1016. 
 
The fact that organisational culture plays significant role in determining the behavioural 
choices of the employees returns the research into qui tam relators’ motivation back to the 
more narrow economic analysis. In corporations, particularly financial institutions, with 
strong organisational culture of personal achievement, and where success is understood as a 
purely financial, materialistic success, the predominant pattern of behaviour is earning 
money. In such environment the calculative approach becomes almost universal, expanding 
to the decision making in respect of potential whistleblowing. In an environment where 
money is a core organisational value, and bonus is an ultimate reward; the traditional 
conceptual framework of law and economics has lost none of its relevance. 
 
The qui tam enforcement mechanism rests on two pillars – the government law enforcement 
and a private party, a relator, whose role is crucial in providing the state authority with 
information about wrongdoing. The law firms assisting the relators play important role in the 
process, particularly in case the relators pursue litigation on their own with the Department 
of Justice withholding its support, but that role is still ancillary to the one of relators’. From 
the government’s point of view therefore it is of a vital importance to develop an efficient 
system of incentives to entice/awe potential relators into reporting. Before starting a drill into 
mind-set of a potential qui tam relator, it is worth noting that although the significance of 
social enforcement and regulatory incentives is very high, there is no clear knowledge on the 
comparative advantages of the many of regulatory tools available for providing such 
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incentives. Despite this vast complexity, however, the current landscape of incentive 
programmes nonetheless reveals several prototypes that may provide some structure to the 
regulatory toolbox. The most widely used strategies are ensuring employees with anti-
retaliation protection, enacting an affirmative duty to report, imposing liability for failure to 
report, and incentivising reporting with pecuniary rewards. Some statutes include several of 
these legal categories, whereas others offer only one of these alternatives. 
 
This part aims to provide a comparative cost and benefit analysis of being a whistle-blower or 
a qui tam relator. Whatever the regulatory regime exists, and whatever factors are in play 
shaping behaviour of corporate employees exposed to fraud in which their employers are 
complicit, the decision to expose wrongdoing will be made on a basis the costs of blowing the 
whistle do not mean financial ruin or precipitous downsizing.  For the purposes of this analysis 
the financial, and broader pecuniary, factors will be complimented by the less tangible ones 
such as career development or potential imprisonment, and purely intangible such as moral 
satisfaction. However, the assumption gives the financial balance a determinative role in 
decision-making. 
 
The costs of delation 
The costs comprise economic and non-economic costs. The analysis starts with the economic 
ones, which objectively verifiable and consist of past, current and/or future monetary losses. 
 
Immediate monetary costs: the costs that can be easily monetised and therefore can be easily 
calculated. The current regulation on compensation usually includes one or more of them. 
 
Loss of employment, reduction of wage: the existing legislation provides some relief for these 
immediate costs to the whistle-blower. When there is no law to explicitly prohibit unfairly 
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retaliatory dismissal, the courts developed a body of rulings against retaliatory termination 
of employment. However, potential whistle-blower should expect to seek a judicial relief 
anyway (see below). 
 
Costs of making the complaint and possible litigation: lawyer fees, expert fees and other 
expenses come at a great cost. The existing whistle-blower protection legislation provides 
some remedy, but the legislation remains patchy (see below). 
 
Like many other statutes in the fields of environmental, consumer, and financial regulation, 
the 2009 Stimulus bill offers traditional anti-retaliation protection: non-federal employers 
may not retaliate against individuals who reasonably believe that there has been a legal 
violation in their organisation and take action to report the violation1017. As such, the 
reporting individuals are protected by law against any adverse action by their superiors, be it 
firing, demotion, or acts of harassment. Many of these reporting protections were developed 
in response to corporate scandals such as Enron and WorldCom, where employer retribution 
threats persuaded employees to “swallow the whistle.”1018 Consequently, these statutes are 
designed to provide individuals with broad anti-retaliation measures. In contrast to the 
whistle-blower protections for federal employees, the American Investment and Recovery act 
explicitly extends protection for disclosures made during the course of an employee’s duties. 
Important example is found in the 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX), which protects corporate 
whistle-blowers when they report financial misconduct to the SEC or internally within their 
organisation. 
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Hailed by scholars as “the gold standard of whistle-blower protection,” SOX provides civil 
remedies for individuals who experience retaliation in reaction to such reporting and makes 
it a felony to act against such an individual1019. Despite their prominence, existing legal 
protections for reporting misconduct are largely unsettled and still debated1020. Anti-
retaliation protections have developed as a patchwork of state and federal statutory and 
common law exceptions to the employment at-will regime, a century-old default rule that has 
allowed employers to terminate their employees “for good cause, for no cause, or even for 
morally wrong cause.”1021 As early as the 1930s, and significantly more since the 1960s and 
1970s, legislatures have carved away at this default by enacting laws that grant employees 
rights against discharge1022. These federal statutes include anti-retaliation provisions 
designed to enable employees to claim their rights and report illegal conduct without fear of 
retribution1023. These statutes encompass a broad range of regulatory fields, including 
financial, environmental, consumer, health and safety regulation1024. 
 
As a parallel development to legislative protections for whistle-blowers, courts have also 
developed the tort of wrongful termination, which allows plaintiffs to overcome the hurdle 
of at-will employment by claiming they were discharged for engaging in social enforcement 
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in the face of corporate misconduct1025. Thus, even in a context where there exists no statute 
that provides anti-retaliation protection, courts have frequently held that individuals cannot 
be terminated by their employer for reporting legal violations1026. In fact, retaliation is the 
fastest growing type of employment law claim1027. However, courts significantly disagree over 
the scope of such protections1028. At the constitutional level, the Supreme Court remains 
divided on what kind of reporting by public employees is constitutionally protected, holding 
in a split 4-5 decision that “when public employees make statements pursuant to their official 
duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the 
Constitution does not insulate their communications from employer discipline.”1029 At the 
tort level, courts vary in the extent to which they are willing to extend anti-retaliation 
protections to different channels of reporting, different types of reported misconducts, and 
different categories of workers1030. 
 
Loss of invested capital in the company: ENRON and WorldCom collapses incurred heavy 
losses on their employees, and those who blew the whistle shared not only moral 
responsibility, but also a financial burden. The growing prevalence of performance based 
compensation schemes paid in options and stock, combined with company related pension 
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funds lead to employees having a very large part of their capital invested in their employer1031. 
Even if a company does not go bust as a result of a fraud exposure (so far it remains an 
exceptional consequence of whistleblowing acts) the almost inevitable drop in its 
capitalisation hits a whistle-blower. At the moment there is no remedy to this financial loss. 
 
The loss of human capital: One of the most important costs to a whistle-blower. In most cases 
whistleblowing brings about reputational damage, and puts an end to the careers of those 
who exposed corporate wrongdoing. Usually whistle-blowers rarely find a new job in the 
industry1032. And even if they are lucky enough to stay, or be reinstated on their positions, 
chances to further advance in their careers are close to zero1033. The whistle-blowers are 
doomed to be blacklisted – put on the “black list” of the “not to be employed”1034.  Although 
they did the right thing, they are considered disloyal employees and a potential liability, “a 
troublemaker”1035. Partly this fear and partly the informal boycott by the “old boys” network 
in the industry make a further career in the same field virtually impossible1036. 
 
Another factor contributing to this expulsion is that the possible collapse of a fraudulent 
company will make any working experience in it suspicious, thus making a devastating blow 
on all working experience of its employees1037. This may be the most important cost to the 
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corporate whistle-blower – particularly in finance and banking – where career planners often 
employ notorious HR techniques: “screening contracts” and “tournament style 
compensation”1038. 
 
The first technique implies that employees are screened in categories of initial low and initial 
high productivity. Both groups are offered a low wage (W1) as a starter for the initial period, 
which duration may be contractually specified, and maybe not. Only after promotion to the 
next career stage a significantly higher remuneration (W2) is on offer. In fact, this is a 
prolonged “probation” period, which can be spread over many years. Those of the beginners 
who don’t expect to be good enough to get promoted may stay on a low wage level W1. High 
productivity employees who believe in a high probability (Pr) to get promotion will work there 
in anticipation of a future higher wage. A simple equation reflects how ambitious financiers 
view their wages – a combination of a present one and the one expected in the future: W= 
W1 + Pr (W2)1039. 
 
From point of view of a whistle-blowing protection, this means that such employees will not 
be satisfied with compensation limited to just W1 (current low wage). Current wage loss is 
not sufficient as a basis to calculate compensation. The compensation formula must include 
expectations of a future promotion and a significantly higher remuneration package. 
 
The other technique is the so-called tournament model1040, where the motivation to exert 
effort today is the possibility of a much higher wage in the future. This expectation motivates 
employees to work much harder than their current salary justifies. The exorbitantly high 
                                                          
1038 Lazear, E.P., (1995). Personnel Economics, MIT press, Cambridge, p.184 
1039 De Schepper, supra note 776 at 172 
1040 Lazear E.P. and Rosen, Sh., Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contract, 89 Journal of Political 
Economy  5 841 (1981) 
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future remuneration works as an encouraging carrot to lure low-level employees, and to 
motivate them to keep working hard in spite of a poor reward. This is said to be one of the 
reason for the extreme high remuneration managers of big corporations receive – partly as a 
delayed compensation for the past efforts, partly as a demonstrative motivation of those 
below in the hierarchy to squeeze much more efforts from them than they are actually paid 
for1041.  
 
As a result, employees in the big corporations will not accept their current salary as sufficient 
and fair enough compensation as their expectations include the delayed future remuneration 
package.  
 
Another challenge for any potential whistle-blower is that the longer he or she works in a 
particular industry the more industry specific skills they acquire. These skills often will be 
useless outside their working environment, and pay off as long as they are employed in their 
industry. As Howse and Daniels (1995) noted, “high levels of firm -- or industry -- specific 
human capital, particularly when the costs of such investment are borne principally by 
employees in return for future compensation, increase the vulnerability of employees to 
retaliation”.1042 For potential whistle-blowers it is not only their immediate wealth being 
under threat, but their potential future earnings. The loss of an accumulated human 
capital1043 might be the biggest cost the corporate whistle-blower will have to bear as a price 
of being a good citizen. 
 
                                                          
1041 De Schepper (2009), supra note 776, p.24 
1042 Howse R. and Daniels, R.J., “Rewarding Whistleblowers: The Costs and Benefits of an Incentive-Based 
Compliance Strategy”, in Daniels R.J. and Morck, R., (Eds.) (1995). Corporate Decision-Making in Canada. 
University of Calgary Press, Calgary, pp.531-532 
1043 Ibid., p.536 
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The non-economic costs -- the subjective non-monetary losses associated with blowing the 
whistle, hard to evaluate, but nonetheless a real cost to the whistle-blower. 
 
Psychological pressure: “Usually the whistle-blower is not fired outright. The organisation’s 
goal is to disconnect the act of whistleblowing from the act of retaliation, which is why so 
much legislation to protect whistle-blowers is practically irrelevant. The usual practices is to 
demoralise and humiliate the whistle-blower, putting him or her under so much psychological 
stress that it becomes difficult to do a good job”1044. 
 
Retaliation by the employer and even fellow employees can be subtle, or it can be rude. For 
instance, workplace harassment and threats devised to make a whistle-blower lose faith in 
the possibility of bringing it to a good end1045. This building up of psychological pressure might 
even be as subtle as silent social ostracism1046, excluding the employee in question from any 
social gatherings, e-mails, and carpools, and giving him or her ‘the silent treatment’. Other 
nuisances might be transferring them to other locations, giving them a closet for office1047, 
increased scrutiny, and investigation of their personal backgrounds to detract from their 
statements.1048 
 
Such psychological harassment is difficult to successfully prove and be protected against. The 
government cannot credibly protect the whistle-blower from this psychological stress. On top 
of that whistle-blowers are, quite often, at first branded as ‘crazy’ even by the authorities 
they report to. This all together can have devastating effects of the whistle-blowers and those 
                                                          
1044 Alford (2002), supra note 1087 at 227, pp. 31-32 
1045 Dyck et al., (2013), supra note 772 at 165 
1046 Kipling D. Williams, (2002). Ostracism: the Power of Silence, Guilford Press, pp.191-196 
1047 Alford (2002), supra note 1087 at 227, p. 32 
1048 Howse and Daniels (1995), supra note 1002 at 229, p. 533 
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close to them1049. It is a serious cost to consider for any potential whistle-blower. Reinstating 
the whistle-blowers in their previous jobs could only lead to a continuation of this subtle daily 
torture. 
 
Breaking loyalty and trust: The people the whistle-blowers denounce are their colleagues, 
their business relations, and even friends. Perceived duty of loyalty to friends and 
“benefactors” is a strong value, and breaking it is often seen as a social wrong1050. Considering 
that the “moral duty to divulge” serves an abstract “public”, the action of divulging is directly 
detrimental to people the whistle-blower knows and may even cares for. This on its own 
might be enough to offset that “ethical” duty. Therefore it should be taken into account to 
correctly assess the non-economic costs the potential whistle-blower faces. 
 
Civil and criminal liability: If whistle-blowers can still be sued according to ‘gagging clauses’ or 
other provisions in their employment contracts this would amount to another cost. A breach 
of contract is very likely as many contracts include confidentiality clauses and “all contracts 
of employment involve an implied ‘duty of fidelity’ which requires honest, loyal and faithful 
service and forbids competition with the employer”1051 Criminal liability for complicity is 
another possible cost. Often fraud is incrementally done step by step. However what starts 
out as a minor manipulation, might soon turn out to be large-scale fraud. To avoid employees 
suddenly being caught in a web of fraud, so they still dare to come out and blow the whistle, 
they should be convinced by giving them relief of complicity. If not, “the ‘leaders’ of the crime 
                                                          
1049 Bucy, P.H., Private Justice, 75 Southern California Law Review No. 1, (2002), pp. 61-62 
1050 Ibid., p. 54 
1051 De Schepper (2009), supra note 776, p. 27 
 250 
within the corporation have a strong incentive to induce other employees to engage in 
wrongdoing so as to immunise them against becoming whistle-blowers”1052. 
 
 
The currently available benefits 
Whistle blowing brings some benefits. For the purposes of this analysis the benefits are 
distributed into two groups: those to offset the economic costs and other benefits. 
 
1. Benefits to offset the economic costs 
Protection from being fired or demoted, and reinstatement: This by far the least realistic 
benefit in existing regulation, almost completely devoid of any realism. Regaining 
employment at your former seniority level or protection from dismissal are quite a poisoned 
benefit, as it puts a whistle-blower in an environment, which is in all probability, quite hostile. 
Psychological pressure would build up, with chances of ever advancing in the firm are almost 
negligible, and social ostracism hardly inconceivable. This “benefit” is therefore almost 
counterproductive, though found in many statutes and court rulings. As mentioned above, 
the focus of current regulation on this unrealistic “protection of current employment” could 
be regarded as an additional disincentive for the potential whistle-blower. 
 
Compensation for loss of wage:  a necessary compensation, which mitigates one of the 
immediate negative wealth effects of retaliation by dismissal or by reduction of wage. But the 
loss of the regular wage is often only a very small part of the actual loss if there are significant 
performance based element of the remuneration package, or as shown above there are 
strong expectations of the future pay rise. And very inadequate if screening contracts and 
                                                          
1052 Howse and Daniels (1995), supra note 1002 at 229, p. 538 
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tournament models are applied, making the current (low) wage a bad measure of the value 
lost by the employee. 
 
Costs of making the complaint and possible litigation compensated: A clear benefit, which 
offsets the cost associated with pursuing the procedure of blowing the whistle. A necessary 
provision in any whistleblowing regulation, including both the PIDA and the SOX. 
 
 
2. Other benefits 
 
Moral satisfaction from doing a public good: This moral duty has played its part in the 
discussions leading up to the SOX and the PIDA1053. It was even proposed to make it into a 
legal duty. While the moral duty to blow the whistle might be more significantly felt in 
situations with a health or disaster risk, posing a direct threat to colleagues, clients and 
general public, the public duty is quite ambiguous in respect of corporate fraud. No clearly 
defined duty exists as such. On top of that, as explained above, this duty is to the abstract 
“public”, while divulging information on corporate fraud is hurting an immediate circle of 
friends, colleagues and business relations. While there are people with very high ethical 
standards that would gladly risk it all for the public good, this should not be overestimated. 
“Moral crusaders” are a rare breed. 
 
Compensation for psychological stress: Currently a rare benefit, due partly to the difficulty in 
proving causality, and partly to the underestimation of these types of subjective costs in 
whistleblowing, which are hard to evaluate and therefore often ignored1054. 
 
                                                          
1053 Rapp, G. Ch., Four Signal Moments in Whistleblower Law: 1983-2013. 30 Hofstra Labor and Employment 
Journal 389 (2013); Hochberg et al. (2009), supra note 821 at 174 
1054 Dyck et al., (2010), supra note 13 at 10 
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Revenge: Controversial, but an important driving force behind some whistle-blower cases1055, 
in which disgruntled (ex-)employees show a higher willingness to bear costs just to get back 
at their employer. Often cases driven by revenge are offered as exemplary whistleblowing 
cases1056, leading to a very unbalanced estimation of what motivates the average employee 
whistle-blower. 
 
Loss of civil and criminal liability: As clauses in the contracts and criminal liability often prevent 
the potential whistle-blowers from exposure. For civil liability this benefit is present in almost 
all systems. Explicitly the case in application of the SOX and PIDA by considering 
whistleblowing a protected right of the employee1057. Criminal complicity is exonerated too 
in the application of the PIDA and the SOX1058, but not in case of the Dodd-Frank Act qui tam 
provisions1059. 
 
A dilutor of the benefits: possible failure of procedure 
 
In assessment of the benefits of blowing the whistle the probability of success plays an 
important role. If the chance is high that the complaint will be ignored or discarded, taking 
the risk of blowing the whistle is unappealing as the costs could be incurred without any of 
the benefits. Qui tam relation stays apart as it grants the opportunity to relators to pursue 
their case even when Department of Justice rejects the filing. A possible equation to represent 
a potential whistle-blower’s approach would be: Expected benefit E(B) =Pr.(B) and the 
                                                          
1055 Clampitt (2004), supra note 997 at 227, p. 75 
1056 Ted Beatty at Dynegy, Ronald Secrist in the Dirks vs. SEC case; also see Kiefer, P. C., A Question of Ethics: 
Whistleblowers, Winter 2002, [online]. Available at: <http://www.courtethics.org/Ethics%20Columns.htm>, 
(accessed on 30 June 2010) 
1057 De Schepper (2009), supra note 776, p. 31 
1058 Ibid. 
1059 Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub.L. 111–203, H.R. 4173 
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Excepted incentive = (Probability of success) (Benefits) – Costs; E(I)= Pr.(B) – C. If the 
whistleblowing procedure has a high probability of success close to 1, the full benefits will be 
taken in account. If on the other hand probability is low due to consistent failure of the 
authorities this will be closer to 0, seriously diluting the benefits. This means that 
reincentivising whistle-blowers by emphasising the benefits only will still be a limited success, 
if the responsiveness of the authorities is low. However, in case of a qui tam mechanism, both 
the Expected benefit E (B) and the Probability of Success Pr (B) will be significantly higher. 
First, qui tam offers a significant financial reward -- higher than modest whistle-blower’s 
compensation. Second, the probability of success is also higher due to its inherent right to 
prosecute even without consent of a government law enforcement agency.  
 
It is clear from the cost-benefit analysis that the government is not offering significant reward 
for the valuable information the potential corporate employees can bring to consideration by 
its law enforcement agencies. The approach pursued by the state regulators is rudimentary 
inefficient with its focus on keeping the delating employees in their previous employment and 
securing them their current level of income within the framework provided by the anti-
retaliatory legislation. Such approach completely ignores the loss of their human capital the 
relators suffer by turning into blacklisted zombies scaring away any potential employer. 
 
Some researchers have shown that even modest statutory benefits currently provided by the 
government have very limited effect. Zingales (2004)1060 summarises evidence on the 
consequences of whistleblowing for individual employees. In a 1992 survey of 1,500 federal 
workers, 25 per cent of employees reported that they experienced verbal harassment and 
                                                          
1060 Zingales, L., Want to Stop Corporate Fraud? Pay off Those Whistle-blowers. AEI-Brookings Joint Center Policy 
Matters (18 January 2004) 
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intimidation; 20 per cent were shunned by co-workers and managers; 18 per cent were 
assigned to less desirable duties; and 11 per cent were denied a promotion. A 1998 survey of 
448 emergency physicians paints an even worse picture: 23 per cent of those who complained 
about an issue reported having been fired or threatened with termination. Brikey (2003)1061 
reports that a random review of 200 whistle-blower complaints filed with the National 
Whistle-blower Center in 2002 found that about half of the complainants said they were fired 
after they reported misconduct. The remaining complainants had been subjected to other 
retaliatory action such as on-the-job harassment or discipline. A survey by another watchdog 
group, the Government Accountability Project in 2005, found that about 90 per cent of 
whistle-blowers were subjected to reprisals and threats1062. It seems there is no much 
progress in improving the environment for honesty among corporate employees.  
 
The complete lack of any compensation for losses of their invested capital and human capital, 
together with the lack of attention paid to non-economic damages makes the current cost-
benefit analysis for potential whistle-blowers severely unbalanced in favour of not reporting 
the fraud. A leading benefit in the current protection approach -- protection of employment, 
reinstatement – cannot be regarded as a serious incentive to tip the balance, not even with 
the compensation of the loss of current wage. The consequence is that hardly any rational 
employee would seriously consider option to bring a delicate inside information on a 
fraudulent corporation to disposal of the public law enforcement. As Duck et al. put it in their 
seminal research, “given these costs, however, the surprising part is not that most employees 
                                                          
1061 Brickey, K.F., From Enron to WorldCom and Beyond: Life and Crime after Sarbanes-Oxley, 81 Washington 
University Law Quarterly 357-401 (2003) [online] Available at: <http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.447100> 
(accessed on 7 September 2012) 
1062 Moberly, R. E.. Unfulfilled Expectations: An Empirical Analysis of Why Sarbanes-Oxley Whistleblowers Rarely 
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do not talk: it is that some talk at all.”1063 Basically the dissenting employee has to start back 
from near zero, often in a completely unrelated field. Compensation based on current salary, 
and focused on reinstatement provides a poorly convincing incentive from this perspective. 
 
The only way for the government agencies to gain unrestricted access to the pool of potential 
whistle-blowers in a corporate sector is to change its focus from providing protection to fully 
compensating the future dissenters. The compensation provisions should specifically include: 
 Compensation for lost current wages 
 Compensation for loss of invested capital 
 Compensation for loss of invested human capital, the loss of future earning potential 
 Compensation for any reasonable costs incurred for the procedure of delating and for 
the full compensation lawsuit 
 Compensation for non-economic damages, such as psychological stress 
 The relief of criminal and civil liability. 
 
The only available mechanism capable to embrace all these provisions is qui tam in its generic 
form devoid of the focus on exclusively fraud against government. From this perspective, the 
adoption of bounty provisions by the Dodd-Frank Act was a step in a right direction. Only a 
qui tam mechanism with its emphasis on providing the relator with a share of recovery offers 
financial reward sufficient to offset all possible losses for a relator. As it was shown above, 
bounty systems prove their efficiency. When employees can bring a qui tam suit that the 
company has defrauded the government, whistle-blowers stand to win – as research of Dyck 
et al. shows, on average the sample of successful qui tam whistle-blowers collect $46.7 
                                                          
1063 Dyck et al (2010), supra note 13 at 10 
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million1064. According to the data of the Department of Justice, Total False Claims Act 
recoveries (Federal and State) since the 1986 amendments revitalised it exceeded $24 billion. 
In average, in the healthcare the US Government is recovering $15 back for every $1 invested 
in False Claims Act health care investigations and prosecutions. The average relator award 
when the Department pursued the case is 16.84% of funds recovered1065. 
 
The recent cases of such rewards speak for themselves: 
 
 UBS Swiss banker Bradley Birkenfeld1066 won the largest reward ever paid to an 
individual whistle-blower: $104 million dollars obtained under the IRS tax fraud 
whistle-blower rewards programme, which was scaled after the qui tam rewards 
provisions; 
 In October 2010, Cheryl Eckard, a former GlaxoSmithKline employee, won $96mln, 
which is believed to be the largest reward ever given to an individual US qui tam 
relator. The award is part of a $750mln settlement over the company’s manufacturing 
practices in Puerto Rico1067. The award may well be increased by bounties paid by 
various states; 
 In September 2009 John Kopchinski a former Pfizer sales representative earned more 
than $51mln1068. 
  
                                                          
1064 Ibid., p.44 
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The sizes of rewards paid clearly compensate the loss of human capital, end of professional 
careers, long years of litigation1069 and even imprisonment (as in Birkenfeld case). 
Notwithstanding the fact that outcome of qui tam suits can be very uncertain and significantly 
delayed in time (5 to 10 years), the expectation of a very big reward might have been an 
important factor in pursuing the employee to file a case. 
 
However, reluctance of the legislators to employ qui tam enforcement in full, including a right 
of the relators to pursue their case even after rejection by the federal prosecutors, limits a 
scope of this enforcement tool and at the same time limits the ability of the public to 
overcome administrative inaptitude or possible regulatory capture. The latter, as some 
empirical researches show1070, remains one of the concerns among potential relators, who 
don’t want to sacrifice their professional careers only to get stuck by the cosy relationship 
between government agency and its private contractors. 
 
Qui tam and the effective solutions to the administrative capture it provides will be analysed 
below in the section “Qui Tam vs. Administrative Drift or Capture”. The next two sections 
focus attention on the unique advantages of qui tam, which secure it the leading position 
among other bounty based law enforcement mechanisms, thus providing opportunity to 
scetch a design of the powerful and cost-effective model of enforcement.  
 
 
Qui Tam and the Optimal Regulatory Design of the Bounty Based Public-Private Model of 
Enforcement 
                                                          
1069 Ms Eckard spent eight years defending herself (Lipman (2012), supra) 
1070 Orsini Broderick (2007), supra note 566 at 126; Feldman and Lobel (2010), supra note 970 at 220; Dyck et 
al. (2010), supra note 13 at 10; Engstrom (2012), supra note 441 at 105 
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In search of the optimal regulatory design of the system, which could combine a well-
conceived set of incentives, moral and pecuniary to the extent sufficient to compensate the 
loss of human capital by a potential whistle-blower, a proper level of protection from 
retaliation, and an integrated failsafe mode of enforcement to tackle administrative capture, 
David Engstrom coming from a law and economics perspective proposed a relatively “simple” 
in his own words theoretical framework capable to provide a methodological basis for both 
of the two distinctive paths of academic inquiry into effective bounty based enforcement 
regime1071. The first deals with design features in an effort to meet the challenge to optimise 
the quantity and quality of tips. The other is to consider the complex efficiency/ control 
tradeoffs that reside in the choice between a simple cash-for-information bounty scheme and 
an elaborated qui tam regime in which whistleblowers are granted a private right of 
action1072.  
That approach first summarised six design dimensions along which pecuniary based regimes 
differ1073:  
 The bounty amount 
 The degree of regulator discretion in determining that amount, and the actor (agency 
or court) who wields such discretion  
                                                          
1071 Engstrom, D.F., Whither Whistleblowing? Bounty Regimes, Regulatory Context, and the Challenge of Optimal 
Design, 15 Theoretical Inquiries in Law (2014) 605-633 
1072 Ibid., p. 613 
1073 Ibid., p.p. 605-606 
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 Whether a whistleblower can exercise independent enforcement authority and, if so, 
the degree to which public regulators exercise residual control over conduct of that 
authority 
 Retaliation protections, including sanctions for retaliatory acts or guaranteed 
anonymity 
 Limitations on whistleblower standing, including carve-outs excluding particular 
whistleblower types (counsel, organisational outsiders) from participation 
 Filing prerequisites, including the requirement that a whistleblower first report 
wrongdoing internally before making an external report to a regulator.  
Then Engstrom builds them into discrete features of the regulatory contexts most often 
implicated in debates over the optimal design of regimes: a two-by-two grid, designed to 
distinguish two core features of the regulatory contexts where bounty regimes are already in 
place – procurement, tax and securities fraud; or that most frequently draw bounty-oriented 
reform proposals -- environmental protection, workplace safety. One axis of the grid captures 
the extent to which the harm to be regulated is more or less direct. The other axis captures 
whether the legal mandate to be implemented is more or less determinate1074. 
Whether the harm is more or less direct to the would-be whistle-blower matters to the 
optimal design of the regulatory regime. First, it is important in terms of the potential 
standing. Second, the degree to which harm is direct more likely correlates with the level of 
moral disapprobation the misconduct attracts within a society, thus lowering psychological 
barriers to report the wrongdoing. It is obvious that on this axis the work place safety and 
                                                          
1074 Ibid., p.p. 620-621 
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environmental protection signified more direct harm. 
Legal determinacy in this framework means whether a legal mandate is comprised mostly of 
rule-like legal commands or more flexible, standard-like directives, thus affecting the 
mandate’s application. It can be more bounded, or instead open to adaptation to new fact 
situations or regulatory contexts1075. In terms of legal determinacy, regulatory framework on 
tax, security fraud and environmental protection is significantly more rigid and specific than 
the one that deals with procurement fraud and workplace safety. 
The degree of legal determinacy matters because it may affect the costs to government of 
the regulation. The costs may be greater in a less determinate regulatory area than in a more 
determinate one because the government may end up paying higher bounties in order to 
generate a productive level of information, or in case of an administrative drift when a 
successful relator in a qui tam lawsuit has been denied support of a regulator. However, 
greater indeterminacy, by reducing the certainty of payouts, may tend to reduce tip 
volume1076. The effect of uncertainty on tip volume also depends on whether the uncertainty 
is symmetric or skewed, and also on the degree of risk aversion of whistleblowers1077. 
For Engstrom, legal indeterminacy presents a particular challenge, as correlates with the risk 
that private enforcers vested with a qui tam private right of action may drive the elaboration 
of legal mandates in democratically unaccountable directions1078. The greater indeterminacy 
translates into a larger interpretive space within which private actors can maneuver in their 
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efforts to exploit regulatory ambiguities and drive the elaboration of legal mandates beyond 
the control of legislative or administrative overseers. 
Such concern stems from the FCA’s unbounded and sprawling nature. Qui tam enforcement 
efforts as privately driven legal innovation at the regulatory frontier, have drawn regular 
criticism for colonising other regulatory regimes for which Congress did not provide a private 
right of action1079. In this respect, the skeptics, including Engstrom, give more favour to the 
simpler bounty based whistleblower mechanism1080. 
 
Applying Engstrom’s Framework to Qui Tam Enforcement Mechanism 
When model is based on a matrix principle the outcome depends mainly on the weights 
allocated to its elements. When legal indeterminacy is viewed as a weakness that opens gates 
to uncontrolled legal innovation, and therefore is given the prevailing weight, the analysis 
above suggests that regulatory architects to rearrange competing bounty designs more in 
favour of a simplistic, but harmless to the regulatory edifice cash-for-information regime. 
The False Claims Act, with its open-textured, antifraud mandate, is proposed to be 
downgraded to a simple bounty regime to eliminate concern about privately driven legal 
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innovation, statutory drift, and the FCA’s tendency to colonise other regulatory mandates1081. 
By contrast, the current cash-for-information regime applied to more structurally rigid tax 
and work safety regulations can be upgraded to a more complex and elaborated qui tam 
regime1082. 
 New York State’s recent extension of its FCA to the tax area1083 ironically proves the same 
properties of the False Claims Act that attract concern. Given the Tax code’s greater legal 
determinacy compared to the FCA’s open-ended antifraud mandate, a qui tam mechanism 
would bring with it some of private enforcement’s benefits (private sector efficiencies, a 
possible anti-capture and gap-filling role), but carry less risk of statutory drift as a result of 
privately driven legal innovation1084. There is, however, one challenge in applying a qui tam 
regime to the taxation: it assumes a privately driven incursion into the tax shelter, transfer 
pricing, and other less determinate areas of tax law. Not coincidentally, they belong to the 
group of the most sensitive to external lobbying areas of legislation. Most likely, such 
perspective will provoke a legislative initiative to denote these sections as bounty-ineligible.  
Workplace safety regulation seems well suited to a bounty approach in general, and a qui tam 
mechanism, in particular1085. Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) is 
drastically underfunded and bureaucratically dysfunctional1086, thus leaving the regulated 
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entities with a vanishingly small risk of inspection1087. A well-designed bounty regime may 
secure a flow of surfacing information about safety violations that the current under-
resourced inspection regime does not provide.  
There is also a reason to believe that a qui tam approach would be preferred. Evidence 
suggests that OSHA’s selection of inspection targets is designed to generate a regularised row 
of detected violations, to the detriment of low- probability hazards or harms with long latency 
periods1088. As in the securities fraud area, a qui tam mechanism has a potential to play a gap-
filling, “failsafe” role, prosecuting workplace violations that would serve the public interest, 
but do not align with agency’s politically-induced enforcement approach1089.  
The conclusions Engstrom draws from his analysis, show challenges of the approach, leaning 
to the concept of grand design in respect of the legislation, with very limited space for 
innovation. When cost effectiveness and openness to some level of private driven legal 
innovation with limited government participation becomes a foundational principle, the 
Engstrom’s framework brings about different results. 
First of all, it is reasonable to assume that qui tam mechanism is the least suitable for 
application to tax legislation. Among all US legislation the Internal Revenue Code is probably 
one of the most challenging to embrace qui tam. With 9834 sections the voluminous statute 
                                                          
Health Administration, Praeger (offering a similarly sceptical assessment) 
1087 Weil, D., Assessing OSHA Performance: New Evidence from the Construction Industry, 20 Journal of Policy 
Analysis and Management (2001) 651 (determining a construction site’s annual probability of inspection to be 
0.039%) 
1088 Lobel, O., Interlocking Regulatory and Industrial Relations: The  Governance of Workplace Safety, 57 
Administrative Law Review (2005) 1071 
1089 Engstrom, supra note 1122 at 631 
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is so large1090, so complicated, that even contains some textual discrepancies between its 
various editions1091. To expand the sprawling nature of qui tam to cover IRC will inevitably 
become an exercise with a constant discovery of unintended consequences. Indeed, the 
conduct of qui tam relators in respect of violation of the IRC has to be meticulously delimited 
prior to the upgrade of the current bounty regime. 
Downgrading the FCA by depriving it from the qui tam mechanism will generate significant 
public costs.  A new regime would forfeit the private-sector efficiencies the current qui tam 
structure achieves, particularly the ability of an increasingly sophisticated relator’s bar to 
adjust enforcement capacity as FCA enforcement opportunities ebb and low. 
Other potential costs will include a change in capture dynamics as a result of moving to a 
simple cash-for-information approach. There is a wishful thinking that a plaintiff’s bar, 
including the securities class action bar and also an increasingly sophisticated qui tam relator’s 
bar, would quickly move into the Dodd-Frank cash-for-information regime upon its 
application to the government procurement. The sophistication will not be needed anymore, 
and such move will bring about an effect of overcrowding among the group of more 
experienced lawyers. This will lead to the drop in activity of the current relator’s bar in respect 
of the downgraded FCA regime. The weakened bar will be less able to counter capture by 
pulling “ re-alarms” to alert legislators where DoJ was dispensing regulatory favours via its 
gatekeeper decisions1092. 
                                                          
1090 See, US Code: Title 26 – Internal Revenue Code [online] Available at:  
https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/26.  Accessed on 30 June 2016 
1091 See, Tax Analysts v. Internal Revenue Serv., 214 F.3d 179 (D.C. Cir. 2000) 
1092 McCubbins, M., and Schwartz, Th., Congressional Oversight Overlooked:  Police Patrols Versus Fire Alarms, 
28 American Journal of Political Science (1984) 165 
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Downgrading will inevitably deprive the system of salutary forms of innovation by diminishing 
the ingenuity the qui tam lawyers currently supply in piecing together new and ever more 
sophisticated frauds that have escaped regulators’ attention. Significant number of such 
lawyers will find themselves overqualified and underpaid in their work to assist 
whistleblowers in a simple bounty regime. 
The argument that much of the value the more and more specialised counsel adds to the 
current qui tam regime comes pre-filing or during efforts to persuade DoJ to join the case, 
but not in post-filing litigation, will deprive the whole system of the systemic advantage that 
makes qui tam so valuable to society. Next section will give a more detailed analysis to the 
role of private counsel in qui tam mechanism as one of its key advantages as a unique 
contribution to the crime deterrence and law enforcement. 
 
 
Qui Tam as a Most Effective Mechanism of the Public-Private Enforcement Model 
 
Viewed through the efficiency lens, the choice of the enforcement turns at least in part on an 
empirical judgment as to which can generate a chosen level of enforcement effort — and, 
with it, a desired quantum of deterrence — at lower social cost. As was shown in previous 
sections, a public-private enforcement model has in theory the potential to achieve the most 
pervasive enforcement at the lower social cost. By relying on hidden information about 
breach of law, which is in the possession of whistleblowers, the government agencies acting 
in an environment of information asymmetry avoid costly investigations. To overcome fear of 
retaliation and almost inevitable loss of human capital by the potential whistleblowers the 
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poorly informed government enacts specific legislation with the express purpose of inducing 
parties with private information about socially costly dishonest or illegal behaviour to come 
forward. 
There are, however, some constraints that limit application of this enforcement design. First, 
an agency problem, when a government body shows inaptitude in prosecuting potential fraud 
due to administrative capture. Second, a government has to sift through evidence to screen 
out the poor information brought in by the whistleblowers. The government seeks a 
mechanism that encourages whistleblowers with high-quality information to come forward, 
but at the same time, discourages whistleblowers with low-quality information from relation. 
Investigations of claims made by low-quality informants are a waste of society’s resources. 
Third, a government seeks to discourage frivolous suits, which exhaust judicial branch 
incurring socially inefficient costs. Fourth, there have to be a right balance between potential 
costs of relation, and level of reward to prevent crowding out valuable information. 
The analysis rendered above has been provided with an assumption that a qui tam 
mechanism is uniquely positioned to offer the most efficient solution to the identified 
constraints. To prove this assumption a simple model has been developed that captures the 
essence of the qui tam optimisation function. Built up upon the Kwok’s modeling discussed 
above1093, and game theory1094, it is based on two foundational assumptions. 
First, it is assumed that the anti-fraud statutes have dominant punitive goal as well as 
                                                          
1093 See Section “Modelling a Qui Tam Mechanism within Regulatory Enforcement Policy” this Chapter at 208-
218 
1094 Casey and Niblett, supra note 978 at 1169-1217; Watson, J., (2008). Strategy: An Introduction to Game 
Theory. 3d ed., Wiley; Rusmusen, E., (2006). Games and Information: An Introduction to Game Theory. 4th ed., 
Wiley-Blackwell; Christen, M., Information Acquisition by Firms: The Role of Specialisation, Motivation and 
Ability. Working Paper n98/77/MKT, INSEAD (1998) [online] Available at 
https://sites.insead.edu/facultyresearch/research/doc.cfm?did=46503 Assessed on 2 September 2016 
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deterrence. Other theories of punishment may focus on factors such as the expressive power 
of law to make certain rules more salient, provide behavioural focal points, or to otherwise 
shift norms1095. But this model is consistent with the legislative history surrounding qui tam 
legislation1096. 
Second, the same soft rational actor framework is applied as elsewhere in this research. The 
impact of imposing costs and offering rewards will obviously differ if whistleblowers or those 
committing fraud are not rational or act out of derangement. The model therefore accounts 
for non-pecuniary costs and rewards. A whistleblower may get value from morality, 
indignation, or revenge. As with any other payoff that value must be considered when 
designing the correct cost-reward dynamic. 
In the model, an employee receives private information about whether their firm has 
committed fraud. The individual receives a signal that is either strong or weak. The strong 
signal of fraud provides for corporate documents or other bulletproof evidence (like tape 
recordings) that outlines how the company has defrauded the government. The weak signal 
of fraud does not provide for any direct evidence that company has been engaged in 
dishonest or fraudulent dealings. Such weak signals may be in a possession of a relatively high 
number of employees, and often appear in the form of a rumour. The model assumes that 
the weak signal is correct only ten percent of the time, and that an employee knows the 
quality of the information, whether the information is strong or weak, and knows the 
probability of the claim to be successfully proven. As it was discussed above1097, before 
                                                          
1095 McAdams, R.H., A Focal Point Theory of Expressive Law, 86 Virginia Law Review (2000) 1649  
1096 See Chapter I 
1097 See supra at 232-236 
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submitting a claim a potential whistleblower/ relator most likely would seek a professional 
advice from a counsel to assess the probability of success. 
For the purposes of this model it is assumed that the government agency/ regulator is not 
captured and would harness the employee’s inside information about fraud to overcome its 
information deficiencies. There are two challenges that the government must address in case 
it chooses to incentivise whistle-blowing behaviour. First, the government agency cannot ex 
ante assess the quality of the information that is brought by the whistleblower. In order to 
determine whether the signal of fraud is strong or weak, the government must launch a full-
scale investigation at a cost of $1 million1098. 
Second, there is a private cost that potential relators must bear when submitting their claim. 
These costs include potential retaliation by the employer, and more importantly a real 
perspective of a loss of accrued human capital. It is reasonable to assume that the 
whistleblower estimates these costs to be $500,000. 
There are two ways for the government to improve the benefit-cost balance. One way is to 
minimise the cost of claim by ensuring confidentiality and anti-retaliation protection. Which, 
as was discussed above, did not prove to be an unequivocal success1099. 
Another method is to increase the benefit side of the equation by compensating the 
whistleblowers for any losses they may incur by providing the information. Consistent with 
the analysis provided by this work1100, the potential whistleblower expects to receive at least 
                                                          
1098 On costs of investigations and their effect on rewards see: Casey and Niblett, supra note 978 at 1193-1197; 
Farhang (2010), supra note 492 at 119 
1099 See section “Economic Analysis of Qui Tam Relators Behaviour” of this Chapter at 228-248 
1100 Ibid. 
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$500,000 in compensation to come forward1101.  
When the investigative authority recognises the necessity to financially incentivise the 
potential whistleblowers, it has a choice of different institutional options so far available. 
First comes a flat fee, or fixed payment, made to everyone who brings the information. If the 
government agency offers $500,000 to all potential whistleblowers, then everyone with week 
and strong signal will come forward.
 
As a result of this incentive scheme, the government will 
be overburdened by the claims, unable to identify the valuable tips from the noise. This will 
generate a so-called pooling effect, when every informant receives the same treatment. The 
flat fee therefore fails to separate strong information from weak. Consequently, the 
government agency drowned in a flood of tips will not have sufficient resources to investigate 
them all thus diluting resources allocated to the promising cases. It leads to under 
enforcement, and from law and economics perspective, reduces deterrence. As shown in 
academic literature on the subject, the deterrent effect of law is reduced as the likelihood of 
inaccuracy in the legal system1102. The fraudulent firms are less likely to be found guilty of 
fraud when the regulator must randomise which firms to investigate because it has received 
too many tips. Given that they are less likely to be found guilty, the likelihood of committing 
fraud increases; this is in spite of the increase in the quantity of information flowing to the 
                                                          
1101 The size of compensation is calculated on a basis of US Bureau of Labor Statistics data on median income of 
white-collar employees (Sourced from payscale.com [online] Available at 
http://www.payscale.com/research/US/Job=Office_Administrator/Hourly_Rate. Accessed on 30 October 2016). 
In case of potential whistle-blowers employed by the biggest multinational corporations, the expected 
compensation will be significantly higher. The same methodology applies to the estimated damages due to be 
recovered, infra at 273 
1102 Kaplow, L. and Shavell, S., Accuracy in the Determination of Liability, 37 The Journal of Law and Economics 
1 (1994) 1-15; Kaplow, L. and Shavell, S., Accuracy in the Assessment of Damages, 39 The Journal of Law and 
Economics (1996) 191; Kaplow, L., The Value of Accuracy in Adjudication: An Economic Analysis, 23 Journal of 
Legal Studies (1994) 307 
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regulator. The fixed payment fee scheme does not work. 
Second comes the existing option to make the payment to the informant conditional upon a 
successful finding of fraud. Both qui tam legislation and a simple bounty system provide that 
a whistleblower is entitled to a portion of the damages that the government receives. Making 
payment conditional can operate as a screen to incentivise informants with high-quality 
information, and discourage those in a possession of a less valuable one, because their 
chances to win remedial proceeds are significantly lower. The expected benefit is a function 
of the likelihood of success, and individuals with strong information, therefore, have a higher 
expected reward than individuals with weak information. This generates a so-called 
separating equilibrium, a point where behaviour of individuals, which belong to different 
types, becomes distinctly different1103. 
The separating equilibrium is to be set at the level sufficient to meet the demands of the 
potential whistleblowers. If the contingent payment is too low, then there will be a pooling 
equilibrium, at which no individuals will come forward, and therefore, no deterrent effect. 
Assuming the expected damages of a company-perpetrator at $40,000,000, if, for example, 
the government sets the whistleblower reward at just one percent of any remedial damages 
neither informants will come forward. Whistleblowers with strong information bear a cost of 
$500,000, but have an expected benefit of $400,000 (one percent of $40 million) -- not 
sufficiently high to incentivise risk taking. The expected reward for whistleblowers with weak 
information is even lower: in the model they have a 10 per cent chance of success, and 
$40,000 as a reward does not sound anywhere near attractive. 
                                                          
1103 Watson (2008), supra note 1145 at 282-292 
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The increase of the reward will bring sought-for separating equilibrium, under which only an 
informant with strong information will submit a claim. Suppose that the government offers 
ten percent of any damages to the whistleblower. Whistleblowers with strong information 
have an expected reward of $4 million. This more than covers the cost of risk taking, as the 
expected benefits now outweigh the costs. At the same time informants with weak 
information will not be induced to come forward. With a ten percent chance of recovery, their 
potential reward in case fraud claim is successful will bring them only $400,000 – not enough 
to outweigh their expected personal loss. Under the conditions of the model, only employees 
with strong evidence will dare coming forward. Since only informants with high-quality 
information provide tips, the government can focus its efforts on these claims of fraud. This 
increases the likelihood of fraud detection, and therefore the deterrence, both aspiring goals 
of the government. 
The relationship between increasing rewards and increasing deterrence is not monotonic. If 
the rewards are too high, then more whistleblowers with weak signals will be incentivised to 
come forward in the hope of hitting the jackpot. Once again, this will lead to the pooling 
equilibrium; but this time, too many informants come forward1104. If the success-contingent 
payment to the potential informants is too high, then the institutional structure begins to 
resemble the fixed-fee system described above. For example, if a whistleblower is entitled to 
fifty per cent of the damages awarded against the fraudulent firm then a great number of 
employees, who receive a signal—weak or strong—will rise to file claims. Whistleblowers 
with weak information will come forward because the expected reward (10 per cent of 50 per 
                                                          
1104 Casey and Niblett, supra note 978 at 1196; Ferziger, M.J. and Currell, D.G., Snitching for Dollars: The 
Economics and Public Policy of Federal Civil Bounty Programs, University of Illinois Law Review (1999), p. 1172 
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cent of $40 million) far exceeds the potential costs. As with the flat-fee incentive structure, 
the government cannot ex ante distinguish between well-informed whistleblowers and 
poorly informed whistleblowers. The regulator is faced with the problem of information 
overload1105. The model shows that excessive contingent payments dilute the quality of the 
information and have an ancillary effect of reducing the deterrence. Under conditions of the 
model, increasing the rewards leads to a rather perverse effect of under deterrence1106. 
Despite the obvious – that a real world is not over simplistic and binary as models assumes – 
the developed model seems to confirm the factual development that happens in the real 
world. Even before the Dodd-Frank Act was enacted, the SEC was receiving a high number of 
tips from the whistleblowers. As a former head of the Texas Securities Commission 
acknowledged, the problem the SEC had to deal with was not the lack of people eager to file 
complaints. The Commission received about 750 thousands complaints a year1107, but it was 
not capable to make “good determinations with regard to those complaints that really 
needed to be followed up on”1108. The theory that suggests the encouraging whistleblowing 
through a simple pecuniary incentive mechanism will therefore be counter-productive in 
                                                          
1105 Casey and Niblett, supra note 978 at 1197 
1106 In terms of formulas, the model stays as follows: The remedial damages are D, the percentage awarded to 
the whistleblower is r, and the cost of submitting a claim is c. The probability of victory in a claim is p and is 
known by the whistleblower. A whistleblower will be incentivised to come forward, if r > c/pD. The informants 
with weak information have a probability of victory as pw, those with strong information -- ps. The threshold 
percentage of damages required to encourage strong informants is S=c/psD. The threshold percentage of 
damages where weak informants will also be encouraged is W = c/pwD. It follows that W > S (After Casey and 
Niblett, supra note 978 at 1197)  
1107 Denise Crowford in testimony before the Committee on Financial Services of the US House of 
Representatives. Capital Markets Regulatory Reform: Strengthening Invest Protection, Enhancing Oversight of 
Private Pools of Capital, and Creating a National Insurance Office: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 
111th Cong. 84 (2009), [online] Available at http://financialservices.house.gov/media/file/hearings/111/ 
printed%20hearings/111-84.pdf Accessed on 15 October 2016 
1108 Ibid. 
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deterring fraud is corroborated by robust evidence from the regulatory practice. 
However, when a described above model applied to the qui tam mechanism the result comes 
up with an equilibrium that allows the government to achieve its goals in the most efficient 
way. 
Qui tam actions bring a set of specific costs, which act as safeguards to hinder efforts of those 
who do not possess the valuable information in respect of fraud. In a business world, where 
material factor plays one of the most important roles in decision-making, the screening effect 
of these costs brings about opportunities over simple whistleblowing procedure.  
First, there are notable costs of bringing suit in court, and these costs must be added to the 
looming costs of human capital loss and career failure. The litigation costs are not relevant 
for the whistleblowers providing tips to the government agencies, but only incurred by qui 
tam relators. First of all, there are significant upfront costs of hiring attorneys, filing costs, and 
substantiating claims. The relators turned plaintiffs will need to expend resources to convince 
the lawyers that their information provides strong evidence of the breach of law. The 
procedure is lengthy, and the plaintiffs must prove to the judge that they have cleared a 
number of statutory hurdles. Additionally, as with any lawsuit, the plaintiff must meet 
minimum pleading requirements, the barrier that most likely will deter potential plaintiffs 
with weak evidence from filing suit1109. It means that at a very initial stage the qui tam 
procedure filters the incoming information screening out the weak relators. 
Second, the costs borne by qui tam relators hit disproportionately those who bring weak 
                                                          
1109 Law and economics theory produced a significant body of research on the decision-making to file suit. See, 
Posner, R., (2014). Economic Analysis of Law. 9th ed., Walters Kluwer Law & Business, (Chapter 22, Civil and 
Criminal Procedure), pp. 606-651  
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cases with low probability to succeed. False Claims Act stipulates that cost shifting is possible, 
and the court can award costs to the successful side1110. But this provision is applicable only 
if relators win. The relator, who aims to bring a frivolous suit, has to keep such costs as a 
contingency loss.  
Qui tam procedure provides that the Department of Justice has to investigate claims made by 
the whistleblower, and elects whether or not to join the case as a co-plaintiff. This imposes 
additional costs on a relator: one that is fixed, and other that depends on the quality of the 
information. 
The fixed costs comprise the costs of convincing the Department that the case is strong. 
Assuming there is no administrative capture and adverse political influence, the DoJ will 
typically join a strong case, and will reject a weak one. As it has been shown in this work1111, 
it takes time -- up to several years – for the Department of Justice to come up with its decision 
on the information brought by the relator. The costs incurred to demonstrate the strength of 
the case are likely to be wasted, if the relator knows that the evidence is insufficient. This is 
analogous to the costs of convincing the contingent-fee lawyer, and convincing the judge at 
the motion-to-dismiss stage1112. 
As an additional cost that is contingent on the strength of the evidence, when the government 
joins the suit the remaining costs of suit are borne by the government, but in cases where the 
government steps aside, the qui tam relator must bear the litigation costs. This has the effect 
of further encouraging relators with strong evidence, and while raising barrier to those, who 
                                                          
1110 Casey and Niblett, supra note 978 at 1204 
1111 See sections “Qui Tam and Information Symmetry” and “Qui Tam vs. Administrative Drift or Capture” of this 
Chapter 
1112 Casey and Niblett, op. cit. 
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cannot build the convincing case. 
Whether the federal government is a very good judge of the strength of a case following a 
preliminary investigation, or it is a better litigator, the data shows that when the Department 
of Justice joins a relator in suit, the plaintiff wins in a majority of cases; however, the relator 
will have some chance to win, when the DoJ refuses to intervene, though with much lower 
probability1113. 
Third, the relator’s lawyers work as additional investigators of the evidence that is brought 
forward. The complexity and cost of prosecuting a qui tam case require specialisation, and 
therefore will more likely involve an experienced counsel to take the case. As it was shown, 
the lawyers in qui tam cases add value1114, and their involvement release the limited 
resources to be channeled by the government to investigate fraud elsewhere. 
The qui tam mechanism is effective precisely because a court-centric system 
disproportionately places the burden for losses on plaintiffs with poor information. The model 
predicts that courts in qui tam litigation are not likely inundated with poor cases. As the model 
shows, the qui tam mechanism optimises the process of enforcement within public-private 
model by introducing three screening barriers, which sift out the evidence to be litigated on 
behalf of the government to discard the weak signals and educe the promising ones: (1) the 
private lawyer screen; (2) the court screen on a stage of a motion to dismiss; (3) the 
Department of Justice screen, when making its decision to proceed1115. At each point, the 
relator undertakes costs that are likely to be wasted if the obtained information is weak. Qui 
                                                          
1113 See Sections “Analysing Qui Tam in the Context of Public vs. Private Enforcement” and “Modelling a Qui Tam 
Mechanism within Regulatory Enforcement Policy” of this Chapter 
1114 Engstrom, supra note 1174 at 1251-1252 
1115 In more depth the screening function of qui tam is analysed in Casey and Niblett, supra note 978 
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tam action, therefore, provide a key institutional advantage over whistleblowers reporting 
directly to a regulator. Litigation forces relators to bear an upfront cost. Further, the costs of 
litigation are greater as the probability of winning falls. This discourages relators who know 
they have poor information from coming forward, thereby discouraging overzealous, non-
meritorious or frivolous claims. 
 
Qui Tam vs. Administrative Drift or Capture 
 
The foregoing account of private enforcement regimes as an effective form of policy 
intervention is contested by some researchers. A contending line of arguments doubts 
whether the qui tam mechanism can advance statutory policy goals, and advances core 
arguments that qui tam relators lead to explosion of frivolous suits; empower judges, who 
lack policy expertise, to make policy; weaken the administrative state’s capacity to articulate 
a coherent regulatory scheme by pre-empting administrative rulemaking; usurp prosecutorial 
discretion; and, finally, discourage cooperation with regulators and voluntary compliance1116. 
 
A primary justification for delegation of policy implementation authority to bureaucracy is to 
leverage the expertise — informational resources, analytical competence, regulatory 
                                                          
1116 Blomquist (1988), supra note 435 at 106; Stewart and Sunstein, supra note 590 at 130, pp. 1292–1293; Zinn, 
M.D., Policing Environmental Regulatory Enforcement: Cooperation, Capture, and Citizen Suits, 21 Stanford 
Environmental Law Journal 81 (2002), p. 84; Grundfest, J.A., Disimplying Private Rights of Action Under the 
Federal Securities Laws: The Commission’s Authority, 107 Harvard Law Review 961 (1994), pp. 970–71; Kagan, 
R.A., Adversarial Legalism: Tamed or Still Wild?, 2 New York University Journal of Legislation and Public Policy 
217 (1999); Stephenson, M.C., Public Regulation of Private Enforcement: The Case for Expanding the Role of 
Administrative Agencies 91 Virginia Law Review 93 (2005), p. 116; Pierce, R.J., Jr., Agency Authority to Define 
the Scope of Private Rights of Action, 48 Administrative Law Review 1 (1996); Cross, F.B., Rethinking 
Environmental Citizen Suits, 8 Temple Environmental Law & Technology Journal 55 (1989), p.69; Austin, J.L., 
The Rise of Citizen-Suit Enforcement in Environmental Law: Reconciling Private and Public Attorneys General, 81 
Northwestern University Law Review 220 (1987); Spence, D.B. and Cross, F., A Public Choice Case for the 
Administrative State, 89 Georgia Law Review 97 (2000); Bawn, K., Political Control Versus Expertise: 
Congressional Choices About Administrative Procedures, 89 American Political Science Review 62 (1995); Greve 
(1990), supra note 461 at 107 
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experience — of policymakers within an administrative body1117. As compared to a more 
centralised, unified, and integrated administrative scheme orchestrated by an administrator 
at the top of a hierarchical agency with powers of national scope, when a large role is given 
to private enforcers in implementation, resulting policy will tend to be confused, inconsistent, 
and even straightforwardly contradictory1118.  
 
The litigation by independent qui tam relators bears the risks of creating incoherent 
fragmented legislation due to the inability of judges to give each case an adequate 
consideration and their lack of understanding of the larger regulatory scheme1119. This 
renders regulatory policy, according to Pierce (1996), via “judicial opinions [that] are 
massively inconsistent and incoherent.”1120 The lack of prosecutorial discretion, argue others, 
lead to overzealous enforcement, excessive litigation and loss of necessary flexibility of the 
law enforcement policy1121. 
 
On macro-level, some researches view qui tam enforcement as a threat to public control over 
the elaboration of legal mandates, which brings the risk that private enforcers vested with a 
qui tam private right of action will drive the elaboration of legal mandates in democratically 
unaccountable directions1122. More specifically, they are concerned that entrepreneurial qui 
tam enforcers will relentlessly press law’s boundaries, exploiting regulatory ambiguities in 
                                                          
1117 Bawn (1995), supra, p.62 
1118 Burbank, S.B., Farhang, S. and Kritzer, H.M., Private Enforcement, 17 Lewis & Clark Law Review 637 (2013), 
p.667 
1119 Grundfest (1994), supra, pp. 969-971 
1120 Pierce (1996), supra, pp. 8-9 
1121 Harkins, M.J., The Ubiquitous False Claims Act: The Incongruous Relationship Between a Civil War Era Fraud 
Statute and the Modern Administrative State, 1 Saint Louis University Journal of Health Law & Policy 131-174 
(2007-2008); Beck (2000), supra note 4 at 5; Stephenson (2005), supra note 949 at 215 
1122 Shavell, S., The Fundamental Divergence Between the Private and the Social Motive to Use the Legal System, 
26 The Journal of Legal Studies (1997) 575 
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industry-wide lawsuits, rather than targeting patently illegal wrongdoing that public-minded 
prosecutors would reject1123. And because judiciary, agencies, and even the legislature itself, 
due the limited will and capacity of courts, can only imperfectly police these efforts, qui tam 
regimes may, relative to cash-for-information regimes, exhibit substantial statutory “drift” 
away from legislative purposes over time.  
A growing number of litigation outcomes this theory assumes, can reshape the interest-group 
environment by giving early litigation losers powerful incentives to work politically to ensure 
that their competitors are subject to the same liability1124. The result is what political scientists 
and economists would call an increasing returns process in which early litigation outcomes, 
by incrementally remaking the political landscape, can push legal mandates along 
evolutionary paths that are different from those the law would follow in the absence of a 
private enforcement role. The presence of a qui tam mechanism can thus drive the law down 
pathways it would not travel when enforcement was left in purely public hands. 
In its core, this advocacy of prosecutorial discretion and the strict view of power delegation 
is based on the belief, that the end and purpose of most of the actions of politicians and 
legislators in making choices for society is the greater good of society or the "public interest” 
– in other words, that the government “is run for the benefit of all the people”1125.  From the 
broader methodological perspective, this belief forms the view -- implicit in neoclassical 
                                                          
1123 See Engstrom, D.F., Private Enforcement’s Pathways: Lessons from Qui Tam Litigation, 115 Columbia Law 
Review (2014) 
 
1124 As Engstrom speculates, had Walmart, contrary to reality, suffered a large judgment in Walmart v. Dukes, 
131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011), the company would have faced powerful incentives to make sure that its big-box-store 
competitors were similarly subject to large-scale class actions asserting discrimination via excessive managerial 
discretion. Walmart, 131 S. Ct. 2541. See, Engstrom, D.F., Whither Whistleblowing? Bounty Regimes, Regulatory 
Context, and the Challenge of Optimal Design, 15 Theoretical Inquiries in Law (2014), p. 619 
1125 Farber, D.  and Frickey, P., The Independence of Public Choice, 65 Texas Law Review 873-927 (1987), p. 873 
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model underlying the mainstream law and economics -- that the government’s role is to 
correct market failure.1126 
Its roots stretch to the Progressive Era, which gave rise to the theory of “public interest” 
postulating that the problems of '”market failures” to be dealt through regulation, adopted 
by the government. Regulation operated to cure market failures by substituting the expert 
planning decisions of an administrative agency for the defective allocations of the failed 
market. Up to the 1950s it was thought that regulators “generally did a creditable, if flawed 
job”1127. However, from the mid-1950s through the 1960's and 1970's, as scholars examined 
the record of regulated industries, they found that regulation did not work perfectly well. It 
was not only the imperfectness in the sense of what had been viewed by Ronald Coase as 
second tier externalities borne to life by the regulation aimed at curing the externalities 
produced by an unregulated market1128. It was the protection of entrenched interests, 
corporate or geographic, from any change at all costs, and the vested interests that hid behind 
regulatory rulings that shook the established view. The evolution of the regulatory process 
turned out to be in the direction to what was passionately opposed by the leading figures of 
the progressive movement on the cusp of the XIX-XX centuries1129. 
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In the face of the discoveries tarnishing reputation of bureaucracy, the public interest theory 
did not survive as a consensus view on the power delegation effectiveness. The scholarly view 
of the regulatory process changed from one of control of private behaviour for the public 
benefit to one of use of governmental powers for private or sectional gain1130. The public 
interest theory ceded ground to the synthesis of the theories of political and economic 
decision-making, or public choice theory1131. 
The proponents of public choice theory offer different perspective within law and 
economics1132. They question the underlying assumption that actors presumed selfish in 
private dealings would behave selflessly upon assuming public office. Public choice proposes 
a private view of politics, a world in which actors in political roles act to maximise something 
of direct interest to them, but defined in ways particular to their roles: politicians are assumed 
to maximise their chances of re-election; bureaucrats -- the size and mandate of their bureau; 
voters -- the benefits they draw from government programmes; interest groups -- the 
programmes conferring benefits upon their members1133.  
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The regulatory capture or administrative drift is a key logical component of the theory. 
Though the regulatory capture as a term can be directly attributable to Marver Bernstein1134, 
the naissance of the theory could be traced further back to Toulmin Smith, who in his 1849 
work1135 wrote a scholarly denunciation of Crown Commissions, a trend prevalent in the XIX 
century United Kingdom, and many other practices of government that he saw as designed 
not for the public good or interest, but for vested interests. He characterised the Crown 
Commissions as playing no other role, but an avenue for the executive to achieve purposes 
and interests personal to them and their friends1136. 
 
The structure of the UK and US governments, and the way they function have significantly 
changed since the time of Toulmin Smith, but the notable body of evidence have been 
collected by the scholars showing the trend that the government agencies are tend to develop 
a narrow view of the public interest1137. From the point of view of the effective enforcement 
regime, the distinct set of concerns about misaligned agency incentives cannot be ignored. 
The main concern is that agencies will be excessively reluctant to authorise private 
enforcement, because agencies are either “captured” or otherwise unduly influenced by the 
industries they are supposed to regulate1138, or perhaps simply because each agency jealously 
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guards its enforcement prerogatives and dislikes the idea of anyone else, including private 
plaintiffs, intruding on its turf1139. Some scholars contend that deputising qui tam relators to 
police fraud on the government is the only way to combat “cosy relationships” between 
government agencies and industry1140. It is the qui tam enforcement regime, which offers 
adequate incentives for enforcement, has the potential to produce durable and consistent 
enforcement pressure, and avoid influences that may lead an agency to stray from legislators’ 
enforcement preferences. 
 
In contrast, regulators may choose to under-enforce for a number of reasons. Given that 
intense preferences for under enforcement exist in the regulated entities, while preferences 
for enforcement are far more diffuse, the regulated entities have incentives and opportunities 
to use lobbying, campaign contributions, and other means to seek to influence or capture an 
agency so as to discourage enforcement1141. 
 
Regulators themselves may have preferences for under enforcement for many reasons, 
including ideological preferences, career goals, to protect or enhance budget allocations, to 
avoid political controversy, or even simple laziness1142. Finally, administrators may face 
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pressure to under enforce from executives or legislatures who may be motivated by 
ideological preferences, electoral imperatives in general, or the desire to protect specific 
constituents in particular1143. 
 
To be sure, weakness in terms of empirical evidence of administrative capture as a broad 
phenomenon has long been a subject of academic criticism. Already in 1974 Posner observed 
that “empirical research [on capture] has not been systematic.”1144 As late as 2006, Dal Bo  ́
pointed out that “empirical evidence on the causes and consequences of regulatory capture 
is scarce.”1145 However, a more detailed picture of the phenomenon is beginning to emerge, 
and the latest empirical work is revealing a portrait far more nuanced than the stark black 
and white sketches of Toulmin Smith, and even more convincing1146. Capture is neither 
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absolute nor one-dimensional. In some cases, influence over regulators may still be explicitly 
purchased, but such illegal activity is likely more the exception than the rule in the United 
States1147. Implicit quid pro quo is almost certainly more typical, and “industry may find even 
implicit deals unnecessary when broader influence can be exercised, indirectly, through 
cultural capture”1148. 
The above said suggests that executive agencies cannot be unequivocally trusted with 
enforcement. Thus, Upshaw Downs and Swienton (2012)1149 showed the limitations on the 
effectiveness of using qui tam mechanism become unavoidable, when the government itself 
has acquiesced to the company’s wrongdoing. Often when a favoured contractor finds itself 
in trouble over procurement, the government agency is more interested in hiding the 
problem than solving it. Scandals in government contractor programmes can create problems 
for the government’s programme managers. Therefore, if there is any credible discretion, a 
government agent may hand out waivers or some other form of approval of a company’s 
misconduct, even though it formally violates the agency’s regulations. Even passive 
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government compliance that winked at fraud can trigger the legal doctrine of “acquiescence”, 
a common defence that there can’t be fraud if the victim does not care1150. The Department 
of Justice, moreover, rarely tries to prosecute a government agent for giving waivers, and 
often uses waivers as an excuse not to prosecute the companies. The normal practice is that 
if a federal government agency opposes a False Claims suit, the Department of Justice will not 
pursue it. As a practical matter, the Department cannot succeed without the regulatory 
agency’s expertise and supportive testimony. 
The political interference from a higher level, which some scholars view as at least a partial 
solution1151, cannot bring the effective resolution. The influence sought to overcome 
administrative capture comes from politically elected officials above the agency. But in turn, 
those officials may be captured by special-interest groups, or act from their own electoral 
perspective. The solutions to the capture problem may be at odds with each other: political 
oversight might curb regulatory capture at the agency level, but increase potentially 
problematic political influence. In that sense, as some researches point out, the political 
oversight just moves the capture problem up one step in the command chain1152. 
A problem of regulatory capture, and inability of political influence to mitigate it undermines 
trust that the individuals within executive branch agencies and departments can be trusted 
with acting on information that their long-time business partners are defrauding the 
government. More studies point out to the growing evidence that no executive agency can 
be designed to significantly reduce regulatory capture1153. This assumption has stronger 
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empirical and theoretical support. While, for example, the SEC’s organisation as an 
independent agency may be explained as an attempt to reduce almost inescapable political 
influence1154, one may identify a regulatory-capture problem that arises from the cosiness 
that exists between the SEC and the finance industry1155. 
Various mechanisms and structures that employ internal and external checks on a given 
agent’s bad incentives have been suggested, including dual agencies, independent monitors, 
court oversight, congressional oversight, and overlapping state power1156. To no avail, even 
oversight by a central agency like Department of Justice and Office of Information and 
Regulatory Affaires cannot be regarded as a potential curb to some of the agency-capture 
problems1157. 
The case in point is the travails of the now defunct Minerals Management Service (MMS) 
(formerly within an administrative structure of the Department of the Interior), a very 
influential and powerful agency that regulated federal natural resources and collected 
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royalties on oil and gas taken from Federal lands1158. The MMS was disgraced in 2008 when it 
came to light that its employees received lavish gifts from oil and natural gas companies’ 
representatives, and were engaged in improper relationships with some of them1159. After 
whistleblowers alleged that the MMS was duped out of royalties on federal oil or gas, the 
Department of Interior’s investigative report uncovered a scheme where lucrative contracts 
had been awarded improperly with major conflicts of interest. Though In several cases the 
Department of Justice declined to prosecute the offenders, eventually it failed to prevent the 
case from going forward1160. 
It might be argued that the political system finally provided the appropriate check on the two 
influential government departments’ failure to pursue claims in those cases. But replacing the 
cumbersome political mechanism with qui tam process would be a simpler solution. The 
court-centric private-plaintiff mechanism seems more effective and straightforward than 
elephantine system of checks and balances to overcome a regulatory-capture and political 
morass1161. 
On practical grounds, legislators may impose private enforcement regimes with dual purpose, 
aiming to create guards against both under enforcement as well as over enforcement by the 
bureaucracy1162. The elaborate qui tam scheme in which whistleblowers are vested with 
independent enforcement authority via a private right of action can counterbalance 
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uncertainty about agency enforcement in two ways. Most importantly, it can operate as a 
simple substitute for, or adjunct to public enforcement. Further, it can bring attention to 
violations going unaddressed by public agencies charged with enforcement responsibilities 
and thereby shame or prod them into action1163. Given the tendency of the sources of under 
enforcement identified above to vacillate over time, qui tam plaintiffs perform what Coffee 
(1983) called a “failsafe function,” by “ensuring that legal norms are not wholly dependent 
on the current attitudes of public enforcers . . . and that the legal system emits clear and 
consistent signals to those who might be tempted to offend.”1164 
 
Generally speaking, the decentralised nature of qui tam enforcement litigation, as contrasted 
with centralised bureaucracy, can also encourage policy innovation for reasons similar to 
those associated with federalist governing arrangements1165. As distinguished from the 
imposition of a policy solution at the top of a centralised and hierarchical bureaucracy, 
litigation of an issue among many parties and interests, and across a number of jurisdictions, 
can lead to experimentation with a multiple policy responses to a problem, with successful 
policy solutions gaining traction and spreading. 
 
The innovative solutions are needed, and moreover, inescapable given the specific nature of 
a white-collar crime. In the environment, where purpetrators are most likely powerful, highly 
professional, well-educated and well-paid ambitious individuals, and where the potential 
whistle-blowers are of that ilk, traditional models of crime prevention have limited effect. 
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Those who are in possession of the strong industry specific evidence will be ready to trade it 
only under specific arrangements, which when agreed will be regarded as kind of contracts 
aimed at delivering some profit. Regulatory framework has yet to adapt to this environment, 
because it seems that public sends a clear message in regard of the coprporate crime. 
Notably, qui tam is uniquely positioned to address this challenge. The next two sections 
analyse qui tam mechanism in the context of corporate world. 
 
 
Qui Tam and Information Asymmetry 
 
Over the past decades, a rich body of literature has been developing that promotes non-
traditional models of crime prevention. Recognising that crime is caused at least as much by 
opportunity as by moral failure or social dysfunction, criminologists such as Ronald Clarke and 
Marcus Felson have challenged the deeply held notion that crime reduction can only be 
achieved by solving large-scale socio-economic problems, or by altering the constitutional 
characteristics of criminals1166. The complementary frameworks of routine activity theory, 
crime pattern theory, and rational choice perspectives -- all suggest that it is a mistake to 
either focus too narrowly on the psychopathologies of individual offenders or to identify the 
underlying crime problems too broadly as ones arising out of poverty, relative deprivation, or 
other intractable social challenges1167. Instead, these ― criminologies of everyday life1168 
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define and study crime as a contextualised phenomenon, specific to the discrete, local 
circumstances in which it occurs1169.
 
The specific nature of white-collar crime is that it is committed by professionals, who can be 
exposed by the people of the same degree of knowledge, and who can produce industry 
specific evidence, which only insider can understand as such and explain its meaning to the 
relevant authorities and judge. It remains an open question, whether even by combining 
resources and insider knowledge, the government agencies, industry relators and specialised 
law firms have the necessary ability to address the problem of egregious information 
asymmetry the law enforcement has to solve when they deal with a sophisticated white-collar 
crime. 
Orsini Broderick (2007)1170 describes the challenges the public enforcers meet when they 
embark on the investigation of the fraud against the government in the health industry, and 
explains why the qui tam relators hold the key to a viable solution. This ability to enhance 
effectiveness of the enforcement in respect of the fraud related to medical assistance has 
become even more important after the US Congress adopted the Affordable Care Act in 
20101171. 
Unlike contractor fraud, which can be equally detected and deterred by suits initiated by 
either the law enforcement agency or a relator, there are a number of reasons why it may be 
                                                          
Journal of Criminology (1996) 445 
1169 Clarke and Felson, supra note  
1170 Orsini Broderick (2007), supra note 566 at 126, pp. 982-984 
1171 Ibid. 
 291 
more difficult for the Department of Justice to spot fraud related to medical assistance than 
other types of fraud. These reasons include:  
 Substantive differences between medical assistance fraud and contractor fraud 
 Issues of privacy only present in medical assistance fraud 
 The huge number of Medicaid claims 
 The substantial autonomy given to medical professionals not present in other fields. 
 
A key reason why the Department of Justice has more difficulty spotting fraud related to 
medical assistance than contractor fraud is the substantive differences between the two 
fields. Both fields require highly specialised knowledge to identify fraudulent practices. 
However, the type of expertise needed to discover the fraud is different. Identifying 
contractor fraud mostly requires legal expertise, while discovering health care fraud requires 
specific medical knowledge. The prosecutorial authorities generally possess the former, but 
rarely possess the latter. Accordingly, the Department needs the assistance of a qui tam 
plaintiff to spot health care fraud, but not contractor fraud1172. 
Contractor fraud often involves knowingly violating “arcane rules and regulations surrounding 
defense acquisition practices” that are “extremely complicated.”1173 Thus, to discover this 
type of fraud, a clear understanding of these laws is necessary. Once that knowledge is 
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obtained, spotting fraud requires no further expertise1174. The prosecutors’ offices, staffed 
with lawyers, will generally possess the necessary legal expertise. Qui tam plaintiffs, on the 
other hand, generally come from within the industry, and as contractors, only a minority of 
them has a legal background. Accordingly, the prosecutorial authorities are much more suited 
to discover contractor fraud than a qui tam plaintiff. 
 
Unlike contractor fraud, where the necessary expertise is knowledge the government law 
enforcement is likely to possess, health care fraud requires an expertise that only medical 
professionals are likely to have. Common health care fraud includes administering and billing 
for an excessive dosage of medication or an unnecessary procedure1175, charging for 
procedures and tests not performed1176, and prescribing unsolicited and unnecessary medical 
equipment to elderly patients1177. To determine whether or not any of these practices are 
fraudulent, one first has to make a medical determination, such as determining that a dose 
of medication provided was, in fact, excessive. The DoJ’s officers generally do not have the 
medical knowledge to make their knowledgeable judgments. On the other hand, qui tam 
plaintiffs who are immersed in the medical community and have some level of medical 
training will have this knowledge. Therefore, qui tam plaintiffs are more suited to identify 
health care fraud than the Department of Justice 
Another important issue unique to the health care industry is the great need for privacy 
between health care provider and patient. Privacy is “a deeply imbedded value in American 
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culture” and “is considered an essential ingredient to individual autonomy and a free 
society.”1178 The Supreme Court has long acknowledged that “[v]arious guarantees [in the 
Constitution] create zones of privacy.”1179 Health care is one area where this right has been 
deemed very significant1180. Although some scholars have argued that the community’s 
interest in projects that use medical surveillance to detect healthcare fraud should trump a 
patient’s desire for confidentiality1181, the majority view rejects this proposition. Instead, 
most scholars argue that “the Fourth Amendment ‘reasonable expectation of privacy’ 
standard is eroded if the citizen now must anticipate that medical and financial records are 
widely accessible to the public.”1182 In light of this academic debate, the Department of Justice 
is permitted to use surveillance methods in detecting medical fraud, but this power is limited 
by statute1183. Qui tam plaintiffs, on the other hand, are generally already privy to all of the 
personal information that is necessary to uncover health care fraud1184. For this reason, the 
privacy concerns implicated when the government law enforcers look for health care fraud 
are not implicated in the same way as when a qui tam plaintiff does so. As a result, qui tam 
plaintiffs have an advantage in uncovering health care fraud over the Department of Justice. 
                                                          
1178 Hatch, M., HIPPA: Commercial Interests Win Round Two, 86 Minnesota Law Review 1481 (2002) 
1179 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482–84 (1965) (noting that zones of privacy can be found in First, 
Third, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments) 
1180 Both federal and state governments have enacted legislation intended to protect the patients’ privacy in 
health care. See, Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-2 (2000) 
(addressing privacy of health care information); 42 U.S.C. § 290dd-2 (providing for confidentiality of records 
related to certain medical treatments); Md. Medical Records Confidentiality Act, Md. Code Ann. Health-Gen § 
4-302 (LexisNexis 2005) (addressing privacy of health care information) 
1181 Gostin, L. O.,  and Hodge, J. G, Jr., Personal Privacy and Common Goods: A Framework for Balancing Under 
the National Health Information Privacy Rule, 86 Minnesota Law Review 1439 (2002) 
1182 Hatch (2002), supra note 934, p. 1486 
1183 Ibid. 
1184 As previously noted, qui tam relators generally come from within the industry (supra). This implies that in 
the context of medical fraud, they will already have access to patients’ medical records 
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A third feature unique to the health care industry which makes health care more susceptible 
to claims by qui tam plaintiffs is the huge volume of Medicaid claims1185. Because of the 
enormous number of claims submitted, “the Department of Health and Human Services is 
simply unable to detect the vast amount of fraud that regularly occurs.”1186 
The number of government contracts, on the other hand, is substantially fewer.1187 
Accordingly, the DoJ needs the assistance of qui tam plaintiffs in the former case, but not in 
the latter. 
Another reason why it may be more difficult for the DoJ to spot fraud related to medical 
assistance than contractor fraud is the level of autonomy that physicians possess. “Physicians 
as a professional group enjoy a high level of autonomy in practicing medicine…”1188 As a 
result, physicians who engage in fraud are able to participate in what Katz has labeled “pure” 
white collar crime:1189 
In the purest “white-collar” crimes, white-collar social class position is used: (1) to 
diffuse criminal intent into ordinary occupational routines so that it escapes 
unambiguous expression in any specific, discrete behaviour; (2) to accomplish the 
crime without incidents or effects that furnish presumptive evidence of its occurrence 
before the criminal has been identified; and (3) to cover up the culpable knowledge of 
participants through concerted action that allows each to claim ignorance1190. 
                                                          
1185 Phillips (1993), supra note 929 at 211, pp. 272–273 
1186 Ibid. 
1187 Ibid. 
1188 Pontell et al. (1982), supra note 931 at 211, p. 117 
1189 Katz, J., Legality and Equality: Plea Bargaining in the Prosecution of White-Collar and Common Crimes, 13 
Law & Society Review 431 (1979) 
1190 Ibid., p.435 
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According to scholars who have studied this classification of crime, undertaking these 
practices makes “the search for evidence of wrongdoing both difficult and complex.”1191 As a 
result, it can be expected that the parties most likely to be able to uncover this type of fraud 
are those closest to the physician—in other words, qui tam plaintiffs. In direct contrast with 
physicians, contractors have very little autonomy. The terms of the contract under which they 
were hired vastly limit their discretion, thus alleviating any special reason to rely on qui tam 
plaintiffs. 
The world of big finance and multinational corporations presents comparable challenge to 
penetrate in search of incriminating evidence. In the gigantic financial institutions there may 
be only a few people understanding a specific financial product. In a large corporation only a 
few gifted engineers may know about sophisticated equipment that allows their company to 
profiteer by playing with environmental standards. So the question is whether qui tam 
mechanism, which includes both bounty and potential suit, offers what the insiders need to 
encourage them to come forward? 
It is where Mertonian theory of deviance that may provide a clue to the answer. It is based 
on Robert Merton’s analysis of the relationship between culture, structure and “anomie” 
(normlessness), published in 1938. Merton defines culture as an "organized set of normative 
values governing behavior which is common to members of a designated society or 
group"1192. Social structures are the "organized set of social relationships in which members 
of the society or group are variously implicated"1193. Anomie, the state of normlessness, arises 
when there is "an acute disjunction between the cultural norms and goals and the socially 
                                                          
1191 Pontell et al. (1982), supra note 931 at 211, p. 120 
1192 Merton, R. K. (1968). Social Theory and Social Structure (Enlarged ed.). Free Press, New York, p.45 
1193 Ibid. 
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structured capacities of members of the group to act in accord with them"1194. In his theory, 
Merton linked anomie with deviance and argued that the discontinuity between culture and 
structure had the dysfunctional consequence of leading to deviance within society1195. 
Merton’s theory postulates that when cultural norms and structured capacities clash one of 
the possible outcomes is what American sociologist called “innovation”, which in fact often 
takes form of crime. 
Applying this framework to the corporate world can help to understand the roots of white-
collar crime. The multinationals are stuffed with ambitious hard-working people, with mostly 
pecuniary motives, derived from the corporate culture that values financial success most. As 
it was shown above1196, they are ready to sacrifice their private lives in exchange to promise 
of high financial rewards. When such promises for some reason do not materialise, then one 
of the reaction may be “innovation” – the disgruntled employees financially rewarding 
themselves. The reasons to come forward with evidence in respect of corporate fraud in such 
an environment may be closely related to those underlying decision to commit crime. Such 
reasons may include envy, grieve, anger, revenge, or greed – calculated decision to take a 
pension pot as a lump sum. 
Qui tam is uniquely positioned to give an answer to all of the demands of potential whistle-
blowers. The reward may not be of a prime concern of them, if they are high-ranking 
employees they are more or less confident that their information is valuable. They may be 
more worried that administrative agency can be captured and will not investigate due to its 
                                                          
1194 Ibid. 
1195 Ritzer, G., (2007). Sociological Theory (7 ed.). McGraw-Hill Higher Education. pp. 251–257 
1196 See this Chapter, section “Economic Analysis of Qui Tam Relators’ Behaviour”  
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cozy relationship with the too big to fail bank or company. Alternative root to reward through 
litigation secures confidence of relators that potential administrative capture will not prevent 
them from getting rich. It is clear that qui tam suits are much more valuable in the context of 
any area with deep inside knowledge and high level of narrow specific expertise often 
acquired through many years of particular employment. The qui tam relators are uniquely 
able to provide the regulatory world with what Bucy (2002)1197 identified as “an essential 
commodity” -- inside information about wrongdoing -- that cannot be found elsewhere. 
The possibility that any collegue may come forward as an informant serves as efficient 
deterrence as only a minor part of white-collar crime is commited by lone purpertrators1198.  
It is reasonable to assume that by increasing probability of breach of trust among potential 
corporate fraudsters qui tam contributes to increase in deterrence. However, this requires a 
further research, which may receive a negative response from the corporate world. 
Addressing the problem of information asymmetry, qui tam as an enforcement regime has 
comparative informational advantages for detecting violations. Potential relators-enforcers 
— who are not directly affected by violations, but whose proximity to misdeeds gives them 
highly valuable inside information, and whose connections to the relevant industry may give 
them necessary expertise to judge violations — collectively have knowledge about violations 
that far exceeds what the administrative state could achieve through monitoring even under 
the most optimistic budget scenarios. As the massive governmental expenditures required 
detecting and investigating misconduct are no match for the millions of ‘eyes on the ground’ 
that bear knowledgeable witness of violations. 
                                                          
1197 Bucy, P.H., Information As a Commodity in the Regulatory World, 39 Houston Law Review  905 (2002) 
1198 Bucy, op. cit. 
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So far the angle of discussion on the merits of qui tam positioned corporations either as 
potential violators, or potential victims. This view, however, may not necessarily be so 
pessimistic as some new data sheds light on potential – as well as actual -- benefits that 
whistle blowing rings to corporations. The emerging empirical evidence is analysed in the last 
section of this chapter. 
 
 
Qui Tam Enforcement and a Corporation: Empirical Evidence of Mutual Benefit 
 
 
The purpose of this part is to review available to date empirical evidence, and by identifying 
characteristics of firms subject to external financial whistleblowing allegations, to examine 
more long-term economic consequences of such allegations. These allegations labelled 
“external” because they have risen to prominence outside of the organisations; cases of 
whistleblowing that were resolved internally normally are not in a public domain. The 
allegations are “financial” because they include alleged earnings mismanagement, improper 
disclosure, insider trading, price-fixing, tax fraud, and violations of securities’ regulations. 
 
It does not merit arguing that qui tam enforcement mechanism has enormously benefited 
from the corporate sector. As long as corporations exist, and they engage as contractors with 
the US government, the concomitant attempts to defraud government agencies will appeal 
to the potential qui tam relators with hefty bounties paid for crucial evidence of their 
employers’ wrongdoings. A converse proposition that a corporate sector has benefited from 
the qui tam enforcers has yet to be corroborated in the face of a strong opposition. 
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Sceptics argue that (1) qui tam reduces prosecutorial discretion, its relators often misjudge 
the situation and indulge in trivial complaints or frivolous suits in pursue of bounties1199, thus 
destabilising the corporate sector; (2) “Machiavellian” whistle-blowers who have an axe to 
grind lodge baseless allegations, divert resources and clog judicial system1200; (3) ineffective 
workers abuse a protected “whistle-blower” status to avoid discharges or disciplinary 
proceedings1201. Those who oppose qui tam in particular, and whistleblowing advancement 
in general, argue that instead of noisy public allegations the potential whistle-blowers should 
voice their concerns through internal corporate channels, and deliver their messages to the 
management first and foremost, not to external – alien -- bodies1202.  
 
Notable anecdotal evidence suggests that whistle-blowers can make a difference, however, 
the key question from the business perspective is whether that difference epitomises the rule 
of law, triumph of justice and exposure of fraud (at a high price, though), or after incurring a 
heavy financial burden on the companies, its management and shareholders they eventually 
made a corporation stronger? 
 
The findings may shed light on the role of employee whistle-blowers through the economics’ 
framework. From a strategy perspective three sets of questions need close examination: 
 
 What is the immediate stock market reaction to an external financial whistleblowing 
announcement? Do these stock price reactions vary with the nature of the allegation? 
 
                                                          
1199 Supra, Chapter II 
1200 Gobert, J., and Punch, M., Whistleblowers, the Public Interest, and the Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998. 63 
The Modern Law Review 25 54 (2000) 
1201 Schmidt, M. 2003. Whistle Blowing Regulation and Accounting Standards Enforcement in Germany and 
Europe — An Economic Perspective. Berlin, Germany: Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin 
Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, Department of Business and Economics 
1202 Miceli, M. P., and Near, J. P., Characteristics of Organizational Climate and Perceived Wrongdoing Associated 
with Whistleblowing Decisions. 38 Personnel Psychology 525–544 (1985) 
 300 
 What are the subsequent economic consequences for firms subject to external 
financial whistle-blowing events? Do these firms experience more earnings 
restatements, more shareholder lawsuits, and poorer future operating and stock 
return performance? 
 
 Do firms respond to whistleblowing allegations by improving their governance 
structure? 
 
The analysis follows methodology developed by Bowen et al. (2010)1203, and data from the 
U.S. government’s Occupational Safety and Health Administration office (OSHA), the agency 
responsible for handling complaints of discrimination from whistle-blowers. Bowen 
suggested 81 employee whistleblowing allegations related to financial misconduct between 
1989 and 2004 reported in the financial press, plus 137 instances of employee whistle-
blowing between 2002 and 2004 obtained from records of OSHA. The companies in the 
sample were not those who exclusively had been subjects of qui tam filings. Due to qui tam 
enforcement applicability only to the areas where fraud took place against the government, 
the exclusively qui tam sample of companies would be less representative focusing 
predominantly on two sectors – healthcare and defence1204. To avoid overly sector specific 
scope of analysis the sample was diluted with other whistleblowing cases to broaden its 
economic base. 
 
Bowen et al. argue that whistleblowing allegations are a function of management’s 
opportunity and incentives to engage in financial wrongdoing, which are related to the 
specific characteristics of the companies1205. The companies in the sample shared the 
                                                          
1203 Bowen, R.M., Call, A.C. and  Rajgopal, Sh., Whistle-Blowing: Target Firm Characteristics and Economic 
Consequences, 85 The Accounting Review American Accounting Association 4 1239–1271 (2010) 
1204 Ibid., p.1246 
1205 Ibid. 
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following characteristics: firms were large, growing, successful in their prior stock return 
performance, and highly regarded; they were under pressure from capital markets to 
continue showing good financial results, experienced downsizing, and did not score high in 
terms of corporate governance and external monitoring; not surprisingly, when the potential 
benefits to the whistle-blower increased (through qui tam model), the companies were more 
likely to face public allegations of wrongdoing1206. 
 
The companies with a propensity to mutiny by the bounties 
Companies, which are subject to capital market pressure, are more likely to suffer from the 
management abusing their office. In recent years, firms have faced heightened capital market 
pressure to deliver sustained earnings growth. Such pressures have likely created incentives 
for some managers to aggressively boost earnings, either via earnings management or via 
other questionable practices such as overbilling customers or improper disclosure of material 
financial events. As a result, those firms, which have been subject to capital market pressure, 
are more likely to experience a whistleblowing event. 
 
Firms that are rapidly growing are more likely to outgrow their controls. Responsibility for 
overall decision-making is typically spread across many individuals, and as a firm grows and 
responsibility is spread over more individuals, each individual has less information and 
authority to stop wrongdoing. 
 
Firms with strong past stock market performance are more likely to be a target of 
whistleblowing. Their employees might be more likely to expose financial misdeeds perceived 
to enable the firm to artificially achieve strong performance. 
                                                          
1206 Ibid. 
 302 
 
A highly regarded firm with solid reputation is more likely to attract the ire of a disgruntled 
employee and the resulting allegation is more likely to be newsworthy. The external whistle-
blower or the media outlet is likely to get more attention from exposing wrongdoing at a 
highly regarded company. 
 
The employee’s motivation to resort to external whistleblowing is higher when channels for 
raising concerns within the company are unclear. This situation likely occurs in at least two 
cases. First, Rothschild and Miethe (1999)1207 suggest that bureaucratic and undemocratic 
work environments are likely to experience higher levels of external whistleblowing because 
of significant barriers to effective internal whistleblowing. Second, King (1999)1208 argues that 
geographical distance and multiple industrial segments in a firm make communication 
channels less clear. 
 
Luthans and Sommer (1999)1209 find that following employee downsizing, employees 
experience a decline in both loyalty and commitment to the firm. Consequently, the 
employees (especially former employees, who have been let go) are more likely to make 
public allegations following layoffs. Further, layoffs can increase the level of animosity 
between the firm and existing employees, and if existing employees perceive their job as 
being less secure, the potential cost of blowing the whistle decreases. 
 
                                                          
1207 Rothschild, J., and Miethe, T. D., Whistle-blower Disclosures and Management Retaliation: The Battle to 
Control Information About Organization Corruption. 26 Work and Occupations 1 107–128 (1999) 
1208 King, G. The implications of an organization’s structure on whistleblowing. 20 Journal of Business Ethics 4 
315–326 (1999) 
1209 Luthans, B. C., and Sommer, S.M.,  The impact of downsizing on workplace attitudes. 24 Group & 
Organization Management 1 46–70 (1999) 
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Employees of large firms are likely to be more confident that their allegations will have an 
audience, and therefore it is assumed that employees of large firms will be more likely to 
make allegations of financial wrongdoing. 
 
Internal controls weaknesses, which are defined as “a significant likelihood that a material 
misstatement of the annual or interim financial statements will not be prevented or 
detected”1210, lead to the increased probability of internal conflict. The employees are more 
likely to resort to external whistleblowing when the firm has poor internal controls. 
 
On the other hand, managers are more likely to engage in financial misconduct when the 
quality of external monitoring is poor. To capture such external monitoring two empirical 
proxies have been identified:  (1) the presence of block holders, and (2) public pension funds 
ownership. 
 
Managers are more likely to indulge in wrongdoing in the presence of weak corporate 
governance and strong private incentives. To capture the quality of internal governance, the 
list of seven empirical proxies was applied: 
 CEO wealth defined as the sum of the CEO’s salary, bonus, the value of stock 
ownership, and the value of all in-the-money options 
 
 The number of directors on the firm’s board of directors in the year before the whistle-
blowing event 
 
 The percentage of directors who are insiders in the year before the whistle-blowing 
event 
 
 Whether the firm’s CEO was also the chairman of the board in the year before the 
whistle-blowing event 
 
                                                          
1210 Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB).  An Audit of Internal Control over Financial Reporting 
Performed in Conjunction with an Audit of Financial Statements. Auditing Standard No. 2. Washington, D.C.: 
PCAOB (2004) 
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 The percentage of directors who were serving on at least three other corporate boards 
in the year before the whistle-blowing event 
 
 The percentage of board members who attended at least 75 per cent of the board 
committee meetings in the year before the whistle-blowing event 
 
 If the firm has a new CEO in the year before the whistle-blowing event. 
 
When the company is a qui tam specific the entrepreneurial employees have the opportunity 
to benefit financially as potential whistle-blowers by uncovering corporate misdeeds. The 
majority of qui tam cases fall into one of two industries: healthcare and defence contracting. 
Over 70 per cent of the funds recovered as part of the qui tam provisions relate to matters in 
which the Department of Health and Human Services is the primary agency, while over 15 per 
cent of the recovered funds pertain to matters in which the Department of Defence is the 
primary agency1211. The qui tam provisions provide employees in the healthcare and defence 
industries with increased incentives to become relators. 
 
The scale and scope of corporate fraud 
 
Any research into the short-term and long-term consequences of employee driven exposure 
of corporate misdeeds would be one-sided without at least brief overview of the quantitative 
and qualitative characteristics of the contemporary corporate fraud. The most recent 
discharge of the academic knights who have been researching corporate fraud for over 
decade brings their focus on the pervasiveness of the companies’ wrongdoings1212. Using the 
dataset of frauds from their previous research1213, Dyck, Morse and Zingales developed a 
comprehensive sample of frauds from Security Class Action cases. The frauds include those 
                                                          
1211 Taxpayers Against Fraud (TAF). 2015. The False Claims Act Legal Center. [online] Available at: 
<http://www.taf.org/> (accessed on 5 August 2015) 
1212 Dyck et al., (2013), supra note 772 at 165  
1213 Dyck et al., (2010), supra note 13 at 10 
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involving financial misrepresentations, but not limited to those. The sample relies on the fact 
that the security class action system provides strong incentives (for attorneys and 
shareholders) to file suit whenever a fraud that is likely to have a material impact is 
revealed1214. 
 
With the dataset the authors tackled the question of unobservable fraud by appealing to basic 
probability rules for guidance of going from observed data of the joint event of engaging in 
fraud and being caught, to the actual variable of interest, the probability of engaging in fraud 
regardless of whether the perpetrators are caught or not1215. The identification strategy 
employed exploits circumstances in which the likelihood of being caught increases 
significantly. By comparing the differences in detection in this special circumstance, and in 
normal circumstances, the authors produced an estimate of the iceberg (i.e. the normal 
detection likelihood), and then go a next step to estimate the unconditional pervasiveness of 
engaging in fraud1216. 
 
The authors take advantage of the natural experiment created by the demise of Arthur 
Andersen that forced all firms that previously had Andersen as their auditor to seek another 
auditor1217. The scandal enhanced the incentives of new auditors to be active. As a result, 
Dyck et al. have found that the incidence of fraud detection by auditors goes up by a multiple 
of close to four1218. This gives a sense of how much undetected fraud exists more generally, 
with the iceberg being 3 times bigger under the water than above the water. Thus the authors 
                                                          
1214 Dyck et al., (2013), supra note 772 at 165, p. 3. For large companies, it is highly unlikely that detected 
frauds exist without a corresponding class action suit 
1215 Ibid., pp.5-7 
1216 Ibid., pp.8-10 
1217 Ibid., pp.10-11 
1218 Ibid., p.12 
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arrive at their best estimate that 14.5 per cent of large publicly traded corporations engage 
in fraud1219, with a very conservative lower bound estimate close to 5.6 per cent1220. 
 
The next step of the research was to estimate the social costs of fraud. Dyck et al. construct 
a new measure of the cost of fraud, which they define to be equal to the difference between 
the enterprise value after the fraud is revealed and what the enterprise value of the company 
would have been in the absence of fraud1221. Using this approach, the authors estimate that 
the median loss of the enterprise value of the fraudulent companies (the firms’ enterprise 
value prior to the beginning of fraud was set as the benchmark) comes up at 20.4 per cent 
1222. Putting the estimate of the extent of fraud with the estimate of the cost per firm of fraud, 
the research produces an estimate of the social cost of fraud for these firms as a percentage 
of their enterprise value. The final price tag turns out to be an astonishing 3 per cent of the 
enterprise value of all large corporations1223. 
 
In their next attempt to identify the most effective mechanisms for detecting corporate fraud 
Dyck, Morse and Zingales conducted the most profound and complex study to date of all 
reported fraud cases in large American companies between 1996 and 20061224. The time 
frame of the study partially overlaps with that of the analysis carried out in this Chapter1225. 
The key question they had asked themselves later made the title of their research paper -- 
“Who blows the whistle on corporate fraud?” The findings of the study were hardly surprising 
                                                          
1219 Ibid., p.13 
1220 Ibid., p.15 
1221 The hypothetical value is constructed by making projections from the pre-fraud period, with assumption 
the trajectory would have followed that of other firms in the same industry (Ibid., p. 25 ) 
1222 Ibid., p.26 
1223 Dyck et al., (2013), supra note 772 at 165, p.29 
1224 Ibid. 
1225 1989-2004 (Bowen et al. (2010), supra note 1035 at 241) 
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to those who followed the media reports on the scandals and litigations related to the fall of 
the structured finance. 
 
As it was mentioned above, the classification of whistle-blowers developed by the authors 
was not in complete match with the way the Sarbanes-Oxley, False Claims Act and Financial 
Reform Act define them. But the broader approach pursued by the North American academics 
highlighted the problem with traditional reliance of US regulators rather on the web of 
institutional whistle-blowers than on individual guerrilla fighters. The study has found that 
fraud detection does not rely on obvious actors (investors, SEC, auditors), but takes a village 
of several non-traditional players (employees and media) with surprisingly effective role of 
industry regulators1226. 
 
The analysis of whistle-blowers’ incentives suggests that positive reputational and career 
incentives tend to be weak, except for journalists. For this category, however, the incentives 
exist only for very large frauds in famous companies. On the contrary, monetary incentives 
seem to work well, without the negative side effects often attributed to them. Moreover, as 
the study shows, monetary incentives for fraud revelation play a role regardless of the 
severity of the fraud. In particular, in healthcare (an industry where the government employs 
a bounty system for whistle-blowers through qui tam provisions) 41 per cent of frauds are 
brought to light by employees. This contrasts with only 14 per cent of cases detected by 
employees in all other industries1227. Hence, the study provides empirical evidence that a 
strong monetary incentive to blow the whistle does motivate people with information to 
come forward. 
 
                                                          
1226 Dyck et al., (2013), supra note 772 at 165, Ibid. 
1227 Ibid., p.4 
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The data provided by the study allows testing the still dominant views on who should detect 
financial fraud. While, the legal view1228 claims fraud detection belongs to auditors and 
securities regulators, the private litigation view1229 attributes it to law firms. And the finance 
view1230 argues that monitoring should be done by those with residual claims (equity and debt 
holders) or their agents (analysts and auditors). 
 
The study provides support neither for the legal view, since the SEC accounts for only 7 per 
cent of the cases and auditors -- for 10 per cent, nor for the private litigation view (3 per cent 
of the cases). The finance view also finds a weak support: debt holders were rare; equity 
holders play only a trivial role, having detected just 3 per cent of the cases. Equity holders’ 
agents (auditors and analysts) collectively account for 24 per cent of the cases analysed. But 
the actors with no residual claims in the firms involved and therefore are traditionally 
considered as much less important players in the corporate governance arena, turned out to 
play a key role in fraud detection: employees (17 per cent of the cases), non-financial-market 
regulators (13 per cent), and the media (24 per cent)1231. 
 
Immediate stock market reactions to whistleblowing announcements 
 
                                                          
1228 Black, B. The Legal and Institutional Preconditions for Strong Securities Markets, 48 (1) UCLA Law Review 
781-855 (2001) 
1229 Coffee (1996), supra note 466 at 108 
1230 Fama, E. F. and Jensen, M. C., Separation of Ownership and Control. Jensen, M. Foundations of 
Organizational Strategy, Harvard University Press, 1998, and 26 Journal of Law and Economics, (June 1983), 
[online]. Available at SSRN:  <http://ssrn.com/abstract=94034 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.94034 > 
(accessed on 8 June 2013) 
 
1231 Dyck et al. (2013), supra note 772 at 165, p. 5 
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The analysis rendered in this Chapter1232 continues where the study of Dyck et al. stops – the 
financial consequences the corporations have to endure following denouncement by whistle-
blowers. 
 
The data available presents evidence on the stock market reaction to whistleblowing events 
measured around five days, from the day before the announcement to three days after (day 
-1 through day +3). The mean five-day abnormal market-adjusted stock market reaction was 
-2.84 per cent1233. The median abnormal reactions, while smaller in magnitude, were also 
significantly negative. Given that the median market capitalisation of a firm from the sample 
was $7.3 billion1234, market reactions following whistleblowing allegations resulted in 
significant losses in shareholder value. The frequency of negative reactions was also high, at 
67.9 per cent of the sample1235. 
 
This significant volatility suggests that, on average, announcements of whistleblowing 
allegations were economically important for the targeted firm and were not immediately 
seen as frivolous by stock market participants. It is worth noting that the time frame of the 
analysis is confined to the era before the advent of high frequency trading with subsequent 
rise in general volatility of the stocks. 
 
Remarkably the stock market viewed whistleblowing allegations relatively negatively for firms 
with alleged earnings management. Specifically, indicating that allegations related to earnings 
management resulted in an average incremental  (overall) -14.3 per cent (-7.3 per cent) return 
                                                          
1232 Bowen et al. (2010), supra note 1035 at 241 
1233 Ibid., p.1253 
1234 Ibid. 
1235 Ibid. 
 310 
over the five-day window1236. Allegations of overbilling indicate an average incremental  
(overall) -7.4 per cent (-0.4 per cent) five-day return1237. Hence, it appears that, on average, 
whistleblowing events were far from trivial for targeted firms, particularly for firms accused 
of managing earnings. 
 
Long-term consequences of whistleblowing events 
 
Long-term consequences for the purposes of this analysis are understood as: (a) earnings 
restatements, (b) shareholder lawsuits, (c) future operating performance, and (d) future stock 
market performance. If a whistleblowing event reveals financial reporting or agency problems 
in the firm, then one would expect firms subject to such allegations to be more likely to file 
future earnings restatements, to be the target of shareholder lawsuits, and to suffer weak 
future operating and stock return performance. 
 
It should be recognised that the issue of endogeneity in evaluating the consequences of 
whistleblowing events must be addressed. While assessing future economic consequences 
such as operating or stock return performance, it is possible that whistleblowing allegations 
arise from many of the same economic forces that contribute to subsequent problems after 
a whistleblowing allegation. Hence, it would be inappropriate to treat the whistleblowing 
event as exogenous. 
 
Control for the potential endogeneity between whistleblowing allegations and future 
economic consequences should be carried out by comparing whistleblowing targets to a 
sample of control firms matched on the propensity to experience a whistleblowing event 
                                                          
1236 Bowen et al. (2010), supra note 1035 at 241, p.1252 
1237 Ibid., p.1254 
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(Armstrong et al. 20091238; Francis and Lennox 20081239). As Bowen et al. point out, the 
primary benefit of using a control sample matched on propensity scores is that it allows to 
compare whistleblowing firms to a set of firms that are the same on all observable 
dimensions, thus allowing to more clearly attribute any observed consequence to the 
whistleblowing event itself, rather than to the firm characteristics associated with 
whistleblowing allegations1240. From a practical standpoint, this matched sample also allows 
to compare whistleblowing firms to control firms along a variety of dimensions (restatements, 
lawsuits, operating performance, stock return performance) without the need for additional 
control variables1241. In essence, this propensity-score matching procedure directly controls 
for any relevant difference between whistleblowing and control firms1242. 
 
Subsequent earnings restatements 
To assess subsequent consequences (in this and the following lawsuit-based tests), it is 
necessary to rely on the restatement and lawsuit samples with one major exception: 
whistleblowing firms that experienced a restatement or lawsuit are not eliminated, as the 
purpose of the analysis is to document the existence of such a link should it exist. 
 
The results indicate that whistleblowing firms in the sample experienced significantly more 
subsequent restatements (p=0.013) in the three years following a whistleblowing action (17.9 
per cent) than propensity-score matched control firms (7.5 per cent)1243. Whistleblowing 
                                                          
1238 Armstrong, C., A. D. Jagolinzer, and D. F. Larcker. Chief Executive Officer Equity Incentives and Accounting 
Irregularities. 48 Journal of Accounting Research 2 225–271 (2009) 
1239 Francis, J. R., and C. S. Lennox. Selection Models in Accounting Research. Working paper, 2008. University of 
Missouri and The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology 
1240 Bowen et al. (2010), supra note 1035 at 241, p. 1255 
1241 Ibid., p.1250 
1242 Ibid. 
1243 Bowen et al. (2010), supra note 1035 at 241, p. 1256 
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firms from OSHA list also experienced more restatements (13.7 per cent)1244 than propensity-
score matched control firms (9.5 per cent)1245, but the difference is not significant at 
conventional levels (p= 0.141). However, the subset of future restatements that represent 
accounting irregularities, as defined by Hennes et al. (2008)1246, shows that OSHA firms were 
more likely to experience an accounting irregularity than their matched counterparts (p= 
0.053)1247. 
 
In sum, firms exposed to whistleblowing events reported in the press were more likely to 
experience a subsequent restatement than were matched control firms with similar 
underlying characteristics1248. 
 
Subsequent shareholder lawsuits 
The sample analysed for this test includes 67 firms and their 134 propensity-score matched 
control firms, and 95 OSHA firms along with their 190 matched control firms. The results 
indicate that whistleblowing firms in the sample experienced significantly more subsequent 
lawsuits (p= 0.004) following a whistleblowing action (26.9 per cent) than propensity-score 
matched control firms (11.9 per cent)1249. The whistleblowing firms in the OSHA list also 
experienced more lawsuits (11.6 per cent) than propensity-score matched control firms (8.4 
per cent), but the difference is not significant at conventional levels (p =0.196)1250.  
 
                                                          
1244 Ibid. 
1245 Ibid. 
1246 Hennes, K. M., Leone, A. J. and Miller, B. P. The Importance of Distinguishing Errors from Irregularities 
in Restatement Research: The Case of Restatements and CEO/CFO Turnover. 83 The Accounting Review 6 1487–
1519 (2008) 
1247 Bowen et al. (2010), supra, Ibid. 
1248 Bowen et al. (2010), supra note 1035 at 241, p.1256 
1249 Ibid. 
1250 Ibid. 
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In summary, the evidence suggests that a whistleblowing event reported in the press can be 
an early warning indicator of future earnings restatements or shareholder lawsuits, and that 
whistle-blowing allegations are not trivial and/or baseless, on average. 
 
Whistleblowing events and relatively poor future operating performance 
The question is whether whistle-blowing allegations serve as an early warning of negative 
future operating or stock price performance. The link between a whistleblowing event and 
negative future performance can be motivated in at least in three ways. First, given the earlier 
evidence that whistleblowing can be a significant indicator of subsequent earnings 
restatements and lawsuits, it is perhaps natural to expect negative future performance 
subsequent to a whistleblowing exposure. Second, managers may engage in defensive actions 
to mitigate negative publicity and other consequences of a whistle-blowing scandal. Such 
defensive efforts can distract managers from normal profit-seeking activities and divert funds 
away from the strategic investments. Third, a whistleblowing event can hurt the firm’s image 
with its stakeholders, resulting in a loss of confidence in management, increasing probability 
of management turnover, and increase the perception that additional problems are lurking. 
 
Whistleblowing events and relatively poor future stock price performance 
The analysis of data on future stock return performance of firms subject to whistleblowing 
allegations considers monthly returns over three years following the month in which the 
whistleblowing allegation becomes public. Thus, this event window does not overlap with the 
immediate consequences tests presented above1251. The data reveals that firms reported 
lower abnormal returns over the one, two, and three years following the exposure. Firms 
                                                          
1251 See pp. 250-251 
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from the OSHA list also reported lower returns over the subsequent two to three years1252. 
Firms exhibited lower returns in year +1 and year +2, while OSHA firms exhibited lower 
returns in year +2 and year +31253. In general, the firms targeted by whistle-blowers suffered 
lower returns in subsequent years, which in turn suggests that whistleblowing allegations on 
average were not frivolous and without merit. 
 
Corporate governance improvement following a whistleblowing revelation 
 
It is not clear whether firms will take meaningful actions to improve corporate governance 
following a whistleblowing event. For example, a targeted firm can easily initiate cosmetic 
changes such as replacing one set of inside directors with another set of insiders. 
 
The corporate governance data available from 10-Ks and proxy statements sheds some light 
on the changes, which followed whistle-blower exposure. For the purposes of this analysis six 
aspects of governance, details of which have been discussed above, stay in the focus of 
consideration. The three-year changes in these six governance variables were calculated from 
the year before the whistleblowing event (year -1) to two years after the event occurred (year 
+2). Of the 81 (137) sample (OSHA) firms, it was impossible to find 10-Ks and/or proxy 
statements for 24 (47) firms1254. 
 
Since governance improvements were encouraged in the period following the accounting 
scandals and Sarbanes-Oxley, a governance data was collected for a sample of matched firms 
that were not subject to whistleblowing allegations. The matched firms were selected with 
                                                          
1252 Bowen et al. (2010), supra note 1035 at 241, p.1256 
1253 Ibid. 
1254 Bowen et al. (2010), supra note 1035 at 241, p.1264 
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the same four-digit SIC code, within the same stock exchange, and with net sales as close as 
possible to the whistleblowing firm’s net sales for the year before the whistleblowing 
revelation. 
 
The findings have showed that, compared to the matched control sample, firms publicly 
exposed to whistleblowing allegations were more likely to reduce the size of the board, 
reduce insider participation on the board, have less busy board members, and were more 
likely to replace the CEO. 
 
There was no evidence that OSHA firms made changes in governance. Thus, on average, 
publicly exposed whistleblowing targets appeared to change governance on four dimensions 
that exceeded the level of market-wide governance improvements occurring in the post-SOX 
era, while firms targeted by whistle-blowers via OSHA (a much less public venue) did not1255. 
This suggests the visibility of the allegation played a role in firms’ responses to whistleblowing 
revelations. 
 
Whistle-blowers do make a positive contribution 
The analysis presented above is remarkable as being low in theory and high in empirical data. 
An unbiased view on its results leads to the conclusion that contrary to the anecdotal 
evidence of shrewd operators among corporate employees manipulating whistleblowing law 
to their advantage and causing nuisance to their employers, as well as greedy qui tam relators 
undermining integrity of corporate cultures, another picture comes out of the blurred 
corporate landscape. The companies suffered from whistleblowing exposures did have an 
                                                          
1255 Ibid. 
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issue – the revelations made by their employees reflected the underlying weaknesses in 
corporate governance, misdeeds by the companies’ managers, misrepresentation of facts, 
straightforward fraud or subtler creatively altered performance reporting and lop-sided 
disclosure. 
 
After whistleblowing events the companies did underperform, thus proving that their 
previous reports were cooked, and they had performance flaws to be addressed. More 
importantly, at least formally the companies involved had to focus on improving their 
corporate governance, and even changed their management. Strategically the temporary loss 
in shareholders’ value may lead to its further increase after the companies complete 
necessary reforms, thus offsetting burdensome financial losses incurred on stakeholders. 
 
Whisleblowing and costs of compliance 
There is an argument that qui tam, and broader, blowing a whistle -- are redundant. The row 
of fines and settlements involving biggest banks and corporations paying dozens of billions to 
atone for the misdeeds convincingly demonstrate that the system works perfectly without 
any private enforcement initiative.  
 
The argument in itself is not without merit. Wishing or not, however, it confuses the cause 
and sequence, leaving aside the problem of deterrence in its entirety. What is really striking 
in the latest statistical data in respect of the punitive payments incurred on the world leading 
banks is that the post crisis legal claims are rising steadily in such a pace that now must be 
considered a cost of doing business. Indeed, a peer group comprising 6 US banks1256 and 12 
                                                          
1256 Bank of America, JPMorgan Chase, Citigroup, Morgan Stanley, Wells Fargo, and Goldman Sachs 
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European banks1257 had to put aside over $260 bln for the period since 2008 as litigation costs. 
The analysis by Morgan Stanley predicts the group will incur another $60bn of litigation costs 
in the next two years 1258. The rise in litigation costs came upon the sum of fines and 
compensation in the last seven years for breaching a variety of financial regulations had 
reached a record $235 bln1259. 
 
What is taking place is the impressive unwinding the accrued distortions in industry 
regulations, engendered by the pre-crisis regulatory theories applied by the supervisors, 
intra-bank risk assessment, discredited compliance mechanisms, motivation systems, and 
theory and practice of corporate governance which failed to live up to the proclaimed 
principles. Manipulation of currency and interest rate markets, miss-selling mortgages, 
money laundering -- the fact that back-offices remarkably failed to impose effective control 
on their banks’ front-offices has brought about huge costs, and it is still counting. 
 
In present circumstances it is in the interests of the corporate sector to adopt and employ 
new models of internal control. Perhaps, tough and even cruel as a model, but qui tam 
provides corporate sector with an effective in-house system of control. The presence of a 
knowledgeable industry-wise potential relator at the next desk will have a significant effect 
on the whole complex of intra-company relations affecting the organisational culture at its 
deepest roots. One may argue, had the banks such an enforcement mechanism behind their 
backs, would they have been now paying such heavy price for mistakes of their managers? 
                                                          
1257 BNP Paribas, Credit Suisse, Deutsche Bank, UBS, HSBC, Barclays, RBS, Rabobank, Lloyds Bank, Standard 
Chartered, ING, Banco Santander 
1258 Ft.com [online] Available at: <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/c6d01d9a-47dc-11e5-af2f-
4d6e0e5eda22.html#ixzz3k1Hlb7P6> (accessed on 2 August 2015) 
1259 Reuters, 25 May 2015  
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From the point of view of economic analysis of law, banks used to respond correctly to the 
pre-crisis regulatory regime, where they got mistaken is at the assessment of its externalities. 
 
Another argument is that the qui tam model will mount additional litigation costs on top of 
the already existing heavy expenses the financial sector has to pay for compliance. Thus, Bank 
of America is spending $15bn a year on compliance, while JPMorgan is spending between 
$8bn and $9bn1260. However, it is not the costs of compliance or costs of litigation that 
presents the most devious regulatory challenge looming large over the corporate sector in 
general and banks in particular. It is the mercurial nature of the regulators that hides a 
strategic problem – its unpredictability. From an economics and law perspective, it is clear 
that the requests for a regulatory design a society sends to the legislators and the executive 
resembles tidal waves – low in times of economic boom, and high when it busts. 
 
At the moment there is a societal demand for a regulatory machismo. But soon the public 
mood may change, and the liberal light touch supervisory regime may come in vogue again. 
Having now much more close relations between banks and the administration than before 
the crisis the society as a result may end up with a whimsical over flexible regulatory regime, 
which can be even more light touch by fact, than at a time of Alan Greenspan in the Federal 
Reserve.  
 
The taxpayers – the individual and institutional alike – should be interested in some stability 
of banking supervision to avoid future (ever bigger by default) bail-outs/ bail-ins. The 
employment of qui tam as an independent enforcement mechanism for the purposes of 
deterrent in case of the probable future liberalisation of regulatory regime strategically may 
                                                          
1260 Ft.com [online], supra note 1074 at 259 
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be less costly for the society than possible (though, most likely, marginal) increase in 
corporate costs. 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
The aim of this research was to contribute to the original knowledge by providing an analysis 
of the qui tam legal concept in its historical evolution in a space of time through twenty five 
centuries, with main focus on two primary common law jurisdictions – the United Kingdom 
and USA. 
The hypothesis underlying the research is that under certain conditions pursuing goal to 
better and more efficiently exercise some of its functions the state following qualitative 
changes in a socio-economic environment may delegate part of its authority to the citizens, 
and provide them with selectively adopted set of pecuniary and non-pecuniary incentives to 
accept this authority. This hypothesis has been tried with analysis from the following 
perspectives: macro level - state regulatory practice, and socio-economic development; 
corporate level -- cost of compliance, and corporate response; basic level -- personal motives, 
and risks of actual and potential whistleblowers. 
The analysis was carried out by applying law and economics methodological framework in its 
more pluralistic version devoid from rigidity of the original law and economics perspective. 
Given context dependent nature of qui tam, and its ability to pervasively change legal 
mandates, the more flexible approach has allowed to subject the concept to a more complex 
analysis, without compromising basic assumptions of the law and economics perspective. 
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The research confirmed the foundation assumption that qui tam model of law enforcement 
despite its long historical legacy remains an effective legal mechanism, which combines 
appeal of big bounties, advantage of a dual plaintiff model with public-private cooperation in 
enforcement, and a freedom to resort to private litigation to prosecute public offences. Viable 
and flexible, qui tam can: 
1. Multiply resources devoted to prosecuting enforcement actions; 
2. Shift the costs of regulation off the governmental budgets, and onto the private 
sector; 
3. Take advantage of private (and highly proprietary) information to detect violations; 
4. Encourage legal and policy innovation;  
5. Send a clear and consistent signal that violations will be prosecuted, providing 
insurance against the risks that a system of administrative implementation will be 
subverted or captured or stumbled; 
6. Limit the need for direct and visible intervention by the bureaucracy in the economy 
and society;  
7. Facilitate participatory and democratic governance. 
 
By applying a Coasean framework to the government law enforcement and placing it within 
public-private model the research has confirmed the hypothesis that qui tam mechanism 
multiplies prosecutorial resources. It is widely observed that budgetary limitations are a core 
and recurring constraint on the administrative state’s enforcement capacity. Allowing and 
encouraging relation and private litigation can bring vastly more resources to bear on 
enforcement, potentially mobilising private actors and plaintiffs’ highly professional 
attorneys in numbers that contribute to agencies’ capacity. Moreover, qui tam enforcement 
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mechanism can actually enhance the efficient use of scarce bureaucratic resources by 
allowing administrators to focus enforcement efforts on violations that do not provide 
adequate incentives for private enforcers, while staying assured that those that do will be 
prosecuted by private litigants. 
Post-crisis scarcity of government revenues also highlights the comparative political and 
economic feasibility of enacting multi-purpose qui tam enforcement mechanism as compared 
to bureaucratic intervention. The lack of adequate tax revenues, or the political costs of 
raising it, encourages government to achieve public policy goals through private legal process 
because it shifts the costs of regulation away from the state and on to private parties. 
Scarcity of public funds places obvious limits on administrative implementation. As 
distinguished from funding an executive agency to carry out enforcement activities, qui tam 
enforcement regime is, from the government standpoint, more or less self-funding. Although 
increasing rates of litigation will lead to some increase in the costs of maintaining the judiciary 
branch, these costs to be offset by the drop in criminal. Thus, with qui tam legislators can 
provide for deterrent at lesser cost than with administrative implementation. 
As this research shows, the qui tam mechanism offers an efficient remedy to the problem of 
administrative drift or capture. The growing body of evidence show the scale of a trap modern 
state finds itself in – the ever growing size of its executive, trying hard to squeeze itself within 
the strict budgetary confines; the underpaid judiciary and administrative staff facing the rising 
fast challenge of information asymmetry limiting their ability to understand the evolution of 
the business environment and ever changing business practice; the new phenomenon of the 
so-called “fourth branch” of the government, comprising governmental agencies and ever 
present contractors, -- all this builds an environment, where a fraud against the government 
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can be exposed only when two conditions are fulfilled: first, the government has physical and 
intellectual ability to investigate, and second, the government shows its resolve to pursue the 
alleged wrongdoing. The practice of the departmental waivers presents a new reality, in 
which the advanced system of milking the federal and state budgets remains undetected due 
to its sophistication and benign attitude of the administrative supervisors. In such an 
environment the prosecutorial discretion bears a risk to evolve into tacit abetment. 
Evolving through the last 30 years qui tam has little in common with an anachronistic view of 
it as an act of individual guerrilla fighters challenging big business. In fact, today the growing 
professionalisation of qui tam enforcers has borne to life a new legal profession serving the 
numerous relators, turning the whole process into more than just rudimentary alternative 
prosecutorial model. As this research shows, when applied within a longer-term qui tam, and 
wider – whistleblowing – proves to be beneficial to the corporations, contributing to increase 
in shareholders’ value.  
The model of public-private enforcement with built-in qui tam mechanism developed for the 
purposes of this research, proved effective ancillary role of qui tam, both in terms of 
optimisation of scarce government resources, and legal innovation. As compared with 
conservative tendencies that bureaucracy fosters, relators who turn into private litigants and 
their attorneys are more likely to press for innovations in legal theories and strategies that 
could expand to be adopted by public enforcers. Freedom from bureaucratic constraint also 
allows private litigants to mobilise and reallocate their enforcement resources more flexibly 
and expeditiously than established bureaucratic mechanism. 
Qui tam is ambiguous as a form of state intervention. Therefore, it may be preferred to direct 
administrative intervention by legislators with anti-statist agenda, a significant strand of the 
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American political tradition, particularly as applied to the Federal government in the United 
States’ federalist system. Qui tam as a private enforcement regime may be embraced by such 
legislators as a way of thwarting the growth of “the State”. As compared to constructing and 
financing bureaucratic regulatory enforcement machinery and endowing it with coercive 
powers, for example, to investigate, prosecute, adjudicate, and issue orders, an enforcement 
regime that is founded instead on allowing persons to file on behalf of a state a suit in court 
may attract broader support. If there are pivotal lawmakers prepared to obstruct enactment 
of regulatory policy that entails bureaucratic state building, utilising qui tam enforcement 
mechanism may facilitate overcoming such obstructions. 
For the above-mentioned reasons qui tam presents politically more flexible concept. Its 
reputation as a powerful tool available at hand to the state prosecutors who fight fraud 
against the government attracts sympathy among defenders of a big state. 
Finally, qui tam enforcement mechanism contributes to participatory and democratic self-
government. Meaningful access to opportunities to defend interests of a state through 
independent litigation can amount to a form of active and direct citizen participation in the 
enterprise of self-government. The fact that bounty is also an important part of that 
mechanism makes it possibly less attractive for the statists who traditionally prefer altruistic 
motives of citizens’ activism. But generally speaking, any legal concept, which combines safe 
loyalty to the state interests and earning good money, will be eventually popular. 
 
The form of participation offered by qui tam may incorporate individual interests into the 
governing process that would be rendered impotent by simple majoritarianism. Although 
majoritarian institutions are often thought emblematic of democracy, such institutions do not 
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exhaust forms of democratic governance. A democracy must respect the rights of individuals 
and provide opportunities for expression and participation or establish conditions for rational 
discourse, and courts may be distinctively suited to contributing these elements to a broader 
democratic regime. 
The research shows that as a conceptual framework of economic analysis of law proves that 
the flexible qui tam public-private enforcement model can bring additional value to the 
society by serving its strategic long-term interests both in time of crisis and economic 
expansion. 
The fact that in a wake of financial crisis the government has become a more salient 
stakeholder made the picture more complicated, but also highlighted the value of an 
independent enforcement mechanism offered by qui tam. Combining an appeal of bounties 
paid for valuable information inaccessible and cognitively challenging for those who are not 
a party in the narrow circles of highly remunerated professionals, with a right to 
independently litigate on behalf of a society in the interest of public good qui tam 
enforcement may work as an inherent multi-purpose public-private enforcement model, if 
devoid of its artificially narrowed focus on fraud against the government. The potential of qui 
tam within this model is significant, and requires further analysis, both in terms of theoretical 
studies and field research. 
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